

THE MANEUVER FORCE IN BATTLE

2005-2012



MANEUVER CENTER OF EXCELLENCE
FORT BENNING, GEORGIA
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The Soldier is the Army. No army is better than its soldiers. The Soldier is also a citizen. In fact, the highest obligation and privilege of citizenship is that of bearing arms for one's country.

— General George S. Patton, Jr.

October 2015

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INTRODUCTION

“In our schools, we generally assume that the organizations are well-trained and at full strength, that subordinates are competent, that supply arrangements function, that communications work, that orders are carried out. In war, many or all of these conditions may be absent.”

— George C. Marshall

Today’s maneuver leaders face an unpredictable and complex operating environment against a spectrum of adaptable enemies, all while resources continue to diminish. The 2015 edition of *Maneuver Forces in Battle* is a unique look at maneuver leaders and their Soldiers across the Range of Military Operations as they adapted to enemies during the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan and their transitions to national sovereignty. The lessons learned over the past decade of conflict are critical for our leaders to understand and internalize as we prepare for the increasing complexity on the future battlefields. The vignettes in this manual take the reader across the Warfighting Functions and the range of military operations through the eyes and actions of our company-grade leaders who often found themselves at the decisive point of military operations.

I am proud of the Maneuver Center’s efforts in this endeavor, which captures the tactical experiences of our Maneuver Leaders since 2005. These past ten years have featured pivotal moments in our Army’s history, and the vignettes here illustrate those moments at the squad, platoon, and company levels, where war is personal and real. War by its very nature is unpredictable and chaotic. This is, in part, because war is a human endeavor, executed by humans facing an enemy who is adaptive and creative. Furthermore, this work represents the first endeavor by the students and instructors at the Maneuver Center of Excellence—not just Infantry, or Armor, or Cavalry—but combined arms effort, studying together in the same way as they fight together.

There is no guarantee that lessons extracted from these vignettes will apply to the next conflict. Few of Marshall’s lessons from 1934 would resonate with today’s maneuver leaders. However, the lessons learned by this generation of Maneuver Leaders, lessons often paid for in the blood of our Soldiers, provide an example of how our Army that adapted in conflict, adapted technologically, adapted in approach, and adapted in thinking. Sir Michael Howard wrote to a generation of officers in 1961, “It must not be forgotten that the true use of history, military or civil...is not to make men clever for the next time; it is to make them wiser forever.” As I write this, and as our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan become

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the substance of debate and study, I believe that professional military education remains a core component of our profession. An excellent way to begin the discussion is to study the combat experiences of our maneuver leaders who integrated combat arms in their conflict.

Austin S. Miller
Major General, US Army
Commander, Maneuver Center of Excellence
Fort Benning, George
October 2015

EDITOR'S NOTES

Ten years ago, I had the privilege of editing *Infantry in Battle—From Somalia to the Global War on Terror*. Throughout these ten years, many things have changed in the world and here on Fort Benning. Our Nation continued its evolving fight against terror both in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and the Maneuver Center of Excellence stood up, bringing the Infantry and the Armor schools together to train the way the two branches fight—in concert. We have continued to add to the collection of monographs, written by students—Infantry and Armor—who came here to study in the Maneuver Captains Career Course, and it is from those papers that these vignettes come. Therefore, I would first like to thank those officers who spent many hours and more than a few drafts to capture their experiences for the Maneuver Center's Donovan Research Library archives and for this work.

In many ways this book was more difficult to start. We reviewed over 500 outstanding papers and then chose those that best supported the topics the senior leaders on Fort Benning wanted us to cover. I would like to thank MAJ Isaac Howard for his hard work on this task. I would also like to thank CPT Will Garvin who wrote several discussions and ensured we selected only the best vignettes, participated in the editing process, and patiently answered all of my questions.

Once again, the talented Small Group Instructors in the Directorate of Training wrote the discussions, in particular MAJ James Trask, MAJ Mark Evans, MAJ Eric Evans, MAJ Lawrence Rubal, MAJ Courtney Dean, MAJ Andy Love, MAJ Aaron Childers, MAJ William Sitze, CPT Widmar Roman, CPT Matthew Wilkinson, CPT Brett Matzenbacher, CPT Mikel Resnick, CPT Erika Holownia, CPT James Lucas, CPT Stephen Harnsberger, CPT Robert Humphrey, CPT Daniel Huff, CPT Jonathan Erwin, CPT Kyle Trottier, CPT Thomas Flounders, CPT Daniel Wilcox, CPT Jason Walsh, CPT David Trinh, CPT Michael Skok, CPT Andrew Jenkins, CPT Timothy Blair, CPT Beau Hughes, CPT Scott Krasko, CPT Daniel Clinebelle, CPT James Vance, CPT Jamal Khan, CPT Stephen Spaulding, CPT Justin Ottenwalter, and CPT Lloyd Wohlschlegel.

This book would not have been completed without the support and feedback from COL David Snodgrass and COL Timothy Davis, Directors of DOT; LTG H.R. McMaster, who commissioned the book; and MG Austin Miller, who approved it. This was truly a “combined arms” effort.

Joanie Horton
Editor

CHAPTER 1

Mission Command

"Mission command establishes a mind-set among leaders that the best understanding comes from the bottom up, not from the top down."

— General Martin E. Dempsey
Mission Command

INTRODUCTION: The term 'Mission Command' is relatively new in our doctrinal literature, replacing the Command and Control Warfighting Function. It is worthwhile to look at the different definitions to appreciate the specificity that the term Mission Command brings to our military vocabulary. The FM 3-0, dated February 2008, defines the Command and Control warfighting function as the related tasks and systems that support commanders in exercising authority and direction." Mission Command, on the other hand, is defined in ADRP 3-0 (*Unified Land Operations*, May 2012) as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent." This change is not a matter of semantics. Because of the complexity of the modern battlefield, the requirement to fight distributed across time and space, and the speed at which we are able to operate today, leaders at the lowest levels must understand and share a common operating picture and exercise disciplined initiative to win.

On 14 August 2009, Alpha Company, 3-75 Ranger Regiment, was assigned a clearance mission in Afghanistan that would take the company through extremely difficult terrain with high mountain ridges and thick vegetation to capture or kill a senior foreign fighter and his associates.

My company was augmented with two platoons from Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Rangers, a surge company, to include its company commander; the Alpha 3-75 company commander would remain the GFC for the operation. While clearing the objective, the company (augmented) would be broken into three separate elements. One element, led by me, would clear the first portion of the assigned objective. Another element, the 2^d Platoon, Alpha, 3-75 and the GFC, would emplace on a nearby ridge. The third element, which included 3^d Platoon, Alpha, 1-75,

and its commander, would pass through my element to clear the remainder of the objective.

From my command post, I continued to monitor my element's progress and report our status to the GFC. I also watched 3^d Platoon, Alpha, 1-75, as it moved north up the ridgeline to my front. As it moved, I heard no traffic or reporting over the command frequency, which I found odd, but with everything happening simultaneously, I did not pay much attention to it. As 3^d Platoon moved further up the ridge, I could no longer see its lead element, and I noticed it had stopped moving. Despite its halted formation, I still heard no traffic over the command frequency and, again, thought it was odd.

Then, all of a sudden, a mass of gunfire erupted from 3^d Platoon, and I immediately dove behind cover and called, "Troops in contact!" over the net to the GFC. As the gunfire continued, I could tell from the rate of fire that 3^d Platoon was engaging with one of its machine gun teams. I visually picked up the red tracer rounds flying through the air from the machine gun and followed them to their point of impact to see if I could identify what they were shooting at. As soon as I saw the rounds impact, my heart stopped, and I couldn't believe what I was witnessing: 3^d Platoon was engaging the ridgeline where 2^d Platoon was. As fast as I could, I called over the 3^d Platoon assault net and repeatedly yelled, "Cease fire! Cease fire! You are engaging friendlies!" To which the 3^d Platoon Leader responded, "Negative, we were engaged by enemy on the opposite ridge, and we can see them maneuvering." I immediately responded by telling him that 2^d Platoon was on the ridge that he had just engaged. Amidst 3^d Platoon's engagement of 2^d Platoon, an enemy element tried to probe the northeastern side of 2^d Platoon's patrol base, further confusing the situation. Immediately following my transmission, 2^d Platoon's platoon sergeant came over the command net and yelled, "Cease fire! You are firing on our position!" Then the company commander with 3^d Platoon came over the command net and asked 2^d Platoon to flash a VS-17 panel to identify its position. As soon as 2^d Platoon's PSG held up his signal panel on the opposite ridgeline, the commander immediately called a positive visual of his position and confirmed that 3^d Platoon had, in fact, engaged 2^d Platoon. Following his transmission, the GFC reported over the command net that there were two casualties as a result of the friendly engagement. His RTO had a gunshot wound to the left leg, and a round had ricocheted off the

ground and struck the battalion surgeon, who was traveling with 2^d Platoon, under his right eye.

After returning from the mission, I asked 2^d Platoon's PSG what had happened at his position when they came under fire. He said he was located at the CP sitting on a rock, taking a drink of water, and talking to the GFC when the gunfire erupted and rounds began to impact all around him. He said the RTO was standing right next to him, holding the satellite antenna and monitoring communications with the JOC. As soon as the rounds began to hit, dirt and rocks flew everywhere; the PSG rolled off the rock, away from where the rounds were coming; and he tried to take cover as best he could. As soon as the firing stopped, he sprung up and began to check for casualties. By the time he reached the RTO's position, the RTO was already being treated for injuries. He said the battalion surgeon was one of the medics working on the RTO, even with the blood streaming down his face from his own injury. The battalion surgeon had to be pulled from the RTO to receive treatment himself. The 2^d Platoon's PSG also stated that when he returned to the position where he was sitting when the shooting started, he picked up the water bottle he was previously holding, and there was a bullet hole right through the middle of it. He considered everyone at his position extremely lucky, considering the minimal injuries sustained, despite the high amount of accurately placed rounds 3^d Platoon had fired.

From the personal experience monograph, written by CPT Carmen Bucci, who served as the Executive Officer for Alpha Company, 3^d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. CPT Bucci's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: There are six principles of mission command, and one of them is Create Shared Understanding (ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*). It is critical that leaders are able to not only understand the problem, but also to visualize a solution, describe it to their subordinates, and direct actions until completion. Captain Bucci's account demonstrates the challenges a leader will face as he tries to create shared understanding from the planning of an operation through mission completion. Leaders must effectively communicate their intent and direct the execution, especially when dealing with variables like rugged terrain, multiple units moving simultaneously, and attached units. Finally, as is seen in this vignette, having the commander in a position in which he could command and control the fight allows him

to recognize and mitigate the situation quickly, thus preventing further casualties.

On 14 August 2009, Alpha Company, 1-75 Ranger Regiment, part of the surge of forces to Afghanistan, was assigned a clearance mission that would take the company through extremely difficult terrain with high mountain ridges and thick vegetation to capture or kill a senior foreign fighter and his associates.

Clearance had already begun by another platoon, led by the Alpha, 3-75 XO, CPT Carmen Bucci. My platoon conducted a forward passage of lines with the clearing element, and we made our way to the other portions of the company's objective. Another platoon, along with the GFC, was providing overwatch of the clearance from a nearby ridge.

I discussed with CPT Bucci what he had cleared so far and where we were headed. He pointed out the location of his mortar team and attached gun team which was generally northeast of our location and along our clearance route. During this conversation, I confirmed with CPT Bucci that the discussed position contained solely a mortar team and a gun team and not his CP. He said that the CP was across on the opposite ridge (generally east of where we were standing). It is during this time that I should have asked for a more exact location of that element; however, at the time, the ridgeline seemed so far away that the element would not interfere with our movement to the northeast. We did not view it as a factor for our clearance of the next set of objectives.

While CPT Bucci's element was clearing the next objective, the plan was passed along via FM radio to the rest of the platoon, but the overwhelming majority of the platoon did not hear the radio transmission. My platoon then passed through the XO element's lines and began movement. We determined that the next objective was inaccessible due to its location on a cliff side, so we continued our movement generally north-northeast. This is when we received a radio transmission on the command net from CPT Bucci, stating that his interpreter had intercepted enemy transmissions. The enemy intercept was interpreted as, "They are moving towards us." At the time, CPT Bucci was the only person I could reach or hear on the command net. We assumed that this enemy call was discussing our platoon movement since we were the only element moving. Immediately following this call, I passed the information across our platoon assault net to whomever I could reach. SSG B came across the assault net

and said he observed one male using binoculars to observe our movement. SSG B's next statement was that the male began moving northeast up the opposite ridge and that he had lost visual of him. This radio call was followed by another radio call from CPT Bucci, relaying that a second enemy intercept had been made and interpreted as, "Stay low, don't move." At this point, we were within 50 to 75 meters of our next objective, and I halted the platoon.

Our element was at over 9,000 feet and climbing at least a 30 degree slope into an enemy defensive position. SSG E and I quickly discussed how we would continue to bound forward on a very steep, narrow ridge, as the rest of the platoon found cover and began scanning the surroundings. I again received a call from SSG B that our sniper observation team had seen one, possibly two, individuals observing our movement from the general vicinity seen earlier.

At this time, I heard SSG E yell at his squad to get down. I made eye to eye contact with him and he shouted, "We are getting shot at!" I then heard SSG B yell the same thing. According to both squad leaders' sworn statements, they heard at least two extremely close audible snaps of rounds bypassing our position and a third that was more distant. By this time, one machine gun team and the Sniper Observation Team had set in to react to contact, and I had made my way to them. I did not hear the rounds' "snaps," reported by my squad leaders; however, I did hear an extremely large volume of escalating gunfire just below us in the vicinity of CPT Bucci and his element. I immediately assumed, with the high volume of rounds, that they were in contact as well. The Rangers in my Sniper Observation Team then relayed that the individual they saw had a hand-held radio device, leading me to believe it was the same enemy individual who had been observing and reporting our movement. At this point, we were in contact, and I told my gun team and snipers, "If they are shooting at us, engage!" Unfortunately, at that range, approximately 546 meters to the ridge they were viewing, I could not positively identify the enemy; I had to rely on the high precision optics of my snipers who then began shooting. I immediately called CPT Bucci and relayed we were in contact. He responded that the rounds we were hearing were rounds cooking off from an enemy ammunition cache his element was burning. He then relayed that we were firing in the vicinity of GFC and his CP. I immediately called a cease fire. At this point, my snipers had fired three rounds between the two of them,

and my gunner had fired two to three bursts from his machine gun. My company commander moved from the rear of the formation and asked the snipers to confirm what they were shooting at. One sniper then identified back packs and realized that they were friendly forces. We made radio communications with the GFC and confirmed what we feared; they had two friendly wounded and had received rounds from us. Simultaneously, they had received small arms fire from the enemy to the north of their position. I believe that our gunfire may have initiated enemy returning fire from behind the GFC's and 2/A's position.

Due to the trajectory of the rounds and the impacts to the wounded, it was determined that the small arms fire which caused the injuries were from our platoon and not the enemy fire. One of the wounded received a gunshot wound to the lower leg which penetrated the calf. The other received a ricochet round which fragmented and embedded shrapnel near his eye. He almost lost his vision, but he eventually recovered. The GFC immediately went into MEDEVAC procedures. The Rangers in my platoon were devastated by the incident, but we had to put it aside and complete our mission. Once the wounded were stable and awaiting evacuation, we continued on our clearance.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Ramon Ramos, who served as the Platoon Leader of 1st Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Ranger Regiment. CPT Ramos' monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: Few narratives drive home the importance of Mission Command as well as the one describing a friendly fire incident in Afghanistan. While maneuvering multiple elements simultaneously as part of a battalion operation, the commander must have a common operating picture for all of his squads and for all adjacent units. It is critical that all information is disseminated to higher, subordinate, and adjacent units in a clear, concise, accurate, and timely manner. The failure of leaders in the adrenaline pump of the moment can lead to drastic failure to the detriment of the unit.

Bravo Company, 2-30 IN of 4-10 ID deployed to Afghanistan in October 2010, and occupied Charkh Province. In March 2011, after several weeks of failing to decisively engage local Taliban forces

interfering with stability operations, 1st Platoon set an ambush using another platoon, 3^d Platoon, to lure enemy forces into the open.

At 0100 on 24 March, 1st Platoon left COP Charkh for the ambush positions. Land navigation at night is difficult, especially when it is imperative to stay exactly on the pre-planned route. I put my best land navigator, SGT Rick Woods, as the point man, and we began our movement along Route Orange. Everything was going fine until the lead element got to Checkpoint 2. Instead of making a left and keeping the platoon out of the village, the lead element continued to go straight, leading us right into Pengram. Before we realized our mistake, it was too late; we were already in the village. Reversing an entire formation tends to be confusing and time consuming, so instead of backtracking, we just walked as quickly and quietly as possible and hoped for the best. The barking dogs worried me, but there was not much we could do about it. SGT Woods quickly got us out of the small part of the village we had entered, and we resumed our movement south into the valley.

We reached the top of the mountain by 0430, giving us adequate time to determine our positions. As planned, we had three ambush positions looking east and one security position facing northwest. The furthest south position (Position 4) had a squad leader, a 240L machine gun team, an M320 grenadier, and the ANA sniper attachment. Position 3, immediately to the north, had the same composition but without the ANA attachment. Position 2, my position, had the Barrett .50-Cal Sniper; a 240L machine gun team; and my FO, PFC Cody McBride. The Platoon Sergeant was in charge of Position 1 to the north, with a medic, the weapons squad leader, and a machine gun team. Everyone was in position by 0530—just before daylight. As predicted, the hours between 0530 and 0800, before the sun finally began to warm us, were absolutely miserable. I told myself over and over to “stop shivering, Ranger School in February was worse—suck it up.”

When it got light, the last task to perform was a ground familiarization over the radio. The leader at each position carried a grid reference guide (GRG), which assigns a number to each building in a specific area. This allows everyone to communicate accurately and quickly identify the building they are referring to without having to use a grid. However, at such a high level above ground, identifying the physical building on the ground and its coinciding GRG on the map was rather difficult. I gave everyone 30 minutes to familiarize himself with the area,

and then I led a radio walk-through to ensure all of the position leaders were on the same page. I started by describing the most distinguishable building on the ground, said what GRG it coincided with, and had my subordinate leaders either acknowledge or disagree. We then transitioned to the less distinguishable buildings until all the leaders had a good overall understanding, both on the ground and the map. Once complete, we simply watched and waited.

The 3^d Platoon left the COP at 0800, as planned, and began its movement along Route Yellow. Before the mission, we had done a fairly extensive company rehearsal to ensure both platoons had a thorough understanding of the phase lines and how to shift fires according to where 3^d Platoon was located on the ground. LT Paul Lankford, the 3^d Platoon Leader, and I maintained constant radio communication over the company frequency. I carried two radios, one on the company network and the other on the platoon network. This allowed me to speak with my squad leader and send/receive information to the company simultaneously, maintaining situational awareness. My platoon sergeant did the same in case he needed to call in a CASEVAC while getting updates from me at the same time. During this operation, LT Lankford relayed information to me, and I relayed it to my platoon.

We watched 3^d Platoon take a long halt to identify a possible enemy position. About ten minutes into 3^d Platoon's halt, the sniper at my position spotted a group of seven males form a group, pick up weapons, and start jogging east toward 3^d Platoon. The group had been milling around a field roughly 600 meters from my position. After spending a few seconds ensuring 3^d Platoon would not be in danger from our fires, I gave the sniper the authority to engage and began giving guidance to the other positions. The enemy was now sprinting along a wide trail leading east. I quickly pointed the enemy out to my machine gunner; however, guiding the other positions' fires onto the enemy was more challenging. The enemy had broken into three smaller groups, and though we had rehearsed this contingency, it took longer than I would have liked for each position to finally identify the enemy and direct their fires onto them.

Approximately 15 minutes after we opened fire on the Taliban to the east, Position 4 began taking fire from the northwest from the village of Nawshad, the town surrounding the bazaar on the west side of the river, an area we had yet to enter. The fire was relatively accurate and very heavy.

The platoon sergeant reported taking fire from two or three personnel with one PKM machine gun. To fully use the AWT, I controlled one bird while my FO controlled the other. I took control of one AH-64 and walked him onto the location where we had last engaged the enemy while my FO repositioned to where he could identify the fire from the village to walk his AH-64 onto the building. Position 4 was eventually able to identify from where the Soldiers there were taking fire and return fire on the enemy; it was coming from within a building. The enemy was standing away from the window and shooting through it. Due to the ROE, the AH-64s were not allowed to fire a Hellfire onto the building, but the Soldiers at Position 4 were able to place effective fire on the building, and the enemy fire stopped shortly after.

After we ceased fire, 3^d Platoon began its movement towards us to conduct BDA. The AWT was able to positively identify only one enemy KIA, so 3^d Platoon split and sent one section to the KIA and the other to the house with the enemy. The search of the body yielded an RPG launcher and an RPG, an ID card from Pakistan, a small amount of money, and a cell phone. The section that went to the house took the two detainees. Before heading back to the COP, 3^d Platoon moved to the location where we first spotted the enemy pick up with weapons, hoping to find a cache. LT Lankford reported that while searching the surrounding area, one of the ANA soldiers took the cell phone they had found on the KIA and hit “redial.” A civilian man standing in the next field over took out his cell phone and answered. He was also detained.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Eric Hanson, who served as the Platoon Leader of 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 2-30th Infantry, 4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. CPT Hanson’s monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: The philosophy of Mission Command is guided by six principles: Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust, Create Shared Understanding, Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent, Exercise Disciplined Initiative, Use Mission Orders, and Accept Prudent Risk (ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*). The narrative of CPT Hanson is a great example of a cohesive team with mutual trust in which leaders exercised disciplined initiative in the execution of a textbook ambush. The unit accepted risk in

regard to one of its platoons but mitigated it through the massing of combined arms effects. The detailed order and rehearsals of this unit enabled all elements to have shared understanding even in the heat of battle, leading to the accomplishment of the mission.

CONCLUSION: These vignettes clearly illustrate the requirement for the amendment to our Warfighting Functions as it pertains to Mission Command. These changes to doctrine come as a result of an evolving battlefield that is controlled in more than two dimensions. While the requirement for communication has always existed in warfighting, today, more than ever, it is a prerequisite for winning.

CHAPTER 2

Leadership

“The greatest leader is not necessarily the one who does the greatest things. He is the one that gets the people to do the greatest things.”

— President Ronald Reagan

INTRODUCTION: During this period of continuous conflict, Army leaders at all levels have embodied the attributes and competencies found in our doctrine and have proven themselves time and time again to be the best our Nation has to offer. In the past 12 years, we have watched young leaders adapt and grow to meet the requirements of an increasingly complex world, all under the microscope of anyone with a computer and internet access, and they have made us proud. This period has also given us the opportunities to study leaders, both good and bad, and to continue our tradition of learning from our past to improve our future.

In February 2007, the 173^d ABCT conducted a major training exercise, preparing for its deployment to Iraq in June. While this exercise was progressing, the brigade received a change of mission, stating it was to deploy to Afghanistan in May. The 1-91 CAV, the Cavalry squadron for the brigade stationed in Schweinfurt, Germany, deployed on 12 May 2007 from Germany and arrived in Afghanistan two days later. On 27 July 2007, Bulldog Troop, 1-91 CAV, was ambushed during a squadron mission called Operation Ghwar Dawah (Mountain Highway in Afghanistan).

Bulldog Troop took over the most northern U.S. outposts in all of Afghanistan. It was responsible for manning Camp Keating, OP Warheit, and Camp Kamu. The terrain was extremely mountainous, with peaks ranging from 7,000 to 14,000 feet, and all the mountains contained large amounts of vegetation. Each squadron FOB or outpost was built along the Kunar River and was spread throughout the squadron AO, from south to north.


From our first days in country, we immediately realized how unstable the LOC was in our AO. Multiple local national truck drivers were stopped by individuals manning illegal check points and were either tortured or executed. The LOC was the only road that moved all the way

through our squadron AO, and it paralleled the portion of the Kunar River in our AO. In July, our Squadron planned a mission to push out U.S. forces along the LOC to provide enough security to move local national resupply trucks all the way through our AO.

Bulldog Troop was tasked with establishing an OP four kilometers east of Camp Kamu to overwatch a river crossing often used by the enemy. This was to be an extended OP, held for roughly five to eight days. Enemy contact for this operation was likely but only in squad-sized elements, which would most likely conduct only harassment fire on us. Before this operation, we faced, at the most, 15 fighters, and intelligence did not point to a mass buildup of fighters in the area of operations. My platoon, 2^d Platoon, was tasked to conduct the decisive operation for the troop: establishing and maintaining this OP for five to eight days. Our 1st Platoon, conducting Shaping Operation 1, was tasked with establishing two OPs along our axis of advance and overwatching our movement to the objective. Our 3^d Platoon, conducting Shaping Operation 2, would serve as the troop QRF and maintain force protection on Camp Kamu. Traveling on this mission with my platoon was our commander, CPT Thomas Bostick and his headquarters team, as well as 20 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers. Except for our quick reaction force, all elements in this mission were dismounted.

The 1st Platoon, B Troop, left Kamu 24 hours prior to our movement to establish an overwatch position for our movement to the OP. The platoon located and occupied an outstanding location for the OP—high up on a ridgeline—during the nighttime so that no local nationals could observe its movement. Four hours prior to our departure, 1st Platoon radioed back to Kamu that there was no significant activity, and, overall, things were quiet.

On the afternoon of 26 July, we conducted our last rehearsal and walk-through, and that night, we tried to catch some sleep. At 0200, 27 July 2007, my platoon, with attachments, left Camp Kamu to occupy our observation post approximately five kilometers east. All in all, the nighttime movement went well, and we arrived outside of the tiny village of Saret Koleh at approximately 0500. Our squadron commander asked us to conduct a KLE in the town prior to occupying the OP, which was about 800 meters to the east of Saret Koleh.



Operation Ghwar Dawah

Courtesy of CPT John Meyer

After conducting the KLE, we left the village, and I pushed my lead squad out to begin navigating our route to the OP. We had to move further down the road then cut up the mountain for about another 500 meters. When we reached the location to leave the road and cut up the mountain, we conducted a security halt just off the road to allow my lead squad to scout out an appropriate route. At this point, the patrol came under heavy fire and sustained three casualties.

As soon as the fight had begun, and we all realized the intensity of it, CPT Bostick ordered the QRF to push forward and stage about one kilometer to our west. Due to this, the QRF, consisting of five HMMWVs, made it to our location within 30 minutes and provided excellent firepower with its .50 cal's and MK-19s. We immediately loaded up our three casualties and sent the QRF back west headed for the secure HLZ. To buy more time and to allow us to maintain an extended firefight, I began maneuvering my platoon higher up the mountain and off the road. I knew

we had to get into locations that were better covered and concealed if we were going to continue this fight for the rest of the day.

After the MEDEVAC operation, the two AH-64 Apaches remained on station, and a third joined the mission to continue engaging enemy targets. Unknown to any of us on the ground, the enemy was holding their large weapon system, the 12.7-mm Dshk, for U.S. aircraft to arrive. We could hear the thunder of the Dshk, coming from above us on the same mountain, engage our Apaches. Immediately, one AH-64 was damaged so badly it had to leave our fight and make an emergency landing outside of our squadron FOB. Within 40 minutes, the remaining Apaches also left the fight due to battle damage to the aircraft.

During this relative lull in the fighting, I decided to have my lead squad begin moving down the mountain and link up with us. During its movement, the squad discovered five enemy fighters in between its location and ours and engaged the enemy with small arms and grenades, killing all enemy fighters.

Soon after I gave the order for my lead squad to push down the mountain, the fight resumed its intensity, and we began receiving effective RPG and small arms fire. CPT Bostick established the troop CP consisting of his RTO, JTAC, and FSO 15 yards below my position on the mountain. Minutes after the fight intensified, I heard a loud explosion just below me. Somehow, at that moment I knew my commander was gone. All three Soldiers with CPT Bostick were blown from the CP location down to the road. The FSO sustained minor shrapnel injuries, while the RTO and JTAC sustained major face injuries. After hearing radio silence from the commander, I immediately called to our QRF to again drive to our location to gather casualties for MEDEVAC. The QRF was staged at the HLZ, so its reaction time was very quick.

Unlike last time, when the QRF arrived, the enemy fire actually picked up a bit. We had already gathered the injured from the troop CP, so I sent the trucks to locate our commander. Ten minutes after the explosion, the QRF squad leader, SSG John Faulkenberry, called in on the radio that "Bulldog 6 is KIA." The 1st Platoon PL, 1LT David Roller, immediately called me to say that, as the platoon leader conducting the decisive operation, I had assumed command of the troop on the ground.

The QRF was currently conducting three tasks: loading up the CP casualties, suppressing enemy with its crew served weapons, and moving

CPT Bostick's remains down the mountain to the road. We had been working Close Air Support assets for the past hour, and as the fight intensified right before and after CPT Bostick was killed, we began bringing the bomb strikes closer and closer to our location. Some of the explosions from the 500-lb bombs were so close that the blast threw shrapnel over our heads and actually shifted some of the QRF trucks.

While moving CPT Bostick, SSG Faulkenberry was hit in the leg, and his femur was shattered. The QRF Soldiers began immediate first aid on SSG Faulkenberry to try and stop the severe bleeding. Right around this time, I received a call from the QRF platoon leader, who stated that my lead squad had linked up with the QRF on the road. He also stated that my lead squad leader, SSG Ryan Fritsche, was killed in action. Unfortunately, during my lead squad's assault down the mountain, SSG Fritsche was shot in the head and instantly killed. Under fire, the squad bounded down the mountain, leaving SSG Fritsche's remains on the mountain. To add stress to the already intense situation, I received a radio call from higher stating we would not receive any more Apaches the rest of the day because they were shot up so badly that none could return to duty.

On the ground, at this point in the battle, I had the three wounded from the Troop CP, SSG Faulkenberry bleeding out, my medic shot in the arm, my Commander's remains, and my lead squad leader's remains up on the mountain. As I saw it, I had three choices: stay until dark then leave, fight up to Fritsche's remains now, or exfiltrate now to refit and push back in with more troops. After talking with my senior NCOs, I decided to give my higher a timeline: I needed to know when reinforcements were arriving or I would pull out the troop in five minutes. No answer ever came, so I made the decision; I decided to pull us out. We lacked the adequate numbers and firepower to stay and fight or, more importantly, fight up the mountain to SSG Fritsche's remains. Right or wrong, I truly believe if we had fought up the mountain, we would have sustained many more KIAs.

The exfiltration plan was very simple. We loaded up all of the wounded into the trucks, and the rest of the dismounts walked, using the trucks as cover. Of the two platoons on the ground, we had approximately 25 U.S and 18 ANA soldiers walking with four trucks carrying the wounded. Moving slowly during the exfiltration, we used the trucks as cover while the mounted .50 cal, M240Bs, and MK-19s tried to provide as much suppression as possible. This was not a tactical movement; we simply

jogged beside or behind the trucks and engaged enemy fighters as well as we could.

During the exfiltration, two of my Soldiers were shot, two received RPG shrapnel, and one ANA soldier was shot in the chest and died. Even though the bomb strikes killed so many, this was a very intense movement, and we received rifle, machine gun, and RPG fire for most of the movement. At one point, we got bogged down in the middle of the kill zone. The enemy massed fires on us, and all I could do was yell at our guys to keep on pushing through. This is when the ANA soldier was shot in the chest, and because we had no time to assess his wounds, we simply threw him on the hood and kept on driving forward. We finally made it out of the kill zone and to the HLZ location where we established a troop defensive perimeter. The MEDEVAC birds arrived approximately 15 minutes later to load up eight casualties and our commander's remains.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT John Meyer, who served as the Platoon Leader of 2^d Platoon, Bulldog Troop, and then as Commander of Bulldog Troop, 1-91 Cavalry, 173^d Airborne. CPT Meyer's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: On 27 July 2007, CPT John Meyer was unexpectedly thrown into command of Bravo Troop, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment, when his Troop Commander, CPT Thomas Bostick, was killed in action while on patrol. The ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, describes command as “the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.” Under intense fire from enemy positions, and without the support of CCA, CPT Meyer faced the difficult decision of whether or not to move back up a hill to retrieve the remains of a fallen Soldier. In the absence of guidance from his higher headquarters, CPT Meyer analyzed the assets available to him and determined the best course of action for his unit was to withdraw, refit, and then move back with more Soldiers.

According to ADRP 6-22, a leader's role in motivation is to “understand the needs and desires of others, to align and elevate individual desires into team goals, and to inspire others to accomplish those larger goals.” Bogged down in the middle of an enemy kill zone, with enemy

forces massing their fires on his formation, CPT Meyer rose to the challenge. He motivated his combined formation to push through to their destination and establish a defensive perimeter.

An often overlooked subcomponent of leadership is the importance of the personal example that the leader provides. The ADRP 6-22 says leaders serve as “role models; their personal example and actions carry tremendous moral force.” When propelled into command of his troop in the middle of an intense firefight, and through the subsequent withdrawal to a defensive perimeter, CPT Meyer set the example for his Soldiers to follow. Although the decisions and challenges he faced were difficult, CPT Meyer rose to the occasion to ensure the survivability of his formation.

In May 2010, the 1st Battalion, 502^d Infantry Regiment, of the 2^d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Airborne Division deployed to Zhari District, Regional Command-South, Afghanistan in support of OEF 10–11. On 15 July 2010, 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1-502^d participated in the battle for the Park-Hunter Flag in the subdistrict of Pashmul.

The Soviets dubbed the Zhari District the Heart of Darkness. It is the spiritual birthplace of the Taliban movement, home of Mullah Mohammad Omar, and had never witnessed a persistent concentration of coalition troops until the arrival of two BCTs. My company was responsible for an area in the district known as Pashmul, a relatively small and particularly volatile collection of villages located approximately 30 kilometers due west of Kandahar City.

From a distance, Pashmul looks like any other farming community in the Arghandab River Valley. It is lush, with tree lines that snake along the irrigation canals and a blanket of foliage that spills over from the trench-like vineyards dominating the landscape. Despite its docile appearance, those who have spent time in Pashmul know it is not a place of growth and life, but one of death. It is a battle arena, an Afghan coliseum, where, for decades, insurgents have trumped all intruders in close combat. Here, among the orchard labyrinths and war-shattered villages, the factor that determines the outcome of any given battle is not technology, firepower, or even numbers, but rather the ability to maneuver quickly and effectively through the endless fields of grapes.

The Afghan farmers planted grapevines on the sides of large mud slopes that usually span between 3 and 5 meters high and are 50 to 200

meters long. Fields can have a few dozen or several hundred rows, each running parallel to one another with around a two meter spacing in between. Most of these fields are surrounded by crude mud walls that serve to separate property lines and can vary in height from less than one meter tall to more than five meters, creating tight mazes where infantry formations are forced to move single file. It is impossible to see anything outside of the row one occupies, and the ability to jump walls and sprint between the rows can easily turn the tide of an engagement or provide a speedy getaway. The weight of weapons, protective vests, and special equipment makes scaling even the most minor of obstacles a challenge.

On the 28th of May, the 28 Soldiers of my platoon and I moved down from FOB Wilson, the company CP, to the nearest outpost, known as COP Fitzpatrick, so-named for a Soldier from 1-12 IN who was killed there the previous year. On the morning of 30 May, my company commander directed me to replace the company's 3^d Platoon at the second COP, located just over one km to the south of COP Fitzpatrick. This outpost was called COP JFM, an acronym derived from the last names of three 1-12 IN Soldiers who died there the previous year. We originally planned to rotate locations between the platoons on a regular basis, but the actual execution of this plan proved to be highly difficult and time consuming. As a result, I spent the majority of my time at COP JFM.

Once inventories were complete, I was tasked to conduct patrols around COP JFM and to travel to nearby villages to develop relations with the locals. Unfortunately, daily attacks and ambushes prevented us from accomplishing much more than react to contact. The fighting was daily and intense, and temperatures reached upwards of 110 degrees by mid-afternoon, forcing us to carry additional water, which added to our already burdensome combat load. The insurgents operating around COP JFM wore tennis shoes, carried only minimal equipment, and were able to sprint up and down the rows without difficulty. This allowed them to initiate contact, sometimes within 5–10 meters, and then disappear into the vegetation-covered rows before we were able to fire a single shot in response.

Despite all indications to the contrary, our command believed that the threat in Pashmul was minimal and that the local population would rise up to support us if only we showed them proper COIN compassion. As such, the command explicitly forbade the company from executing any action that might have resulted in civilian property damage or casualties. We were not

allowed to cut down trees to improve visibility for the towers in our COP, nor were we allowed to reduce walls or other obstacles to make terrain navigation more manageable. Furthermore, we were not, under any circumstances, able to use or even call for indirect fires without command approval direct. For a while, we were able to use CCA but after the Taliban emplaced numerous DsHK and ZPU anti-aircraft guns inside the villages surrounding our COP, the helicopters, following the same restrictive ROE, could not return fire into the villages.

By early June, the number of insurgents around COP JFM, as well as the rest of Pashmul, had greatly increased. In response to the impending fight and perhaps because they had been forced to do so, almost all remaining civilians fled the area in one large, dramatic mass exodus. Those who remained did not do so of their own free will; we were informed through our brigade intelligence channels that many of those who did not flee were kept as prisoners by the insurgents to serve as human shields against air strikes. In at least one incident, the insurgents broke both legs of a young girl after she and her family tried to escape. This was done as a warning to other families who might have contemplated leaving.

Once most of the locals were gone, insurgents emplaced hundreds of pressure plate and remote controlled IEDs in the fields, around the COP, and at all the nearby village entrances, forcing my patrols to stay single file in the rows which severely restricted our ability to move on the trails. Once the IEDs were set, the insurgents attacked relentlessly. Each day throughout the month of June, we saw upwards of three large and coordinated attacks on patrols and the COP. We were never able to get more than 100 meters outside of the COP before the enemy would surround us and force us to break contact; further, they would target the COP's towers with RPG and 82-mm recoilless rifle fire. Oftentimes, snipers, armed with 7.62 mm Dragunov rifles, would attempt headshots on my Soldiers as they stood guard in the towers. On five separate occasions, sniper bullets impacted the bulletproof glass of the towers directly in front of my Soldiers' faces as they were looking outward. Casualties became an almost daily occurrence, and by the end of June, most of my Soldiers had been wounded at least once. What remained of the platoon had been so significantly degraded that we were unable to conduct normal patrols or COP security operations on our own.

The relentless combat and the ever-increasing IED threat quickly began to take a psychological toll on my platoon as well as the rest of the company. There was not even peace in sleep; at some point during most nights, an enormous explosion would ring out as an unfortunate animal stepped on one of the countless number of pressure plate IEDs that filled the fields around our COP. We were, in a very real sense, living in the middle of a minefield and surrounded on all sides by an enemy that greatly outnumbered us. A flag hanging ritual, recently adopted by the Taliban, only made the psychological toll of daily life worse. Whenever a Soldier from Bravo Company was killed, the Taliban would raise a large white flag on the nearest tree to mark the victory and then, we were told, surround the base of the tree with IEDs to prevent us from taking it down. After the deaths of PFC Park and SSG Hunter, we could easily see the flag from any point on COP JFM; it served as a daily reminder of the loss and a point of infinite fury for all of us. I hated looking at that flag every day, but I knew better than to go after it.

Death became a part of daily life, and every morning I accepted the fact that I would probably not live to see the sun go back down. I believe this is why, on the night of 14 July 2010, I accepted the Park/Hunter Flag mission from my commander without asking questions. My orders were simple: move in a dismounted patrol to the tree where the flag was hung and figure out a way to get it down. To mitigate the IED threat, we were to take grappling hooks and a Military Working Dog that arrived to the COP the week before. We also had two mine detectors and a set of Thor III CIED backpacks. These enablers provided a useful defense against IEDs but were by no means infallible.

My initial mission planning was brief. The flag was located near the center of a village called Charkuchaw, situated only about 600 meters to the direct east of JFM. I knew we would probably get ambushed along the way and tried to mitigate that possibility by planning our departure for the early morning when attacks were less frequent. I decided to send my Platoon Sergeant, SFC John Jarrell, out on a distraction patrol to the north 30 minutes before my departure time in an attempt to draw attention away from my element's movements. Since SFC Jarrell's and my formations were so small, we often used this tactic so if one of us came under heavy contact, the other could quickly move to support. I never seriously thought about how to get the flag down from the top of the tree, which must have

been at least 30 meters tall, because I honestly did not believe we would make it that far.

After a quick map reconnaissance of the objective area, I went to see SSG Nicholas Christensen to tell him about the mission. He was, understandably, in total disbelief at first. He knew, as well as I did, that such a mission could only end poorly unless the entire company and multiple battalion enablers were involved. I remember trying as hard as I could to take ownership of the mission and avoid placing blame on the commander. SSG Christensen finally accepted the fact that I was not joking, and we started to work out the details of the mission.

Ultimately, we decided that if the patrol was able to get within 50 meters of the tree that held the flag, then I would lead a small team towards it with the dog and mine detectors until we discovered an IED. At that point, we would call in a team from EOD and let it place enough explosives so as to destroy the IEDs and take down the tree in one blast. It seemed like a simple enough plan, but neither of us wanted to state the obvious: most of the IEDs we encountered in the past had been remote controlled, and all detonations had been followed immediately by an ambush. Finding the IED with a mine detector or dog is exactly what the Taliban wanted us to do because it either put us within its blast radius or directly in the kill zone of the ambush. We put this knowledge aside and then moved down to the ANA side of the COP to brief our partnered platoon leadership on the mission.

The next morning, SFC Jarrell departed on his distraction patrol as planned, and my element darted out of the COP's ECP and proceeded down into the grape rows. We crept slowly and deliberately along the edges of an irrigation canal towards the flag, keeping the dog team and mine detectors with a small security team forward to clear our path. The first 30 minutes went smoothly, and we managed to cover about 200 meters. Then we started seeing men wearing tennis shoes about 100 meters to our south running in the general direction of the flag. They didn't appear to be carrying weapons and quickly disappeared from view. Expecting an attack at any moment, I halted the formation and told everyone to get ready for a fight. We took cover behind the walls of the canal we were in, and I felt the all-too-familiar sick feeling in my stomach of a day about to go horribly wrong. Before moving on, I removed my digital camera from its carrying pouch and took a short video of my Soldiers and the flag off in the distance. I wanted to capture one last snapshot of all my brave Soldiers.

After successfully navigating through the unforgiving terrain and climbing numerous walls, we eventually made it to within meters of the tree and its despised flag. The plan was for me to move with a small team, consisting of the working dog and its handler, two Soldiers carrying the Thor III and mine detector systems, and two others for security. We would proceed towards the flag until we came into contact or detected an IED. In either event, the next step of the plan was for SSG Christensen to move an element up to provide support for my team's withdrawal or recovery since we did not have enough combat power to fight inside the village. Neither one of us thought my team would make it even remotely close to the flag, and we were both a little apprehensive about what was coming next. I wanted to say something reassuring to SSG Christensen but could not find the words. (Editor's note: See the next vignette for the rest of the story.)

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Daniel Plumb, who served as the Platoon Leader of 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 502^d Infantry, 2^d BCT. CPT Plumb's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: The battle for the Park-Hunter Flag in Pashmul, Afghanistan, is an example of extraordinary leadership at the platoon level combined with the failure of leaders at the company and battalion level to apply the tenets of Wide Area Security, develop unit cohesion, and understand combat stressors.

Wide area security is the application of the elements of Combat Power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains to retain the initiative (ADP 3-0). The restrictive ROE imposed by commanders on operations occurring in Pashmul may have been appropriate for Regional Command-South, but they were inappropriate for the offensive actions occurring in the Zhari District. Changing battlefield conditions are a natural state of combat operations, and changing conditions on the ground should warrant revision of the ROE. Less restrictive ROE and the use of combat multipliers, such as close combat air, mortars, and artillery, would have enabled 1st Platoon to seize the initiative from the enemy forces that occupied Pashmul and could have resulted in a quick transition to stability operations.

The rapid seizure of the initiative and the pacification of Pashmul would have reduced the amount of operational stress that pressured 1st Platoon. Units with effective leadership feature horizontal bonding, which occurs amongst peers in a small unit, and vertical bonding, which occurs between leaders and subordinates. When both are achieved, the result is unit cohesion: a binding force which keeps units together to perform their mission in spite of danger or adversity. The reader can infer that CPT Plumb achieved unit cohesion prior to receiving the mission to retrieve the Park-Hunter Flag. However, unit cohesion can be detrimental when it causes subordinates' loyalty to their leader to override assessing the feasibility and suitability of a mission. SSG Christensen and SFC Jarrell should have advised CPT Plumb of the suicidal nature of the mission, but the bonds of loyalty inside of a cohesive unit do not always allow for a dissent. We see here that CPT Plumb undoubtedly is experiencing the effects of operation stress when he accepts the mission to recover the Park-Hunter Flag. Whether through a sense of duty, or numbness, CPT Plumb accepts a mission that will ultimately be disastrous.

On July 15th, 2010, 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1-502^d participated in the battle for the Park-Hunter Flag in the subdistrict of Pashmul.

SSG Christensen left me and started rounding up my team, and I moved to a link-up point on the southern side of the perimeter. From there, it would be a relatively short, straight movement towards the flag along a narrow path with high walls on either side. I estimated that if we moved cautiously, it would take only a couple of minutes before my team encountered an IED, allowing us to return to the perimeter and wait for EOD. I was just starting to wrap my mind around the possibility of actually getting my hands on the flag when I heard a deafening explosion directly to my left.

The blast, caused by a remote controlled IED buried behind a section of the wall he was using as cover, barely missed SSG Christensen with the brunt of its explosion, but it had enough force to knock him to the ground and render him unconscious for a few seconds. In the time it took me to turn my head to see what had happened, at least two PKM or RPK machine guns began firing, almost directly from the east, at the point of the explosion. The guns targeted an exposed left flank of the southern portion of the square perimeter, forcing everyone to leap over the wall he had

previously been hiding behind. Unfortunately, I was in the open, and one of the guns was aiming directly at me. I remember seeing the bullet impacts “walking” towards me in the dirt while rounds from the other gun crackled around me. I instinctively threw myself into a nearby ditch just in time to watch the rounds walk past the spot where I had been standing.

In the brief seconds I spent laying on my back in the ditch, I could hear my Soldiers returning fire sporadically, but our most casualty-producing weapon, the 7.62-mm MK-48 machine gun, carried by SPC Andrew Nault, was silent. I knew I needed to get that weapon into action or we might be overrun. I flipped around into a pushup position, rounds still snapping over my head; sprinted to where I had last seen SPC Nault; and threw myself over to the other side. I landed hard and, as luck would have it, almost directly on top of Nault, who was taking cover in the low area of a grape row. He was clearly shaken by the ambush, but I was able to get him to put the machine gun into action fairly quickly. The MK-48 is an exceptionally loud weapon, and our ambushers slowed their rate of fire almost immediately after it started shooting, giving me an opportunity to use my radio to request support from the Kiowa Warriors (SWT) and Apache gunship of AWT which were already in the air nearby. One of my Soldiers marked the enemy’s location with a smoke round from his grenade launcher, and two Kiowa helicopters began conducting gun runs, first with rockets and then with .50-cal machine guns. Between passes, we would fire our weapons and then duck back into the row when a helicopter came overhead. Shells from the .50 cal fell all around us, and the rockets created an incredible amount of noise and smoke. After several minutes, the pilots of the AWT informed me they had expended all ammunition and needed to return to base. There was no enemy fire at this point, and I thanked the pilots profusely for the assistance. I then jumped back over the wall, with much less urgency this time, to check on the status of my Soldiers.

It was immediately evident that SSG Christensen and another Soldier, SPC Mario Delcampo, had suffered head trauma from the blast. SPC Delcampo was only mildly shaken, and SSG Christensen was aware enough to tell me what had happened but was clearly having trouble concentrating. This had been his second IED-caused TBI within 30 days, and I could see his injuries were taking a serious toll. I radioed to SFC Jarrell and informed him that we were all still alive and I planned to take the patrol back to the COP to have SSG Christensen and SPC Delcampo checked out.

SFC Jarrell said he was relieved that we were not going to make another attempt for the flag. Next, I checked in with the Bravo Company command post and stated I was unable to get close to the flag. The RTO in the command post informed me that JFM was taking small arms and RPG fire from the west, and I needed to get my patrol back inside the COP as soon as possible. I then radioed my team leaders and told them to gather everyone up and begin movement back towards JFM using the same route.

At about this time, someone shot at us from the other side of the large wall we had jumped over before the ambush. Everyone dove for cover again, but the fire was sporadic and inaccurate and did not last for long. With the attack going on at JFM, it was a safe assumption that Taliban were flocking towards Charkuchaw to surround our position. We had seen them use the same tactic under similar circumstances twice before, and I knew I needed to get my Soldiers out of there and fast.

I decided to move my patrol directly north in the direction of SFC Jarrell, so he could protect and observe our approach and then hook the movement of the patrol 90 degrees to the west after a couple hundred meters and continue in that direction until we ran back into RTE Summit. My hope was that such a wide movement would allow us to out-maneuver whoever shot at us earlier from the west, allowing us to either bypass or catch him by surprise. However, I did not anticipate the difficulty and length of the movement. It took us more than an hour to travel the short distance, and along the way, many things went wrong. More than anything, I remember the heat was absolutely stifling. It must have been upwards of 100 degrees that day, and the grape rows retained the excessive humidity. Shortly after we started bounding the first walls, the working dog collapsed from exhaustion and had to be carried. Its handler was no help; this was his first patrol, and he was in no way prepared for the heat or physical demands of the grape rows. He threw up multiple times, but none of us had any water to give him since we all had run out much earlier. SSG Christensen had trouble walking and needed two Soldiers to help him stay upright. He was doing his best, but I could see he needed medical attention soon.

When my patrol finally reached RTE Summit, we could not approach the COP because it was under heavy fire from multiple positions to the west and south. I decided to wait behind cover on the east side of Summit until a lull in the contact gave us an opportunity to make a run for it. The AWT, now back on station with Kiowa Warriors and an Apache

gunship, engaged targets to the west of JFM while enemy DsHK and ZPU positions snaked long lines of tracers towards them. Someone in my patrol spotted an enemy machine gun position about 200 meters in front of us, on the other side of Summit, and I instructed SPC Nault to engage it. The enemy retreated into a grape hut, and another one of my Soldiers accurately fired grenades from his 40-mm, M230 grenade launcher into the opening. I believed we were only minutes away from another large ambush and decided it was best to make a run for it. I radioed to SFC Jarrell and asked him to cover our movement as best he could from his position as we ran toward the COP. We then fired several volleys of grenades in the direction of the latest attacker, and I told everyone to get up and run for the COP as quickly as possible.

We headed out in a sprint for the more than 200 meters it took to get to the ECP. All along the way, machine gun rounds impacted around our feet and snapped over our heads. As usual, I made sure that I was the last man back inside the wire. We were greeted by medics and numerous Soldiers with food and water. I then called SFC Jarrell on the company radio and told him to end his patrol and move to COP Fitzpatrick.

After doing a final check on my Soldiers and completing a hasty debrief in the command post, I went back to the small “quad-con” shipping container where I lived, took off my gear, and collapsed onto a cot. I planned to take a short nap before changing out of my dirty, sweat soaked uniform. I had just started to drift off to sleep when I was jolted awake by an enormous explosion in the distance. The sound was loud enough that I knew it was relatively close to the COP. Fearing the worst, I ran to the command post to find out what had happened. The senior NCO met me at the door and told me I should wait outside. A few moments later, he came out and informed me that SFC Jarrell and his medic, SGT Winters, had been killed by an IED several hundred meters outside COP Fitzpatrick and the patrol was under heavy fire. I immediately asked if I could move to their location to assist. The NCO told me 3^d Platoon was already on site, and the battalion bommander and his personal security detail were en route to assist. I moved to the location and assisted in retrieving our dead and evacuating our wounded. Later that night, the Soldiers at COP Fitzpatrick watched as two men climbed a tree and hung another flag to mark the spot where Jarrell and Winters had been killed.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Daniel Plumb, who served as the Platoon Leader of 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 502^d Infantry, 2^d BCT. CPT Plumb's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: The party most responsible for the decision to conduct a platoon attack to retrieve the Park-Hunter Flag is the company commander. The mission had a questionable task and purpose—the retrieval of the flag did not have a clear decisive or attainable outcome. The result is a platoon, heavily attritted by enemy contact, conducting what in the best of circumstances should have been a battalion operation. If Bravo Company's command climate had facilitated vertical bonding, CPT Plumb would have been comfortable questioning the order, and the company commander may have been more empathetic towards CPT Plumb's situation.

In April 2010, 1-71 Cavalry Regiment, 1BCT, 10th Mountain Division, deployed to Afghanistan and, in September, moved into eastern Panjwai District, Kandahar Province. Towards the end of September, the squadron commander conducted a battlespace realignment of his troops and assigned Alpha Troop, 1-71, to an area that had previously belonged to Bravo Troop. As part of the relief-in-place, a platoon from Alpha Troop conducted a joint patrol with 3^d Platoon, Bravo Troop.

Our first patrol took us to a small village of mud huts and grape fields. Bravo Troop had enjoyed little positive interaction with the villagers there who were mostly scornful of American Soldiers and generally uncooperative with our initiatives. My commander's intent was to establish better relations with the locals, break the Taliban influence over the area, and tie the village into the local government at the district center. The purpose of our first mission was to familiarize my platoon with the area, introduce me to the key village elders, and set the conditions for future cooperation. To prepare for the joint patrol, my platoon spent the day prior at Bravo Troop's headquarters, conducting briefs and rehearsals.

The next morning, we arrived in the village but noticed the complete absence of activity there. The people were there but were remaining indoors to avoid the American forces. Soon after, ICOM chatter revealed a spotter within a pomegranate orchard was reporting our actions and locations. After a brief chase and firefight, the enemy withdrew, and we

conducted a battle damage assessment. We took no further contact, but the senior scout contacted me on the radio to say he had followed a trail of shell casings and other small items that seemed to lead to a mud-walled compound on the far end of the village.

As my group of Soldiers made our way to link up with the clearing element, Bravo Troop's 1st Platoon arrived on scene in its vehicles. With it came Bravo Troop's commander and first sergeant, a three-man EOD team, and a civilian dog handler. After receiving an update from 3^d Platoon's platoon sergeant, the Bravo Troop commander decided to search the suspicious compound. While some remained behind at the vehicle security point, several of my NCOs and I made our way with Bravo Troop's leadership to the site of the suspicious compound.

The trail that led to this compound was nothing more than a dirt footpath that wound its way through the dense trees; I don't think it was even possible for a car to make it down that trail. We avoided a footbridge over a large wadi along the way, fearing a booby trap, and chose instead to tightrope walk over a narrow fallen log. When we reached the compound, I could see that it was larger than most; it had high mud walls and enjoyed shade from the numerous trees that grew around the outside. It was clearly set back from the more densely populated strip of compounds where the rest of the villagers seemed to live. The footpath that approached from the east snaked around the compound's large walls and continued off into some dense trees. In the background was the large, looming figure of the rocky Fish Mountain, so-called because satellite imagery of the mountain's long ridge resembled a fish.

After clearing the path leading to the compound and its outside walls, a few Soldiers from Bravo's 1st Platoon began to enter with their metal detectors to search for evidence of weapons, bombs, or other enemy activity. It didn't take them long to uncover hidden danger. They found the first IED when one Soldier moved through a doorway and the ground started to give way; he jumped back and observed a circular rubber pressure-plate poking out from underneath the loose earth. Somehow, the three Soldiers in front of him had missed the device.

At this point, I believe it was clear to everyone involved that this compound had recently been used by the Taliban, and they had chosen to protect it through the use of booby-traps. For reasons that remain unknown to me, this fact was not enough to persuade Bravo's leaders to call off any

further search of the compound. Instead, they decided to bypass the first IED and continue searching deeper into the compound's interior rooms. As if to double-down on this risky choice, Bravo's commander decided he wanted to see the evidence for himself. He took the dog team and followed his Soldiers into the building while several NCOs, the EOD team, and I waited anxiously outside. Listening to reports coming over the radio, I gathered that the search team was continuing to discover possible IEDs throughout the building. "What do they think they are doing in there?" I wondered to myself.

Eventually, the commander emerged from the building and told me that more IED evidence was inside and he wanted me to see it. He thought it would be beneficial for me to get a first-hand look since my platoon was going to be responsible for this area from now on. Privately, I thought it was stupid to keep poking around this building, but he was a commander from another troop, and I believed I didn't have the kind of relationship with him that I could speak candidly and tell him what I thought, so I followed him inside.

The first doorway opened into a large and mostly empty courtyard. The floor was hardened earth, and there was no roof. Two doorways, one to the left and another straight ahead, led farther into the compound. Directly in front of the doorway that lay straight ahead of us, we could see the pressure plate that the Soldier from 1st Platoon had discovered. The Soldiers had carefully scraped away the dirt, leaving the entire device uncovered. The plate had a wooden base with rubber tubing stapled on top, concealing the copper wires that, once pressed together, would complete the electrical circuit and fire a blasting cap, igniting the main explosive charge. The deadly homemade explosives were likely buried directly beneath the plate itself, which was wrapped in a clear plastic bag to protect the electronics from water moisture.

Encountering an active pressure-plate IED directly in one's path should normally be a cause for extreme caution, but the Bravo Commander simply walked right up to it, stepped across, and continued through the doorway. I followed his lead. In the next room, there were some supplies for making IEDs: empty plastic jugs, rubber tubing, and a random assortment of electronic components. There was also a fertilizer sack lying in a corner. The commander informed me that it was booby-trapped. I asked how, and he told me to come get a closer look, so we both got down on our

hands and knees and lowered our faces to the ground. Looking sideways at the sack, I watched as he gently pulled back on one corner. "Do you see it?" he asked me. I couldn't see anything, so I replied, "No." Carefully, the commander pulled back the corner a little more, revealing a thin white cord attached to the bottom of the sack and leading into the ground. "Okay, okay, I see it," I said. It was a victim-operated pull device; the intent was for someone to come along and pick up the fertilizer sack, thereby triggering an explosion.

We talked for a minute about what we had seen so far. The commander told me there was a third room containing an RPG lying in a haystack, which he suspected was also booby-trapped. I told him I didn't need to see it. He then took a minute to gather up some of the electronic components, which we would take back as evidence and finger-print analysis. As we made our way back through the house, again crossing the pressure plate, the EOD team was setting up inside the courtyard to begin its work. An Afghan policeman and a Canadian soldier, who worked in civil-military affairs, were watching them from a corner.

I had worked with several EOD teams in Afghanistan, and unfortunately, this team was the least prepared one that I had encountered. I say this because the team members' actions suggested a lack of experience. The commander briefed the team on everything his Soldiers had found inside, but the mistake occurred when the commander told the EOD team his Soldiers had "cleared" the compound and located three possible devices, and the EOD Soldiers took his word for it. They did not conduct their own search with their metal detector for additional devices before going to work; they didn't even use their robot to conduct a cursory search. Satisfied that they understood the threat environment, they began preparing to disarm the first IED.

I was kneeling outside the house with my Soldiers who were pulling security, discussing what we had seen so far, when, suddenly, there was a deafening explosion from behind me. The initial shock caused me to lose my balance and fall over on my side; I looked up to see a thick cloud of black smoke rising into the sky. All around me, people began screaming as we turned our focus to the doorway, the entrance to the compound, and the men we knew were inside. The first person to react was the dog handler, who moved to the entrance and started yelling inside. He was screaming for the Canadian soldier, his good friend, yelling, "Jay! Jay! Are you in there?"

A cloud of brown dust was pouring through the door when suddenly an Afghan policeman came stumbling out. He was stumbling badly and looked disoriented as he ran right towards me. I pulled him down, and he fell against the base of a tree. Someone came over to help treat him as he was showing signs of shock.

After the minute or so of confusion that always follows events like this, we realized what had happened. One of the EOD team members had struck a previously undiscovered IED inside the courtyard, and the team's proximity to the blast meant the injuries were catastrophic. Several people ran inside and began conducting first aid, and the Bravo Troop first sergeant was communicating back to Bravo Troop's command post and preparing a MEDEVAC request. I took two Soldiers and went down the path a little farther, jumped over a low mud wall, and cleared an open area as best we could so it could be used for a helicopter landing zone. Inside the courtyard, only a few yards away, I could hear the terrible sound of desperate men screaming.

While several people from Bravo Troop were trying to help the casualties inside, I made myself responsible for our security perimeter. I walked around the outside of the compound, checking on Soldiers' locations, when I stepped around a corner and saw another small footpath that led into some trees. Lying there, in the middle of the path, was the body of an American Soldier, his body severed below the waist. He was the EOD team member who had stepped on the pressure plate inside the courtyard, a secondary device to the primary one located in the doorway. The force of the explosion had thrown him over the walls and through the trees. I walked up to him, but I did not reach down to touch him; it was clear that he was dead.

When the MEDEVAC helicopters arrived, I helped place the Soldier's remains inside a body bag and then carried him to the helicopter. After the helicopters departed, we all stood around looking at each other for a few minutes, wondering how that had just happened and what to do next. Eventually, another EOD team was brought to the scene. It conducted a post-blast analysis on the IED that had detonated, and after some discussion, decided that it was too dangerous—and not worth the risk—to continue examining this compound for evidence. A request was sent up the chain of command to conduct a kinetic strike on the compound; eventually that request was approved, and a plane flew overhead and dropped several

bombs, reducing the compound to rubble. My platoon returned to our headquarters late that evening.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Michael Thompson, who served as a scout platoon leader in Alpha Troop, 1-71 Cavalry, 1 BCT, 10th Mountain Division. CPT Thompson's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: CPT Thompson's experience provides the reader with a grisly example of the outcomes stemming from poor and reckless leadership. ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, gives three leadership attributes and three leadership competencies from which we may examine specific failures of leadership that resulted in needless shedding of blood.

The attribute of *Intellect* is characterized by mental agility, sound judgment, and expertise. As events showed, CPT Thompson was correct to doubt the intellectual processes and decisions behind the orders and actions occurring that day. Recklessness is not synonymous with confidence. Leaders who exemplify *Intellect* exercise sound judgment and the mental agility needed to recognize the second and third order effects of their decisions.

The leadership competency of *Trust* also deserves examination here. This competency includes building trust, leading by example, and effective communication. Cavalier behavior in the presence of subordinates is generally not an effective means of building trust. Leaders must also realize that the moral and legal authority generated by their formal charge, combined with the culture of the service, can stifle recommendations and feedback from subordinates. This is exemplified by CPT Thompson's hesitation to question a commander with whom he had no rapport. The failure to communicate effectively with the EOD team prior to sending them into a nest of IEDs also demonstrates the lethal result that poor communication may have. Words have meaning; they must be used correctly to ensure a precise and complete exchange of ideas.

One final thought demands consideration: leaders are charged with balancing mission with the welfare of their followers. Leaders must choose to accept prudent risk when the benefits of that risk will outweigh the cost. Simultaneously, leaders seek to reduce risk and prevent subordinates from making mistakes. What perceived benefit may have outweighed the terrible

cost incurred on this day in April 2010? The failure to destroy the structure before loss of life notwithstanding, what attempts were made to reduce the risk of operating in such proximity to multiple lethal devices? The cynicism one naturally feels in reading CPT Thompson's vignette highlights the moral imperatives of effective leader development, self-awareness, and humility that accompany the responsibilities of leadership.

CONCLUSION: In these vignettes, we see leaders at all levels and the consequences of their leadership. The ADP 6-22 reminds us that leadership, the "lifeblood of an Army," is a process that can be learned, monitored, and improved. Studying leaders from our past ensures we develop leaders who can "balance uncertainty, remain flexible, and provide a climate where subordinates have the latitude to explore options."

CHAPTER 3

Tempo

“Tempo is itself a weapon—often the most important. The need for speed in turn requires decentralized control.”

— FM 1, Warfighting
USMC 1989

INTRODUCTION: According to ADP 3-90, “Military professionals invoke the art of tactics to solve tactical problems within their commander’s intent by choosing from interrelated options, including...task organization of available forces, arrangement and choice of control measures, tempo of the operation, and the risks the commander is willing to take. These options represent a starting point for the professional to create a unique solution to a specific tactical problem.” Controlling the tempo allows the commander to dictate the operation and force the enemy into an untenable situation. Because Tempo involves rate and not necessarily speed, Maneuver forces, using situational awareness, must be adaptive and agile, both cognitively and physically, to dictate the operational tempo and win.

On 18 December 2006, a strike force operating in the heart of Baghdad received intelligence indicating a “bed-down” location of a high-level Sunni terrorist financier with foreign connections.

Based on intelligence, we believed this individual had three armed bodyguards at his location, in addition to 12 guards who would be sleeping in the building across the street. We did not know if any, or how many, were foreign terrorists who would be willing to fight to the death and wearing suicide vests.

In addition to our Strykers and dismounted troops, we would have a section of two M1 Abrams tanks and two BFTs attached to us. Due to the noise they produced during movement, they would remain approximately one kilometer away to be called forward only in the event that they were necessary. We also had a section of attack aviation available on the airfield to be at our location within two minutes of our call. We planned the entire operation to be surreptitious; the only person who would know that we were there would be the financier when we woke him up with an M-4 barrel tapping him on the head.

The mounted portion of the movement was uneventful and short; the neighborhood to which we were traveling was in the heart of Baghdad; the roads were mostly well-paved; and the only sign of life came from the ubiquitous sight of new trash and the smell of fresh sewage.

We dismounted our Strykers 500 meters north of the target building; we would have liked to have stopped on a side street instead of the main road, but all of the neighborhoods had barricades to prevent large vehicles from entering. Immediately, we heard two bursts of AK-47 fire approximately 200 meters to our east. We believed this to have come from a sentry alerting the neighborhood to our presence. I ordered my platoon to continue on to the objective.

Under fire, we reached the location where we believed the financier to be (Building 1), but we sustained fire from the rooftop of that building as well. I called for our attack aviation to begin moving to our location and ordered my 1st Squad to continue movement and suppress the enemy there. I then called my Mobility Squad leader and instructed him to move the Strykers to a nearby intersection to intercept anyone trying to flee. Another platoon leader, focused on the building where we believed the 12 guards to be (Building 2), radioed me and stated his element was in position. At this point, approximately a minute had elapsed.

After confirming we were still taking fire from Building 1 and that my FO and I knew where all of our personnel were located, I instructed the attack aviation to conduct a fire mission to destroy the target. Within seconds, they had fired four rockets and were conducting repeated gun runs on Building 1's roof. The lead pilot reported to me that they had destroyed two enemy fighters on the roof and that 55-gallon drums in the courtyard had caught fire. I then ordered the two tanks and the two BFVs to move so as to provide rear security and destroy the barricades blocking the road to allow the Strykers to enter the neighborhood. The 3^d Squad Leader, in the meantime, had retrieved four thermobaric LAWs from two of the vehicles and moved them forward, employing two on Building 1 and giving the other two to the platoon suppressing Building 2. Between the attack aviation, the thermobaric LAWs, and a squad of infantrymen suppressing Building 1, the enemy fire subsided.

At this point, as I reorganized my platoon to assault Building 1, the lead pilot radioed me that he had been tracking two groups of two insurgents that had departed from Building 1 during the gun runs, and one group had

entered a nearby house (Building 3). The other pair of insurgents had continued to run and attempted to hide under a tree in the courtyard of another nearby house (Building 4).

I instructed the pilots to continue to track those two groups while we assaulted and cleared Building 1. Because Air assets maintained observation of the area, my 3^d Squad Leader suggested that we deal with one building at a time. I concurred and had my 1st Squad maintain overwatch on the building from a nearby intersection while 3^d Squad moved forward, executed an explosive breach, and cleared the first floor of the building. Second Squad flowed in behind 3^d Squad to clear the second story and the roof while the snipers moved to the roof in an attempt to gain a shot on the enemy who had fled. Third Squad then cleared the courtyard. There were a total of four enemy killed in action: two on the roof and two in the building. After completing a hasty sensitive site exploitation, during which we recovered a large amount of media, I called for a leader huddle to ensure proper consolidation and develop a plan to assault Building 3.

The plan was fairly simple. Second Squad, with the snipers, would remain on the roof of building 1 and ensure no one escaped from the new target. The two Strykers would push west, past Building 3 so that the trail Stryker's .50 cal Remote Weapon System was peering over the wall to ensure that side of the house was secured. First Squad would then execute a surrender appeal, while 3^d Squad provided rear security and assisted 1st Squad if necessary.

It took almost no time to disseminate the plan to the squad leaders, vehicles, and the platoon overwatching Building 2. As soon as we were about to begin movement, however, I heard a Stryker's .50 cal fire two short bursts. My Mobility Squad leader reported that just as he began movement toward Building 3, he had destroyed two armed men who had fled Building 3 and attempted to flee south. Additionally, he could make out a bunker in the street into which two other armed men had moved. I ordered the two tanks to move forward to drive over and destroy the bunker, which they did. At this point, there was some confusion as to how many men had escaped from Building 1. Regardless of the possibilities, I decided that the prudent decision was to assault and clear the courtyard of Building 4 in case there were insurgents there.

Essentially, we would conduct the same plan that we had just expected to execute at Building 3; it would just be easier because the enemy

were supposedly in the courtyard. We accepted risk by not having backside security, but it was mitigated by the fact that we believed the insurgents were in the front courtyard. Since it was essentially the same plan, it was easy to disseminate over the radio, and, within seconds, we were moving. We used the pilots to “sparkle” (designate with an infrared beam visible to our night vision devices) the house where they believed the insurgents to be. Once there, 1st Squad tossed a flashbang grenade into the courtyard. Immediately, I heard reports that the only thing in the courtyard was a (very scared) cow. After a quick discussion with the pilots, I assessed that they had lost sight of the second pair of enemy and that the pair was probably the one destroyed in the bunker. After discussing the situation with my squad leaders, I decided that it would be fruitless to search any further.

While this was happening, the other platoon had assaulted Building 2, killing eight insurgents and capturing two more. At this point, the other platoon leader radioed to tell me his platoon had completed sensitive site exploitation on Building 2, and unless I believed there was value in staying, he was ready to leave the objective and return to base. I told him we were ready to leave, so we moved back, linked up with his platoon, and returned to base. Evidence gathered later revealed that one of the enemy killed in Building 1 was the targeted financier.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Ari Martyn, who served as a Stryker platoon leader in this event. CPT Martyn's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: “The [unit] increases its tempo by using simple plans, quick decision making, decentralized control, mission orders and rehearsed operations” (FM 3-21.10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*). When a unit is conducting time sensitive missions, such as a raid in an urban environment, rapid decision making and the ability to issue clear and concise orders are vital to the mission’s success. The tactical commander has a clear understanding of his operational environment and builds momentum through synchronizing and coordinating the efforts of maneuver units and enablers to rapidly transition to the next operation. The unit uses these rapid transitions to control the rate of the operation relative to the threat. By controlling the tempo, the commander prevents the threat from recovering and maintains the initiative through to the operation’s success.

CPT Martyn's forces kept a rapid and steady tempo throughout the operation, allowing him to maintain the initiative and offensive momentum. He relied on his aviation assets and vehicle platforms to keep him informed on the location of threats, allowing him to make quick and informed decisions. The enemy situation continually changed after the initial contact which required rapid decisions based on the available information; CPT Martyn issued mission orders that allowed his forces to maintain contact with the enemy. CPT Martyn's synchronization of his element's efforts enabled him to quickly transition from building to building, while continuing to engage and eventually overwhelm the enemy's ability to recover. The constant and rapid tempo executed by his force was a decisive factor in the success of CPT Martyn's operation.

The Rangers in 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, preferred to conduct their raids in Afghanistan at night. Under cover of darkness, they could maximize technological advantages over the enemy and minimize the chances of civilian casualties. As the years wore on, however, the Afghan insurgents became more and more adept at disappearing by nightfall. By 2011, finding insurgent leaders required ever more innovation, and preventing imminent attacks often demanded that the Rangers change their operating procedures altogether. Thus, during the summer of 2011, when 3^d Platoon, A Company, 1-75, received credible intelligence about a suicide bomber intent on upsetting the relative security in Konduz Province, they knew it would be a challenge to stop him.

Several insurgent leaders protected him, shepherding him about from village to village, eager to have him succeed. Twice, we targeted him at night, and twice we missed him—this particular group of insurgents knew our methodology.

On the morning of 13 July 2010, shortly before I turned in, I stopped by the JOC for a last time. In the few minutes I was there, we located the targeted individual. Pressure mounted. We were wary of missing our opportunity to prevent him from striking, so my higher headquarters gave me the green light to go. We scrambled in the early morning to find rotary assets that could lift us to the target area, requesting air support from Regional Command-North as mission planning began. I did not expect to receive assets from RC-North, because we were not co-located with its headquarters in Mazar-e Sharif, and the urgency of our request meant that

aircraft would have to be diverted to us from another mission. To my surprise, the request was quickly honored: RC-North gave us the RC commander's UH-60 Blackhawks and AH-64 Apache escorts. The six aircraft and their crews had just finished their relief-in-place into Afghanistan that morning and had no missions planned. This would be their first combat flight.

I was on my second deployment with the platoon, alongside my platoon sergeant, SFC Michael Duchesne. From one deployment to the next, the platoon's composition had changed by only one squad leader. This was clearly a strength for us. SSGs Sean-Michael Cleary and Brandon Hollingsworth led 1st and 2^d squads, respectively; our 3^d Squad was task-organized to another organization and not co-located with us. SSG John Drain completed our platoon's leadership team in Konduz as the Weapons Squad Leader with two machine guns. Additionally, we had a squad's worth of technically skilled Rangers and a special squad of Afghan soldiers. Because we had no mission the previous night and were expecting to sleep throughout the day, most of the men had finished one or more tough workouts. We took that into consideration in our planning, but, as it turned out, we underestimated the impact of not sleeping after having exercised hard.

We made a simple plan. Our decisive point was containment: if we could contain the enemy, we could kill or capture him. We could not land too far away because the insurgents would see or hear us and simply blend into the local population—we had to land right on top of them. The compound lay along a rural dirt road atop a long, fertile plateau—one of many farming residences surrounded by fields and other Afghan compounds.

The compound had two external gates: one at the northwest corner and one near the southeast corner. The four UH-60s would land us just outside of small-arms range from the compound, boxing in the insurgents. The plan required 2^d Squad to land west of the compound along an east-west running dirt road that led directly to the compound's southern gate. Our Afghan squad and a machine gun team would land to the northwest, while a team from 1st Squad and my CP would land to the northeast. The second team from 1st Squad and SFC Duchesne's element would land southeast of the compound, south of the east-west running dirt road, to allow SSG Hollingsworth's men to clear sectors of fire as they approached the

compound. We deconflicted direct fires by our scheme of maneuver since the two assault squads would approach in a tightening “L” while our Afghan squad and SFC Duchesne’s element would take a short halt to allow the assault squads to move into positions without restricting their fires.

So much for plans.

Throughout the flight toward the compound, my JTAC, SGT Timothy Officer, received periodic updates on the target compound from our ISR assets. No one had left the compound, but communication with our ISR assets was spotty at best. Again, we had a strong relationship with the night ISR crews but very little rapport with the day crews. At two minutes out, SGT Officer lost all communication with our main asset. I should have radioed our JOC immediately and asked that it retain control of the asset when we landed, but we had lost communication with assets prior to infiltration before and typically reestablished radio contact quickly after landing. I thought little of the temporary break in communication.

The Blackhawks landed us perfectly, precisely as planned, and within seconds, they were thundering off again. Simultaneously, four men stumbled out of the northern gate, flustered and confused. I saw them clearly—they were unarmed. Seeing us, the four men froze and ran back inside the compound. Our landing had spooked several other men in the area, and civilians along the dirt road scattered. From the very beginning, it was hard to keep track of all the movement on the objective area. We began closing the distance. Our primary ISR asset then reported that an armed insurgent had escaped from the northern gate and fled south, away from my element. SGT Officer asked for clarification—we had seen the men flee back inside the compound—but communication broke down again, and for the rest of the mission, we would not reestablish radio link with that asset.

The pilots in the AH-64s, overhead, had seen nothing. My RTO radioed the JOC over satellite communications to confirm the fleeing individual. The JOC, seeing the ISR asset’s video feed, verified the report. Second Squad had seen a man fleeing the area, but he had appeared to be one of the many scared civilians. Precious seconds had elapsed; I radioed SFC Duchesne to send his containment team after the fleeing individual. SGT Donald Seidle began the chase, leaving SFC Duchesne, his medic, and dog handler on the southeast corner containing the compound. The four remaining insurgents had split into two groups—two men in the southernmost room of the building and two in the northernmost room. We

didn't know it then, but they had a bountiful weapons cache available to them inside the building.

The Rangers in 2^d Squad arrived at the compound first; their route along the road allowed them to move faster than the rest of us, and they began setting up ladders over the compound walls. SFC Duchesne arrived shortly after and secured the southeastern gate. SSG Cleary and I trudged through the muddy fields to the north, and we were 100 meters from the compound when the firing began. The enemy fire hit SFC Duchesne with the first burst; the round impacted his chest plate and then redirected across his kit, splitting and tearing through his arm in several places. More rounds spat out the gate. SGT Jeremy Baker and SSG Hollingsworth's A Team leader, scaled his ladder only feet away from the gate and exchanged fire with the enemy to cover SFC Duchesne's escape from the fatal funnel. Seconds later, the northern two insurgents fired on us in the open. SSG Cleary's lead team leader, SGT Brandon Titlow, instinctively directed fire and assaulted across the open field to win back the initiative in the northern of the two gunfights, forcing the two northernmost insurgents back into the building. The enemy continued to fire on us from the building, through the gate, using the twenty feet of standoff between the compound wall and the building to their advantage. My CP and much of 1st Squad were still vulnerable. SGT Titlow again—this time literally—stuck his neck out for us and deftly returned fire through the gate, exposing himself. His tenacious fire suppressed the enemy, and we moved south to the cover of the compound wall.

Under the din of gunfire, I quickly assessed the situation: we had a team of Rangers chasing one insurgent, four well-barricaded insurgents inside our target compound which occupied the rest of our force; a wounded platoon sergeant; and no communication with our primary ISR asset. I radioed SGT Seidle to return to the platoon. If it were night, I may have been comfortable with him continuing the chase on his own. However, it was just after noon, we had already caused a big stir in the local area, and I simply wasn't confident I could employ aerial fires should SGT Seidle become bogged down in a separate engagement. As he moved back to us, things slowed down. I radioed the JOC and asked for the MEDEVAC birds to be ready. Then, just as I had feared, we took contact from the east.

The automatic fire came from several hundred meters away but was accurate and harassing enough to be worrisome. We had been on the ground

less than twenty minutes, but the conditions had changed enormously. I kicked out a small security element to a tree line just to our east and tasked the AH-64s to identify the shooters. Then I radioed the squad leaders and SFC Duchesne; we needed to take a quick pause and talk face-to-face.

It took several minutes to get together, each leader dictating to his subordinate leaders directions for the interim moments. When at last we huddled together, I saw my platoon sergeant for the first time. He had bled a great deal, his right arm was in a tight sling against his kit, and he held an M9 pistol in his left hand. I didn't ask where his M4 was. "How are you holding up?" I asked. He smiled in response. "We'll MEDEVAC you as soon as we can secure an HLZ," I told him. "The hell you will," he replied. Everyone smiled; it was precisely the right thing to say.

By then, the gunfight had lulled. Every so often, an insurgent would spray a few rounds from a window, while we sporadically shot 40-mm grenades into the doors and windows from our 320s, but, otherwise, we were at a stalemate. I was unwilling to assault the building—there was too much open space between the compound wall and either of the doors. We decided to back away from the compound and engage with the AH-64s. I moved to the east with 1st Squad, while SFC Duchesne moved to the west with 2^d Squad and our Afghan counterparts. SGT Officer coordinated the AH-64 attacks, dictating a south to north heading, with the lead ship firing two Hellfire missiles and the trail ship following up with 30-mm cannon fire. He had planned on two engagements: one on the northern portion of the building and one on the southern; the two places we knew the enemy to be barricaded.

The first Hellfire attack struck the center of the building. SGT Officer directed a second pass again targeting the northern room. The second pass fared better and flattened the northern half of the building. SGT Officer called in additional passes on the southern part, but for some reason, with each pass, the Hellfire missiles missed their mark, and we could not gauge the 30 mm effects because we couldn't see inside the building from our standoff. Again, more insurgents fired on us from the east, this time more accurately, but, without the Apaches searching for them, we couldn't locate the shooters. I was eager to destroy the building and move into the compound for better security. On the final Apache pass, we emptied the AH-64s' Hellfire missiles and collapsed our positions back onto the compound, leaving a security element to the east. We scaled the ladders and

saw that the northern portion of the building was completely destroyed, but the southern rooms—where we knew the last two insurgents to be—appeared largely untouched, except for one room’s southernmost wall. I sent the Apaches back to the FARP to rearm.

After assessing the building and the compound, the squad leaders, platoon sergeant, and I huddled again. We felt like we had been on the ground for much longer than we had. In pulling off the compound for the Hellfire attacks and moving back afterwards, we had lost our offensive tempo. Weariness and lack of sleep began to catch up to us as the adrenaline of the early gunfight wore off. SFC Duchesne was visibly drained, as the blood loss and post-adrenaline crash began to take their toll. The mood among us changed as we waited on the helicopters. Everyone wanted to finish the fight quickly, but still, I believed that the right thing to do was to wait. There was no need to storm the compound when we could destroy it with fires.

When the helicopters returned, we again pulled back, and SGT Officer directed fires for a second time. Again, the Hellfire missiles missed, striking short along the southern compound wall. From my position to the east, we could see the southeastern gate but not the full length of the wall. SFC Duchesne and 2^d Squad had pulled off the compound to the west and positioned themselves to view the northwestern gate. As the helicopters circled for another attack, the JOC forcefully called my RTO after viewing our ISR feed: the two insurgents had climbed out of the newly formed hole in the compound wall and were on the run; we had lost containment of the enemy for a second time. Perhaps they figured it was only a matter of time before the missiles hit accurately, and they had better take their chance to run. I had established an overly predictable attack pattern in employing the helicopters. Because I couldn’t see the men, I assumed they were running into 2^d Squad’s location. To my dismay, they split up. Everything, it seemed, was falling apart. By this time, the JOC was our only means of communicating with our ISR platform, but it could only follow one of the two insurgents. The Apaches, circling wide, never saw the men leave the compound. Second Squad fanned out to interdict the insurgents. One of the two entered an irrigation ditch lined with trees, while the other headed back toward the compound.

From the east, 1st Squad and I began moving back to the target compound to try to cut off the second insurgent but now had to worry about

our direct fires because 2^d Squad was beyond the compound moving towards us as well. The ISR reported the second insurgent had limped back into the compound, badly wounded. SFC Duchesne and 2^d Squad deliberately tracked down the insurgent in the ditch but had a difficult time safely clearing along the trees without exposing themselves, so SFC Duchesne released our canine to find the insurgent. The man was still armed but occupied with the dog, and the squad was able to surprise him from the side and finish the fight.

At long last, we were down to one final insurgent. I had lost patience and faith in the AH-64s and was unwilling to pull off of the compound again. We used Rangers on ladders and grenades to cover our Afghan squad's assault on the building. The Afghan soldiers cleared the first room visually through the windows and peered in the second room through the partially destroyed wall before returning to us outside the compound. The man was still armed, and they didn't want to expose themselves to enter the room. Annoyed and fatigued, SFC Duchesne cleared the room by himself with his M9, his right hand still slung. Sure enough, the man had an AK-47 in one hand and a grenade beneath him. Wounded, SFC Duchesne was still the quicker shot.

The JOC had already contacted the BSO and reported the fight and employment of fires. A platoon-sized element from the BSO was moving to our location by trucks to conduct a battle handover but was several hours away. We collapsed our security inside the compound, emplacing our ladders on the inside facing out. The men were tired and dehydrated. SGT Schwarting, our medic, reported that two of our Rangers had reached heat exhaustion. SFC Duchesne needed to be evacuated as well. The sun beat mercilessly, and we still had to complete the handover with the BSO. Later, we learned the identities of the other three insurgents: one was the suicide bomber we were after, and the others were the district's Taliban commander and his body guard. Despite the lingering bad taste and frustrations, the mission was even more successful than we had known.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Will McKenzie, who served as the Platoon Leader for 3^d Platoon, A Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Rangers, found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: During the offense, it is vital to gain and maintain the initiative in combat operations. One of the central features to seizing the initiative and maintaining momentum is a high operational tempo that creates and takes advantage of opportunities. *Tempo* at the operational level allows attackers to achieve results quicker than the enemy can respond and allows tactical level forces to destroy the enemy in-depth (ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*). Commanders maintain a high tempo in operations by capitalizing on reconnaissance and information collection assets and by making quick decisions on the generated intelligence. While the fight was tough, the rapid decisions made by CPT McKenzie based on his target's location created an opportunity for his platoon to destroy insurgent elements.

During his platoon's fight, CPT McKenzie realized the tempo of his operation had slowed, and he needed to regain the initiative from the threat in the compound. He concentrated the aviation and information collection assets assigned to his mission to rapidly place effects on the compound. These effects disrupted the threat, and CPT McKenzie's platoon quickly closed with and destroyed the enemy before the threat could react. CPT McKenzie's ability to set the conditions for success using all the assets available to his force was decisive in the success of his platoon's raid.

In August, 2010, elements of the 3d Ranger Battalion were part of a large-scale effort to eradicate Taliban leadership safe havens across Kandahar Province. The force was tasked with conducting a deliberate clearance of multiple NAIs throughout the province. GEN Stanley McChrystal spurred a shift in priority when he assumed command of the International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) in 2009, and he identified Kandahar and neighboring Helmand as the operational main effort in the ISAF Joint Command's campaign plan.

With increased attention and resources shifted to the pacification of Kandahar, our Task Force was tasked with conducting initial operations to set the conditions for a successful counterinsurgency fight. This series of operations was part of an initial effort by Special Operations Forces in Kandahar Province, designed to create freedom of maneuver for the new BSO, 2^d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division. The goal was clear: we would attack deep into enemy territory and operate for extended periods of time to disrupt insurgent resupply and staging bases as well as to set the conditions for a future battalion-level BSO offensive into the area.

Due to large-scale popular support of the insurgency in Kandahar Province, Taliban officials and fighters enjoyed total freedom of maneuver throughout the area. The ISAF had not conducted large-scale deliberate operations since 2009, lending to the Taliban's feeling of security. In an attempt to ensure prolonged security, and knowing that American forces were building combat power north of Highway 1, fighters constructed a complex defensive network, consisting of elaborate tunnel systems, reinforced bunkers, and caches. These positions were protected by mutually supporting IEDs, both command-initiated and victim operated systems of varying complexity. House-borne IEDs contributed greatly to the overall restrictive nature of the battlefield. Much of the population had long-since abandoned the villages, leaving many compounds to be used as traps. These compounds were occupied by fighters for several days at a time and would then be rigged with explosive charges at the breaches. After using a compound for several days, the fighters would then move to another compound and begin the process again.

August 6, 2010, was designated as the date for the operation to begin. Our company had begun extensive intelligence development of the target area several days in advance, developing several NAIs to target known and likely enemy locations. Our elements would clear each of the NAIs to disrupt Taliban command and control and to destroy enemy forces in zone. My Platoon Sergeant, SFC Peter Facchini, and I directed platoon-level troop-leading procedures and supervised preparations. The squad leaders and team leaders conducted rehearsals and ensured loads were adequate to sustain the force without slowing down the men during movement. The Company Executive Officer, CPT Bob Schulz, coordinated an aerial resupply, consisting of food, water, ammunition, and medical supplies for the two-platoon assault force.

The basic scheme of maneuver consisted of two platoons air assaulting simultaneously to designated HLZs across four CH-47 Chinook helicopters. The platoons would infiltrate shortly after dark and would be in locations to mutually support one another for the duration of the operation. After inserting into hostile territory, our elements would maintain separation of several hundred meters and clear through several NAIs until we reached a limit of advance four kilometers north. The Task Force would then remain over day in two patrol bases before moving an additional two kilometers to the designated extraction site.

Our element made initial contact with the enemy as my helicopter was on final approach. Fighters had positioned posts intermittently throughout open fields and secured IED's to the tops of the posts with lanyards as initiators. The rotor wash from our helicopter initiated two IEDs but caused no significant damage. The door gunners engaged likely enemy positions in a thick tree line approximately two hundred meters east. As we ran off the back of the helicopter, I heard intermittent fire from one PKM medium machine gun to the south, attempting to fix us in our positions. As our sister platoon maneuvered parallel to our axis of advance to the west, a Ranger in the point element initiated a trip-wire IED. He was slightly wounded, suffering from a mild concussion, but insisted on continuing the mission. At this time, 2^d Platoon located and destroyed one 82-mm mortar system. Both platoons halted to allow EOD technicians to conduct a deliberate clearance for additional trip wires.

Approximately thirty minutes later, the EOD technicians cleared the route, and both platoons continued moving north parallel to one another. My platoon moved to clear a densely vegetated wood line to our east and, subsequently, our first NAI. The wood line was oriented north to south and was flanked on both sides by grape orchards. These orchards are constructed with six-foot deep paths that divide each row. The grapevines grow in a tangled mass, downward into the pathways. This created a natural trench system for the Taliban defenders, capable of providing cover from direct and indirect fire.

At this time, Weapons Squad and 2^d Squad were positioned further north with SFC Facchini. They established a local support-by-fire element oriented east to isolate the northern portion of the tree line. The assault element consisted of 1st and 3^d squads, with my command and control element to their rear. The squads stretched approximately one hundred meters from a field on the east to a grape orchard on the west. I was located to the rear of 3^d Squad with my Radio Telephone Operator and Joint Terminal Air Controller. The lead element came under direct contact when three fighters engaged 1st Squad from fifty meters to the east with AK-47s and a PKM. SGT Nate Marquez maneuvered 1st Squad without hesitation, orienting his men east toward the threat. They assaulted through the enemy position, overwhelming the enemy with direct fire in an extremely close fight, killing all three in the position. SGT Marquez and his men conducted

Sensitive Site Exploitation, and the platoon prepared to continue clearing north.

After moving approximately two hundred meters north of our last contact, 3^d Squad received contact from an additional three fighters in a trench system. The trench was concealed within the tree line and consisted of several fighting positions and an underground bunker at the northeastern corner. The aggressive Squad Leader, SGT Shaun Hardin, threw two fragmentation grenades into the trench and jumped in to deliberately clear. At this time, the surviving fighter engaged SGT Hardin with PKM fire, wounding him in the foot. 1SG Rob Phipps and PFCs Jason Droddy and Alex Davis were within feet of SGT Hardin, and all three Rangers immediately engaged the fighter, wounding him further as he disappeared into the underground bunker. One round from the fighter's PKM hit PFC Davis' weapon and ricocheted into the dirt.

The Rangers recovered SGT Hardin from the trench and moved southwest to my location where the Platoon Medic, Doc Jiminez, treated him. Based on the complexity of the trench system and likelihood of additional IEDs, I recommended to the commander, MAJ Alex Garn, that we use A-10 Warthogs to reduce any further enemy positions. My element was not in contact at this time, and we moved west to link up with SFC Facchini and the rest of the platoon at a safe distance from the trench. After SFC Facchini and I confirmed that all personnel were accounted for, Air Force TSgt TJ Gunnell, cleared the A-10s inbound to drop multiple laser-guided bombs. The air assets conducted two additional passes, effectively destroying the enemy trench line and reducing much of the vegetation.

At this time, I met with the company commander and the rest of the company leadership to discuss courses of action for the remainder of the mission. Based on the amount of contact with the enemy and the slow, deliberate speed of the clearance, MAJ Garn determined that the company would not be able to clear all the way to our designated patrol base location before the sun rose. The planned patrol base was still at least one kilometer away, and it had taken us over two hours to move the first kilometer. We had two hours of darkness remaining and, more importantly, two Rangers who had to be evacuated for medical treatment. Using maps and imagery, we found a suitable location for a patrol base only three hundred meters to our north. The two large buildings were on the north side of a small east-west running road and would provide interlocking sectors of fire. Our sister

platoon advanced 200 meters north and established a support-by-fire position to allow us freedom of maneuver to clear and secure our compound. Once we were in place in the compound, 2^d Platoon advanced to clear and secure the second large compound. Once both compounds were secure, we conducted a CASEVAC for the two wounded Rangers and received a resupply of ammunition, food, and water.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Chris Wallgren, who served as the Platoon Leader for 3^d Platoon, Bravo Company, 3^d Ranger Battalion. CPT Wallgren's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: Leaders control Tempo, the rate of military action relative to the threat, instead of mission speed to maintain initiative throughout operations (FM 3-21.10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*). The use of careful planning procedures and clear, concise mission orders enable leaders to transition through offensive operations while maintaining contact with the enemy. By continually maintaining contact, forces are able to overwhelm defenses and immobilize and destroy the enemy before they can react (ADRP 3-90). During operations, forces increase their tempo by capitalizing on fire and maneuver to destroy the enemy through the depth of the fight. Leaders also balance tempo and mission command to prevent outpacing their ability to command and control subordinate units. During CPT Wallgren's mission, his platoon maintained its offensive tempo throughout the operation, successfully destroying the enemy as part of the fight to disrupt insurgent elements in Kandahar Province.

CPT Wallgren's mission began by conducting planning using the TLP process at both company and platoon levels. The development of a clear order and rehearsals at the tactical level ensured that once his platoon made contact, it was able to react faster than the enemy could adapt. This faster reaction time and the integration of aviation assets allowed CPT Wallgren's element to maintain contact with enemy forces throughout the fight, leaving the insurgents unable to rest and consolidate. By maintaining the initiative in the fight, his platoon destroyed the enemy defenders before they could recover. The tempo of CPT Wallgren's operation was balanced and based on the deliberate and synchronized pace required to clear his assigned NAIs in parallel with another force to ensure mission success.

CONCLUSION: The saying, “the enemy has a vote,” is common, and we see this throughout many of the monographs contained here. The moment an operation begins, all of the elements of METT-TC impact the plan. To maintain tempo and, thus, the initiative, leaders rely on well-trained, well-rehearsed, and adaptive Soldiers to carry the day.

CHAPTER 4

Intelligence

I don't get intelligence off a satellite. Iraqis tell me who the enemy is.
— Major General James Mattis

INTRODUCTION: In the sixth century B.C., Sun Tzu advised commanders to know their enemy, thus setting in motion what has become a requirement for the systematic process of gathering and evaluating intelligence. Throughout history, his admonition has proven relevant and critical to winning on the battlefield. In the past, this process focused on formations at the platoon level and higher; today, it can easily focus on individual players, resulting in an evolution in this Warfighting Function. In the foreword of ADP 2-0, MG Gregg Patter writes, “Intelligence is critical to unified land operations and decisive action. We have made tremendous progress over the last ten years by utilizing lessons learned to improve the intelligence Warfighting Function.”

From May until November, 2006, Marines in the Marine Advisor Detachment 1-7 served as advisors to the 1st (Commando) Kandak (CK), 3^d Brigade, 201st Corps, Afghan National Army (ANA). The Afghan National Army (ANA) Battalion's 3^d Company Commander, Captain X, had served as an intelligence officer for four years in the early 1990s. He had also served in the Mujahedeen against the Soviets in the 1980s. His battalion commander assigned Captain X's company a specific AO in the same manner that U.S. commanders assign their subordinates battle space, and Captain X began to actively develop the situation in his battle space with an aggressive patrolling effort that saturated the area.

As the company became familiar with the area, Captain X established a network of informants. Soon, he had an informant in each of the four major villages in his sector. He devised an ingenious way of establishing the informant and the method of communicating with him. Every time a patrol would enter a village, a *Shura* (gathering of elders) was called, as was customary when a group of visitors arrived. Captain X would address the entire group, and then he would talk to each member separately. During this meeting, he would determine if an individual was capable and willing to provide information to him. In each subsequent patrol, he would return

to that village, and the process would be repeated. As the relationship grew and the informant became trustworthy, Captain X began to gather information about the area.

As the quality of information grew, we were able to gather sufficient intelligence that the Taliban had consolidated and established its headquarters and logistics node in the town of Zangabad. This town was located about 1,500 meters to our southwest. Our intelligence was reinforced by the increasing amount of activity our patrols were receiving when heading in that direction.

We had decided that we needed to prevent the enemy from establishing a strong position, like they had in Pashmul, thus denying them their last toehold in the area. We also determined that the increasing enemy activity back in the Pashmul area and along Highway 1 to the north was being directed and supplied from this location. The informants gave Captain X detailed information on the routes the enemy used to funnel troops and supplies to these areas. We also found out the Taliban leaders' names and the places and times the Taliban commanders held their councils of war. The intelligence showed that the enemy leaders would meet every third night, rotating between three locations.

On the night of 6 October, Captain X received a call from one of his informants that a security detail of one of the Taliban commanders had moved into a house close to our base to gather intelligence on our positions. From this intelligence, we were able to act on some of the targeting packages we had developed from the increasing intelligence coming to us. After determining the exact location of the enemy and civilians within the area, we decided to drop a laser-guided munition on the target house. The result was ten enemy confirmed killed. This incident served to validate the information the informants were providing.

While the CK was initially attached to TF Grizzly, made up of elements of the U.S. Army 207th Infantry Brigade, they eventually turned over responsibility of this AO to NATO's command element, TF Kandahar. The CK now came under the operational command of the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR). The RCR met the intelligence we were providing with skepticism. As a result, the operation to attack Zangabad was postponed. Over the next week, the enemy ramped up their efforts to secure their foothold in the area and began to increase their security area.

We were not adequately manned or equipped to attack Zangabad on our own. We had to wait for approval to conduct the attack and, thus, began to see the rapid encroachment of the enemy into our security area, the possibility of our only ground LOC being cut off, and the probability of our location eventually becoming surrounded. With the number of IEDs increasing and direct contact closer to our defensive perimeter, we decided to take action. Otherwise, our position would soon become untenable, and the Taliban influence in the area would grow rapidly, mitigating the successes of previous operations.

The instances in which our human intelligence sources provided accurate reports eventually caused the LAV Canadian company commander to agree with our assessment of the situation. We decided to conduct an operation focused on preventing the enemy from influencing our LOC. Labeling the operation as a “security patrol in force,” the Canadian battalion commander agreed to his force’s role in the operation as a QRF and allowed us to use his 81-mm mortar section as our indirect fire asset, in addition to having priority to any standby air assets in the area.

The attack was to be focused on a compound that was less than a kilometer away from our current position. Two days before, one of our security patrols engaged the enemy at this position. It had struck us as a formidable position manned by a squad-sized element much closer to our LOC than we had seen before. Intelligence showed that the Taliban was setting up illegal checkpoints along the main route and reinforcing these checkpoints during the daytime with about 50 fighters. At night, they would leave only about ten fighters behind in a compound along the road. Our intent was to draw the enemy out into a large-scale fight and destroy them with indirect fire and close air support.

When the attack commenced, it soon became evident that the force on the objective was much more substantial than expected. The enemy maneuvered on us via concealed “ratlines” and occupied pre-established positions in between our two companies. A platoon-sized element at this position took my company under enfilading fire, pinning us down along the edge of an open field. We called the Canadian QRF to begin its 1,800 meter movement to our position and relieve the pressure on my company, thus allowing us to assault our objective. Due to confusion between the Canadian company and its parent battalion, the LAV platoon never came to our aid.

At this point, we had no choice but to extract ourselves. After linking up with our sister company, we conducted a series of rearward bounds. We decided to return to base under protection of several sections of British GR-7 Harriers.

The operation resulted in the deaths of 48 enemy fighters, while sustaining minimal friendly casualties. While I believe this operation accomplished most of our goals, Captain X believed that we missed an opportunity to inflict twice as many casualties.

From the personal experience monograph written by Capt James Birchfield, who served as a Marine combat advisor with Marine Advisor Detachment 1-7. Capt Birchfield's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: The IPB developed by Capt Birchfield and CPT X depicted the enemy forces in Zangabad accurately; however, they were unable to capitalize on relevant intelligence to leverage necessary assets to conduct a successful attack.

The ATP 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace*, defines the IPB as “the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations.” Capt Birchfield and his ANA counterpart developed relationships with the local populace, HUMINT, that enabled them to paint an accurate picture of the enemy activity within their area of operations. They capitalized on the elders’ willingness to talk, developed a course of action (laser guided munition), and executed it rapidly, resulting in ten confirmed enemy killed. However, when Capt Birchfield and CPT X attempted to seize the initiative, they were met with skepticism by their higher headquarters.

The ADRP 2-0, *Intelligence*, defines the intelligence process in four steps: Plan and Direct, Collect, Produce, and Disseminate. CAPT Capt Birchfield and CPT X were relentless in the intelligence process. Their efforts resulted in them gaining an accurate and valuable understanding of their enemy through HUMINT; however, the delay in the targeting process enabled the enemy to develop improved fighting positions and a scheme of maneuver.

When the combined forces finally executed the mission, the enemy was waiting for them. The unexpected strength of the enemy, in addition to

their engagement area development, forced the partnered force to withdraw instead of exploiting the initiative and destroying the enemy strongpoint.

Spectacular suicide bombings, extravagant assassinations, and devastating roadside bombs characterized the history of Saydiyah, Iraq, that commenced with the U.S. invasion and terminated at summer's end in 2007. The 3^d Platoon, C Company, 1-18 Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, participated in a mission to capture an individual sought in connection with attacks on U.S. forces on 9 August 2007.

Throughout the summer of 2007, the task force had been tracking Abu Salah, who orchestrated IED and EFP attacks, trafficked weapons, and orchestrated various acts of intimidation and violence. On numerous occasions, one of our platoons readied for his apprehension only to be stood down prior to departure because of intelligence issues. In early August, a local Iraqi man, Mohammed, presented himself to U.S. forces at FOB Falcon and purportedly had intimate knowledge on the whereabouts of Salah. Mohammad also had specific, actionable information about two other men the task force sought for similar nefarious activities, though their roles were peripheral, vice Salah's, whose role was instrumental. Fortuitously, pattern-of-life analysis concluded that all three men would converge in Saydiyah for one night—9 August.

The CO told me, "If Mohammad turns out to be legit, your platoon is on for tonight." Tensions were especially high this time since the company had lost one of its own three days prior in an EFP attack. The unmentioned (but not unnoticed) implication of a possible linkage between our target and our recently lost friend increased emotions. Despite the dearth of information, the squad leaders were quite adept at preparing their squads for nearly any eventuality.

I kept in contact throughout the day with the intelligence collector who was questioning Mohammed and gathering as much usable information for us as possible. I disseminated what was pertinent as it became available to assist the squad and section leaders in their planning: identification of target individuals, general descriptions, location of sites, religious/political/ethnic affiliations, attachments to our platoon, rough scheme of maneuver, approximate timeline, etc. By dinner time, I had received and disseminated virtually all of the information we were likely to obtain.

After the CO approved my mission plan, we poured over a map with the intelligence collector, Mohammed, and an interpreter. We moved to the

vehicles shortly thereafter and prepared to depart. Each vehicle extinguished its lights as it rumbled through the gate away from FOB Falcon towards ASR Jackson. We reached an empty ASR Jackson and proceeded north toward Saydiyah. It took a few minutes to get everyone organized and oriented once the vehicles offloaded their passengers.

Our movement into the first house was effortless. Three military-aged males were in the house as well as other family members. We separated the three men from the rest of the family. I conducted an initial questioning of them, but all three men gave evasive or nonsensical answers—indicative that they were being less than forthright. I photographed them and moved back down the street with a small security element to the vehicle where Mohammed was. He stayed in the vehicle so that he would not be identified as having worked with U.S. forces. Mohammed and I hovered over my camera as I clicked through the photographs. He did not recognize the first two men but confirmed the third man was one of the lesser players we sought.

We did not have much to justify holding the other two men, but the military working dog team indicated that several rooms had strong traces of explosives and probably had contained explosives recently although none were present now. This would be enough information for us to justify detaining all three men. The second target house we approached was demolished and clearly no longer being used. We received, however, very heavy contact in the third building we approached, and multiple Soldiers were wounded. I had to radio for the Bradleys to come forward and engage the house with 25 mm before we were able to neutralize the threat.

Local reporting, which could be sketchy, sufficiently coalesced a couple weeks after the operation and closed the book on our mystery—Abu Salah had been killed along with his accomplice. Additionally, the accomplice's parents, who were present in the house during the engagement, also perished.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Brian Bifulco, who served as the Platoon Leader of 3^d Platoon, C Company, 1-18 Infantry, 2-1 ID. CPT Bifulco's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: According to FM 3-60, *The Targeting Process*, there are four Principles to the Targeting Process: Determine the Commander's

Objectives, Create Desired Effects through Lethal and Non-lethal Actions, Use Participation of Many Disciplines, and Achieve Effects through Lethal and Non-lethal Effects in a Systematic Manner. During CPT Bifulco's operation, he used these principles to ensure success on the battlefield. He determined High Value Targets through the commander's priorities, used multiple levels of intelligence analysis, and determined his scheme of maneuver through the TLP process. In conclusion, he was able to disrupt the network through lethal targeting of High Value Targets.

The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was a fully-functioning Islamic shadow government that, at its height of power in 2005-2007, arguably had more power than the U.S.-backed Government of Iraq. It had maintained a low profile during the U.S. forces' surge in 2007. Moreover, a large number of ISI leaders were targeted and killed or captured by U.S. Special Operations elements during the surge, dealing a significant blow to the operations of the Islamic shadow government in key Iraqi cities such as Baghdad, Mosul, Bayji, Baqubah, and Fallujah. The subsequent drawdown of US-led military operations provided the dormant ISI leaders, specifically its military wing, with an opportunity to fill the vacuum that was created in the battlespace. During the spring of 2009, the ISI would attempt to retake the momentum that was lost in mid-2007.

The focus of our intelligence collection, targeting, and kill/capture missions in spring, 2009, was against ISI leaders in central Iraq. In late March 2009, intelligence sources received information that major bombing attacks were being planned for urban population centers in central Iraq, specifically Baghdad, Baqubah, and Balad. The intelligence reports stated that the ISI was most likely going to conduct the attacks with SVBIEDs and dismounted suicide bombers in heavily-crowded areas of the urban centers. The mission of my strike force was to dismantle this network prior to the suicide attacks. We were to neutralize this network using intelligence assets, mainly ISR assets, to pursue the individual insurgent leaders. Specifically, UAVs provided an "unblinking eye" on enemy compounds to observe patterns of life and determine a bed-down location where we could conduct a kill or capture raid.

On 26 April 2009, intelligence collections assets provided reliable information on the location of a senior ISI commander who they said was due east of Balad, Iraq. Our ISR assets were positioned near where

intelligence sources believed the target was located. The battlespace owner was conducting a battalion-sized operation in a village ten kilometers to the north of where our ISR assets were scanning. Sources had informed our intelligence staff that local insurgent leaders were going to be fleeing the village as a result of the BSO's operations during that period of darkness. Based on this information, our ISR assets were looking specifically for the signature of multiple military-aged men moving to the south.

The intelligence source was not only timely, but also accurate. As dusk arrived, the ISR assets identified a group of 12 men moving tactically with objects that we assessed were weapons. As the 12 men settled in for the night in a remote orchard, the trigger to launch my assault force was met, and our time-sensitive target SOP was initiated.

During our infiltration, we were able to preserve the element of surprise and land far enough from the objective, so the enemy could not hear the roar of the helicopters. Isolation began with the lead squad reaching the release point and ended with isolation established by two rifle squads. At the release point, SSG Larry Loring maneuvered his squad 150 meters northwest of the orchard, establishing the northwest blocking position. The PSG, SFC Eric Bohannon; Bahco, the K-9; and SGT Brandon Breffle, the K-9 handler, were located with SSG Patrick McGuire's squad. Isolation was established, and the assault was ready to commence.

SSG McGuire led the silent assault on the orchard, identifying an opening in the thick vegetation on the southern edge of the orchard. As his squad began the clearance of the orchard, it was engaged by small arms fire from the enemy security element. The ISR assets reported that the enemy inside the orchard began fleeing in three directions—west, northwest, and northeast—in teams of four. Although our goal was to capture the HVIs alive, and I wanted to give them every opportunity to allow us to capture them, the enemy on this objective was not going to be taken alive. The enemy element moving to the west provided the rest of the enemy with covering fire to break contact. The sniper team engaged two men moving to the west. The ISR reported that four men were moving north approximately 200 meters from the orchard. The group of enemy fleeing to the northeast displayed no intentions of surrendering either. The situation was clear: the enemy was heavily armed, it had a base of fire element to enable the HVIs to break contact, and it was not going to surrender. I ordered the AH-6s to destroy the enemy fleeing to the northeast and north. The manned ISR asset

provided observation of the enemy to the north, and the unmanned Predator UAV provided observation of the enemy fleeing to the northeast. The two AH-6s conducted eight gun runs with six thousand rounds of 7.62-mm mini-guns and fourteen 2.75-mm rockets. The initial battle damage assessment was eight EKIA.

SSG Loring's blocking position northwest of the orchard blocked the enemy fleeing to the west. His squad was in a small arms firefight with the four men with no more than 75 meters between the two elements. The corrugated fields to the west of the orchard provided the only cover and concealment. The manned ISR asset provided me with timely status reports on the enemy as SSG Loring's men were engaged with them. Three of the men were neutralized, but one maneuvered into a prepared fighting position 200 meters to the west of the orchard. SSG Loring could not get a visual on the enemy position despite his night vision devices, to include a thermal optic. I relayed traffic from the ISR platform that estimated the enemy position was 50-60 meters to the north of SSG Loring's lead element.

The enemy was in a prepared fighting position in defilade. SFC Bohannon, with SGT Breffle and Bahco, maneuvered to SSG Loring's position to use Bahco, a multipurpose canine, to assist in locating the enemy position. Bahco tracked to the enemy location and briefly neutralized the enemy before being shot multiple times with an AK-47. Bahco's sacrifice allowed SSG Loring's squad to identify the enemy position.

As SSG Loring maneuvered his squad on the enemy position, the fortified enemy and my Rangers exchanged small arms fire and grenades at a range of 15-20 meters before the enemy was neutralized. SSG Loring cleared through the enemy position, identified a flame on the enemy's chest, and called for his Rangers to fall back. The enemy's explosive suicide vest started to burn from the 5.56-mm tracer bullets fired by SSG Loring's squad. Without any regard for his own safety as the explosives were continuing to burn, SSG Loring recovered Bahco's remains and sprinted south towards the rest of his squad. The enemy explosive suicide vest detonated as SSG Loring reached his squad 25 meters from the enemy position.

As the firefight between SSG Loring's squad and the fortified enemy ensued, the manned ISR asset reported one enemy maneuvering 100 meters to the southeast of the orchard. SGT Brandon Brawley's squad maneuvered on the enemy location as the ISR asset "sparkled" with infrared

light pulses the enemy location. I ordered SSG Brawley to call out the enemy from his position and attempt to capture him for intelligence value. The platoon's forward observer identified the enemy concealed in a thick bush and neutralized him with hand-to-hand combat. SSG Brawley immediately conducted tactical questioning of the enemy fighter. He revealed that all of the fighters on the objective were armed with AK-47s, hand grenades, and suicide vests. This information was critical in how I was going to fight the remainder of the mission.

At this point, the two groups of fighters to the northeast and north that were engaged by the AH-6s were assessed to be EKIA, and the four fighters to the west were killed in the firefight with SSG Loring's squad, one of them by his suicide vests detonating. I ordered all of my squads to maintain a security posture at their current location. I believed that the suicide vests on each fighter were too unstable to safely clear through the engagement areas.

After reporting the situation to higher, another Ranger platoon, with two K-9 teams, and the BSO, with EOD assets, were activated. The additional Ranger platoon arrived first. This platoon was from a different company and led by its company commander. After I briefed the commander on the situation, he became adamant that the enemy needed to be cleared now and that delaying any longer would detract from the tempo of the fight. I strongly advised against this course of action; I believed clearing through the enemy without EOD and facing the possibility of a sympathetic detonation of an SVEST were too dangerous and not worth the risk to the force. Despite my recommendation, the commander ordered his platoon to start clearing through the engagement areas. As I saw their lead squad enter the northwest engagement area, I heard an explosion. An SVEST had detonated and wounded one Ranger from the other company. He was successfully evacuated with wounds to his lower extremities. No further clearance was conducted until the BSO with the EOD assets arrived, who eventually conducted controlled detonations on multiple suicide vests.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Scott Quigley, who served as a platoon leader in D Company 2-75th Ranger Regiment. CPT Quigley's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: CPT Quigley's platoon had effective surveillance on the enemy in the form of UAS and CCA, which were able to provide him with early warning, observation of NAIs, and the ability to track key targets on the battlefield. Sensor platforms are, by definition, passive and could not provide CPT Quigley with the specific composition and intent of the enemy that he was fighting. This then cued CPT Quigley on the need to conduct reconnaissance for HUMINT on their objective and adjust his scheme of maneuver and surveillance plan to ensure his Rangers could effectively capture and then question an enemy combatant. The FM 3-55, *Information Collection*, states that the primary sensor is the Soldier and that Soldiers should be prepared to conduct tactical questioning. The FM 2-91.6, *Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection*, defines tactical questioning as direct questioning by any DOD personnel of a captured or detained person to obtain time-sensitive tactical intelligence at or near the point of capture or detention and consistent with applicable law. Following the successful capture and tactical questioning of the enemy combatant, CPT Quigley was able to mix the different collection assets available and gain a more complete picture of the enemy. No one system alone is capable of providing perfect information. The UAS could provide him with the disposition of the enemy force and his general composition, but he learned about the enemy's specific armament and intent through HUMINT. With this knowledge of the enemy's disposition, composition, and likely course of action, CPT Quigley was able to maneuver on and destroy the remaining enemy forces, while avoiding the risk to his own force that the suicide vests represented.

On 17 October 2011, a Special Operations strike force supported a Marine offensive by conducting a night raid to kill or capture a mid-level Taliban commander in a Taliban-controlled region. The strike force element, conducting a shaping operation, was tasked to disrupt enemy command and control in the periphery of the Marines' AO to enable the Marine battalion conducting the decisive operation to clear a route and the area directly north of the Kajaki Dam.

During our support of Operation Eastern Storm, my strike force conducted numerous raids into northern Helmand. The shaping operations prior to Eastern Storm led to the killing or capturing of several insurgent leaders and their associates, which, in turn, contributed to the disruption of

the enemy mission command and their build-up of combat power along the Marine AO. These operations also resulted in the identification of new targets by means of the F3EAD cycle. Among these new targets was the targeted individual of this mission. Using intelligence gathered, exploited, and analyzed during these and other operations into northern Kajaki, our intelligence analysts identified the individual's name, position within the insurgent network, and three frequented areas, designated as NAIs. The team knew nothing of the HVI's biography, pattern of life, and bed-down locations, which made finding, fixing, and finishing the target with any level of accuracy difficult.

Given the information shortfalls, refining a trigger for the target would include the layering and synchronization of several forms of intelligence and could take several days, if not weeks or longer. Special Operations strike forces, designed to conduct surgical operations, are typically employed against targets with operational or strategic-level payoff and are known, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be located at a known and actionable location. At the time of the operation, we did not know enough about the HVI to meet the standard threshold for triggering a mission against the target. However, due to the lack of time remaining before the Marine offensive began and the need for continued disruption of the enemy within the AO, my strike force was approved to execute a kill or capture mission against the HVI.

For the mission, we determined that we would have to clear NAI 3, a cluster of mud and brick compounds just beyond the northern edge of a village in the Kajaki District. Analysts selected NAI 3 by overlaying numerous forms of intelligence and determined it to be a possible bed-down location for the HVI. After isolating the target compound, the strike force would establish containment and conduct a silent clear of the target compound. After the target compound at NAI 3 was cleared and secured, the strike force would transition to post assault operations, which included security, tactical questioning (TQ), SSE, and KLE.

If the HVI was not located at NAI 3, and intelligence collected during clearance and post assault operations at NAI 3 identified the HVI's location, the strike force had a plan to move to, isolate, and clear that location. Both NAIs 1 and 2 were assessed to be alternate bed-down locations for the HVI; NAI 2 was a cluster of four mud and brick compounds located along a karez system, and NAI 1 was a larger cluster of six smaller compounds, with a

karez system running along and internal to the NAI. Upon killing or capturing the HVI, determining our HVI not to be at any of the NAIs, or reaching our no-later-than exfiltration time, the strike force would conduct a dismounted movement to our primary extraction HLZ located east of NAI 3. An alternate HLZ to the southeast was planned in the case the strike force conducted clearance of NAI 2 and/or 1.

My strike force and I conducted a rotary wing insertion and began the dismounted overland infiltration to NAI 3 according to the plan. Immediately, our intelligence collection assets detected a spike in activity in vicinity of NAIs 1 and 2. As we approached NAI 3, we slowed our movement and transitioned to travelling overwatch. Assets reported men with possible weapons to our front, but we were unable to gain positive identification to engage. During this time, we also became aware that the enemy used night vision devices to see our IR signature and recognized our front line trace. To maintain the element of surprise, I directed the strike force to turn off all IR lights and strobes and to execute discipline with IR lasers.

At NAI 3, my strike force established isolation and containment and conducted a silent clear of the target building which resulted in nothing significant. During post assault operations, we did not find any significant SSE, and tactical questioning did not yield identification of the HVI. Due to the limited time we had to conduct TQ of the military-aged males on target, we secured and moved them with the strike force to the next NAI. While transitioning from NAI 3, we received reports of possible spotters on the rooftops of NAI 2, followed by the egress of twelve military-aged males from the compounds at NAI 2 into a karez-type tunnel system entrance.

Based on the intelligence collected on the HVI thus far in the operation, the activity at NAI 2, and the time available, I decided to commit my strike force against NAI 2. After disseminating the plan to my strike force and reporting my recommendation to higher, we initiated movement towards NAI 2. After moving a kilometer southeast in traveling overwatch, the strike force reached the en route release point. The isolation element moved to isolate NAI 2 to the north and provided security on the karez entrance where twelve military-aged males egressed. As the assault element moved to the south side of NAI 2 toward the breach, the lead team engaged a military-aged male armed with an AK-47 moving from an adjacent

structure towards another karez entrance. The enemy was hit but continued to egress into the karez system. While the lead team cleared the karez entrance, assets identified a male hiding in a treetop within the compound where the enemy originated. The assault force conducted a hasty clear of the compound, detained the man in the tree, and transitioned back to NAI 2.

Once isolation and containment were set on NAI 2, the assault force breached and systematically cleared the compounds. The assault force detained several males and discovered an AK-74 and chest rack while conducting cursory SSE.

After clearing, conducting SSE, and conducting an abbreviated TQ at NAI 2, we neared one hour from the planned extraction time. Assets reported the HVI was still active and that there was an increase in activity by military-aged males at NAI 1. My team commander and I assessed the timeline, moved the extraction HLZ closer, and elected to clear NAI 1.

While maneuvering south to NAI 1, the activity of military-aged males changed from the northern end to the southern end of the NAI. Based on reporting from assets, I changed the primary compound for clearance at NAI 1. While establishing isolation at NAI 1, the containment element sustained three casualties when it engaged a group of enemy inside the cluster of compounds at NAI 1. While my platoon sergeant took control of casualty evacuation, I called up the nine-line medical evacuation report. I also directed the assault element to clear the remainder of NAI 1 to eliminate the remaining threat and prevent the egress of any enemy into possible karez entrances located in the compounds.

Both daylight and extraction time were quickly approaching, and completion of the mission was not feasible in the time remaining. My team commander coordinated for our sister strike force to conduct a helicopter insertion to NAI 1 as a QRF. Our sister strike force would bring us a resupply package and reinforce our position for a ROD operation.

Following the clearance of NAI 1 and the completion of casualty evacuation, a squad leader and I selected an Afghan compound to be our ROD site. I collapsed the strike force's isolation element and consolidated the strike force in a strong point position, and my team commander and I coordinated link-up with the quick reaction force.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Arnold Steinlage, who served as a Strike Force Leader and Ground Force Commander in a

Special Operations Task Force. CPT Steinlage's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: In August 2011, CPT Steinlage led a special intelligence-driven raid to kill or capture a high value individual operating in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. By using the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate methodology, outlined in FM 3-60, *The Targeting Process*, new targets were quickly developed and targeted to maintain pressure on insurgent networks. This targeting methodology combines both intelligence and operations to achieve a more holistic approach to targeting than the Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A) model allows. The F3EAD model is not a new process separate from the D3A process; it is the natural evolution of a targeting process that was not designed to support the operational tempo required to disrupt or defeat insurgent networks.

CPT Steinlage's strike operation was launched without the target being fixed. To achieve concentration, CPT Steinlage decided to clear the three separate NAIs sequentially. Continuous observation of the remaining NAIs allowed the information collection assets to "pull" CPT Steinlage's raid force to another location if the target was fixed at another site.

The use of the term NAI should be changed to targeted area of interest if friendly forces have planned to strike an enemy force inside the area of interest. While this may seem like an arbitrary differentiation, it does impact the legalities of using special intelligence collection assets. Focus Targeting Forces should be careful to use the correct term, especially when ROEs become less permissive.

CONCLUSION: As we can see from these Soldiers' experiences, intelligence gathering has evolved, allowing greater precision and lethality. Leaders have seen the necessity to consider all sources of information—whether HUMINT, SIGINT, and others. It is in the layering and synchronization of multiple forms of intelligence that brings a clear picture to our leaders and Soldiers so they can plan and execute effective operations.

CHAPTER 5

Reconnaissance

“Getting the operational plan properly worked out by reconnaissance in advance is crucial to the subsequent success of any operation...”

— LTC Bob Stewart
Broken Lives

INTRODUCTION: “Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area” (JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*). While recent technology provides greater facility in the collection of this information than ever before, the information requirements have increased as well.

In October 2005, TF 2-1, 172^d SBCT, was conducting operations in Mosul, Iraq, and over a 20-day period, TF 2-1 was engaged by five SVBIEDs. On 23 October, the Battalion S-2 determined that the enemy would conduct a complex attack consisting of either an IED or an SVBIED, followed by sniper fire or RPGs once recovery assets arrived. The battalion commander wanted to interdict this attack, so he sent 3^d Platoon, Alpha Company, to conduct surveillance and interdict, if possible. The 3^d Platoon immediately established three mutually supporting positions within the city.

At approximately 0700 the next day, the sounds in the streets picked up into the normal buzz of a Monday morning and, by 0800, became what can only be described as a roar of people and traffic; the environment favored the enemy. However, we noticed one particular vehicle, a green Renault with a broken right side mirror and occupied by three military-aged males, which had driven through the intersection numerous times over the previous hour. The usual *modus operandi* employed by the enemy was to use two to three military-aged males for direct attacks, such as ambushes and RPG attacks, and a single military-aged male in an SVBIED. My 2^d Squad Leader, who was across Route Buick to my southeast, confirmed that we had, in fact, seen the same car pass through. At that point, I called battalion and gave the BOLO (be on the look-out), and the battle captain

directed two platoons to the area to interdict. An MP unit, which worked closely with our battalion, was in the area and came up on the net, letting us know it could assist. As the MPs made their way toward the intersection, a blue four-door Opel pulled on to Route Buick behind them. The Opel was driven by an elderly male, accompanied by three women, who we later learned were his wife and two daughters. The MPs signaled for the man to stop, and he complied, putting his hands up to signal that he meant no harm. The Opel then exploded. The concussion from the blast shattered the windows within a one-block radius.

Seconds later, “RPG! RPG!” came across the net from my 1st Squad Leader. A flurry of gunshots dropped a military-aged male who was standing next to the green Renault. The Renault then sped away. We used Apache pilots as guides to find the Renault, and once they observed the passengers firing from the windows, they destroyed the vehicle with a Hellfire missile.

Once the fire was extinguished at the site of the Renault, we discovered two dead males, three AK-47s, two RPGs, ammunition, and four cell phones. We had been engaged by the two components of the complex attack; the SVBIED was the initial engagement, followed by the direct action cell. However, based on SIGINT picked up from higher-level assets, the coordinator was still active. According to the information, the enemy was able to vector more assets to the area and was trying to get in contact with a second VBIED in the area, supposedly a green bongo truck. This green bongo truck detonated itself on Alpha Company’s 2^d Platoon four days later.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Antonio Aguilar, who served as the Platoon Leader of 3^d Platoon, A Company, TF 2-1. CPT Aguilar’s monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, violence waxed and waned; however, there was one major constant: units that properly managed their reconnaissance were extremely successful. In this case, the platoon properly applied the principle of Redundancy to its operation and was able to maintain continuous reconnaissance on the vehicle in question. Without this effort, a gap in coverage would have developed, which was a deficiency the insurgents in Iraq were particularly adept at exploiting.

Additionally, the ability to develop an effective trigger and coordination measures to cue an asset onto a reconnaissance objective (in this case the car involved in the small arms attack) is critical. Without the integration of the various assets at the disposal of the unit conducting a reconnaissance mission, it becomes extremely difficult to ensure that the unit can effectively gain and maintain contact with an enemy. These other assets, which can be cued to observe a target, help to focus the limited assets that a commander will task with conducting continuous reconnaissance.

The FM 3-90.1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team*, asserts there are rarely enough reconnaissance assets to cover every requirement. However, deliberately planning for and using the assets that are on hand maximize an individual unit's ability to collect information throughout the AOR.

From March until October 2006, Charlie Company, 1-25 Marines, served in Fallujah, Iraq. The company's mission was to secure MSR Fran and conduct counterinsurgency operations within Fallujah to prevent insurgent activity. MSR Fran was the primary thoroughfare in this battalion's AO.

Bravo Company was required to secure MSR Fran to the east of our AO. It accomplished this by positioning three OPs along the MSR which were extremely effective in preventing the insurgents from emplacing IEDs along MSR Fran in its area of operations. However, Bravo Company had an advantage it could exploit that Charlie Company did not have: a string of residential neighborhoods located in its AO that overlooked MSR Fran. Bravo's leadership was able to rent the houses from the owners and set OPs in them. This was not the case in our AO which was mostly industrial; therefore, we were unable to follow Bravo's example. Our company commander would have to find another way to secure MSR Fran.

Typically, the insurgents would emplace their IEDs in the same locations time after time. Now, one would think this would be an easy scenario to prevent. However, the number of local citizens who lived in the city, or passed through our area of operations daily, provided a high level of foot and vehicular traffic that the insurgents used to emplace IEDs. Furthermore, there were no suitable buildings that offered us protection against insurgent attacks, which occurred daily against OPs. In addition, since our firm base was the only American base within the city, we had to have a robust security perimeter manned by a platoon. We did not have the

resources to accomplish all of our specified and implied tasks and carry our permanent observation posts. It was a catch-22: we wanted to operate permanent OPs; however, we also had to accomplish a great deal of other missions.

We then attempted to position temporary OPs along MSR Fran with the support of our snipers. We would emplace these OPs for only 24 hours. The problem we faced with this tactic was that there were limited buildings that supported our mission with good observation and fields of fire. Since all of these buildings are inhabited by the local Iraqis, we could only man them for a very short amount of time before our positions were compromised. In addition, we did not like to use the same positions each time we set in our observation posts due to the insurgents' ability to prepare an ambush against our forces.

For these reasons, we adapted and initiated what became our most effective tactic for denying the insurgents the ability to disrupt our friendly forces' movement along MSR Fran. We would accomplish this by an aggressive patrolling effort, building local citizens as sources of intelligence and using the Iraqi police to assist us during our cordon missions of suspected IEDs. We would patrol MSR Fran frequently with at least squad-sized elements that were both mounted and dismounted. In addition, we provided a cordon of a suspected IED within five minutes of its identification. Although this created opportunities for the insurgency to attack our forces, this prevented the insurgents from accomplishing the destruction of friendly forces traveling on MSR Fran.

From the personal experience monograph written by Capt Sean Miller, who served as a Rifle platoon leader with Charlie Company, 1-25 Marines. Capt Miller's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: The experience of Capt Miller and Charlie Company, 1-25 Marines, demonstrates the inexorable linkage between reconnaissance and security operations. In this example, we see a unit tasked with a security operation, specifically the security of a route. As Charlie Company oriented limited combat power on the task, it correctly identified the requirement to maintain continuous reconnaissance in keeping with the fundamentals of security.

Enemy pattern analysis created a good understanding of the enemy's most probable course of action which, in turn, allowed for the creation of NAIs to orient friendly forces on a reconnaissance objective. However, a combination of urban terrain, dense civilian population, and friendly troops-to-task prevented the establishment of observation posts capable of adequately and continually observing these named areas of interest. This required Charlie Company to adopt different TTPs than the successful methods employed by their neighboring company. In warfare, tactics must always be adapted to suit the existing conditions.

Captain Miller and Charlie Company ultimately accomplished the mission of securing the route by tasking subordinate organizations with route reconnaissance patrols. As is typical in stability and counterinsurgency operations, gaining and maintaining enemy contact in such missions largely depends on the enemy's course of action. However, Charlie Company developed and refined drills to react as units made contact with enemy obstacles. The challenge that units face beyond the initial reaction to obstacle contact is developing the enemy situation further. Charlie Company correctly established local security and prepared to defeat enemy attacks. Beyond this, leaders must seek to transition from the route reconnaissance to an area reconnaissance to maintain enemy contact and further develop the situation as their METT-TC conditions permit. This aggressive reconnaissance mindset ultimately facilitates transition to offensive operations and destruction of enemy forces either through hasty attacks or by refining the running estimates of the IPB process for future operations.

On 12 January 2010, a devastating 7.0 earthquake struck the country of Haiti. The epicenter was traced southwest of the nation's capital, Port-au-Prince. With death toll estimates in the six-figure range, the United States sent members of the U.S. military to conduct stability operations in the form of humanitarian aid (HA).

My unit arrived in Port-au-Prince on 19 January 2010, exactly one week after the earthquake. Alpha Company conducted the battalion's decisive operation for the deployment, and its AO included Cité Soleil, located on the outskirts of downtown Port-au-Prince. Cité Soleil, which has long been the poorest slum in Port-au-Prince and possibly the Western Hemisphere, was a densely populated area characterized by poverty, crime, and limited government assistance. The residents survived any way that

they could, and Cité Soleil was in desperate need of humanitarian assistance well before we arrived and after we left.

The majority of the population in Cité Soleil lived in either one-story concrete homes or shacks made out of tin walls and aluminum siding. Therefore, the earthquake did not destroy many homes or kill as many people as in downtown Port-au-Prince and in other areas. There was, however, a large increase in the number of people who lost their homes in Port-au-Prince, relocated to Cité Soleil, and established internally displaced person (IDP) camps in fields and parks within the city.

After assuming control of Cité Soleil, my company commander divided the area into four platoon AOs. Most of the political leaders worked and lived outside of Cité Soleil, so religious leaders possessed a great influence among the locals. We also sought out leaders at schools, medical clinics, and orphanages since these organizations were the ones that people came to looking for help. We asked these leaders about the capabilities they currently possessed and their requirements and needs. All of the schools were closed, the medical clinics were in desperate need of supplies and medicine (which didn't differ much from before the earthquake), and the orphanages were at maximum capacity. From the information that we gathered from the local population and from conducting terrain analysis, I proposed to my commander possible HA distribution points within the area that could be used to effectively distribute food, water, and supplies to the greatest number of people in need.

My platoon was next tasked to identify the prices of local commodities, specifically rice, beans, cornmeal, brown sugar, charcoal, canned goods, and water, and compare the prices before and after the earthquake. The earthquake greatly affected the price of food and other goods which people could barely afford before the earthquake. To prepare for this task, my platoon conducted a zone reconnaissance of the company's entire AO to identify key boundaries, locations, and routes within the various sections of Cité Soleil. Since there were no commercial stores in Cité Soleil, we would conduct patrols throughout the city to question the locals who were selling these goods in front of their houses, alongside a road, or in a local market. I recorded all of the prices, most of which had increased since the time of the earthquake, with some items doubling or tripling, and I passed that information to the company headquarters so it could prepare for a large HA distribution in Cité Soleil.

During the food surge, the distribution of rice occurred in the morning, and my platoon conducted dismounted patrols every afternoon in a different area of the city. We also sought information about the lines of effort for stability operations of sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, security, and other considerations that were of interest (SWEAT-MSO), all of which required vast improvements even before the earthquake. We walked through the neighborhoods and the newly developed internally displaced person camps to see if the food surge was working and if the rice was getting to those most in need and to identify their needs and concerns. We also identified significant information regarding the terrain. When we walked through an internally displaced person camp, we made a sketch of the camp that included the approximate number of tents; how the camp was organized into different sections; the leaders of those various sections; and the locations of any medical tents, water distribution points, or latrine sites. As the food surge continued, we noticed a slight decrease in the cost of some food, especially rice; however, overall, the prices remained higher than prior to the earthquake.

Once we found as much information as we could for that section of Cité Soleil for the day, we would load our HWMMVs and return to our base. I would debrief the CoIST and provide it with all of the information that I recorded, to include hand-written notes, markings on my map, and sketches of the internally displaced person camps. The CoIST would then provide that information to the company commander for him to use for planning future operations and to pass on to the battalion headquarters.

Once the two-week food surge was complete, my platoon continued to conduct limited patrols for approximately a week throughout Cité Soleil to identify any major stability concerns and provide a security presence in the area. At the end of February, my battalion received word that we completed our mission, and we were to prepare for redeployment.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Mark Boychak, who served as AT Weapons Platoon Leader with D/1-325 IN, 2-82 ID (ABN). CPT Boychak's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: While we normally consider conducting stability operations within the context of a counterinsurgency (see Iraq and Afghanistan), that was not the case in Haiti. Despite not having a specified threat to answer

information gaps on insurgent activity or terrorist networks, two major lethal-focused requirements for COIN, the imperative for conducting reconnaissance remains.

Unlike most of our deployments within the past 12 years, where we already have an adequate amount of information on the OE, CPT Boychak's unit was starting from scratch. CPT Boychak's commander tasked an AT platoon to conduct a zone reconnaissance within the AO, and he provided a list of information requirements that CPT Boychak's platoon needed to answer—notably what were the immediate needs of the people living in Cité Soleil and where would be the best locations to distribute relief of those needs. Moreover, the employment of CPT Boychak's expansive role in the mission was to support not just his own assigned platoon AO, but the commander's AO. It is this technique that adds value to employment of reconnaissance at any echelon: answer the commander's critical IR, so the commander can maneuver his forces in a position of relative advantage—in this case—to provide better HA for the people of Cité Soleil.

The other significant aspect of CPT Boychak's mission is that he was in charge of an AT platoon and not a scout platoon. Although Cavalry organizations traditionally own reconnaissance, security, and economy of force missions, all units must prepare to conduct these missions on their own. Any commander can task organize his own reconnaissance patrol if he believes the need exists. What is important to remember for any commander, however, is to determine what information he is seeking and how specific that information is. CPT Boychak's commander wanted to know about specific needs of the people of Cité Soleil, a critical component for tasking any reconnaissance element for answering the commander's critical IR accurately and in a timely fashion.

Anti-Afghan forces (AAF) overran and seized the village of Barge Matal, Afghanistan, on the morning of 7 July 2009. On 12 July 2009, elements of Task Force Chosin landed outside the village and engaged in close combat mountain warfare.

On the night of 7 July, LTC Mark O'Donnell, Commander, 1st Battalion, 32^d Infantry, issued a warning order to me for Operation Mountain Fire. The battalion's S-3, MAJ Scott Horrigan; CPT Michael Harrison, A Co Commander; and MAJ Pete Granger, the BN XO, were also present. I was ordered to move my platoon by helicopter to participate in an operation to land in the vicinity of Barge Matal and confirm or deny the

existence of the large enemy force that was believed to be occupying the village. The warning order provided little detail of the composition and disposition of the enemy forces. Estimates ranged from 100 to 800 AAF operating in the Katigal Valley, with a force believed to have seized the district center at Barge Matal.

My scout platoon was tasked to provide overwatch of the village to deny enemy freedom of movement. In addition to this, one of my squads was tasked with landing with the first lift of helicopters on the HLZ Copperhead, to the east, to confirm or deny the presence of AAF on HLZ Rattler, on the west, to allow the second lift, with an ANA unit and the rest of my platoon, to land on the western side of the village. To accomplish these tasks, SSG Caesar Cuellar, Shadow 2, was chosen to take his squad on the first lift. SSG Robert Ridge, Shadow 1, would lead 1st Squad on the western side of the village to establish an OP on the high ground above the village. With him were the three snipers, led by SSG Marty Marthaler, Ghost 4, and a 15-man ANA force with one Marine ETT. The ANA force was tasked to accompany these elements to provide local security for their small OP. SSG Robert Kussart, leading Shadow 3, upon landing, would immediately establish a support by fire position to the south to provide suppressive fire to allow the ANA force to retake the district center. The task force's plan was designed for the Afghan forces to enter into the village first, demonstrating the strength of the Afghan government. All assault force elements would land on northern HLZs, allowing the enemy to exfiltrate to the south. This would limit the amount of fighting that would occur in the village and allow the enemy to tactically withdraw.

On the morning of the 12th, the first lift of four CH-47s and four AH-64, with two F-16s, left FOB Bostick en route to HLZ Copperhead. An hour later, they were back to pick up my element on the second lift. The first words from the pilots were that no shots were fired on the HLZ upon the initial infiltration. However, the AH-64 pilots, providing overwatch, did observe 40-60 personnel begin leaving the village from the east carrying RPGs and AK-47s. The AH-64s were fired upon with small arms and returned fire at which point the enemy fire ceased.

Upon infiltration of the second lift, I sat on the last seat prepared to be the first to exit the aircraft. At five minutes out from landing, the helicopter began evasive maneuvers, swerving in an attempt to make it difficult to target the helicopter. At one minute out, the crew chief turned to

me and informed me that we were landing on a “hot HLZ,” confirming that shots were being fired by enemy forces at the landing helicopters. We landed in a corn field with three feet high corn completely in the open and exposed to the enemy. Quickly moving towards the mountains and cover, each element moved towards its planned positions.

After the ANA forces secured the district center, villagers began to approach us and informed me that 100 enemy fighters had fled up the valley to the west of the village and another 100 fighters had fled up the valley to the east of the village. I believed the villagers’ numbers to be high based on the reports we received from the AH-64s; however, we quickly secured the remainder of the village and established hasty positions while we maneuvered all of our forces to occupy key positions.

Ten minutes later, at around 1800, violent amounts of fire erupted on all four hilltops surrounding the village. The entire task force was directly engaged by heavy enemy direct fire. As the firing continued, the mountains continued to light up with muzzle flashes. Within minutes, we had identified at least 16 separate positions.

The fire fight raged for over an hour until two A-10 Warthogs arrived on station. Working in coordination with the JTACs, located on my side of the river, we guided the A-10s in to 30-mm gun runs on enemy positions near the “grassy knoll.” After two gun runs, the enemy ceased fire.

Over the next two weeks, the enemy engaged the task force in large scale attacks much like the one that occurred on the first day. These attacks continued daily, creating logistic problems for replenishing our ammo.

Four days later, ICOM intercepts indicated that there was a number of AAF using a cave to the north of Barge Matal to stage attacks. SSG Cuellar, with his squad and two JTACs, maneuvered north along the base of the mountain on the eastern side of the river. He soon identified the cave and spotted an armed guard outside and men moving in and out of the cave. SSG Cuellar coordinated with two AH-64s to target the cave. The AH-64s were able to positively identify the cave and fired one Hellfire missile into the cave. We confirmed four enemy KIA.

On 31 July, 3^d Platoon, Combat Company, was on patrol on the southwest side of the village. It was again engaged by enemy forces from multiple positions. The enemy had maneuvered close to its position, concealing themselves in the six foot high cornfields to the south of the

village. During the engagement, SPC Justin Coleman was wounded and quickly succumbed to his wounds.

On 4 August, SSG Kussart led Shadow 3, with a four-man Navy SEAL team, on a night reconnaissance patrol up the southeastern mountain. Enemy fighters had positioned themselves above the village, and their locations had to be identified. Intelligence provided information that the fighters maintained continuous overwatch of the village, while other anti-Afghan forces resupplied them from the south during the night. Using the cover of darkness, SSG Kussart maneuvered his six-man squad up the mountain with the SEAL team to identify the enemy positions and infiltration routes.

Around 0400 on the 5th, SSG Kussart's point man observed three enemy fighters moving up the mountain from the south. The enemy fighters were 25 meters away and unable to identify the U.S. forces in the dark. SSG Kussart quickly positioned his squad for a hasty ambush and engaged the three fighters. The enemy fighters were killed, but other fighters in concealed positions on the mountain returned fire. The enemy had occupied mutually supporting positions on the southeast and southwest mountains. SGT Simeon Alibrando was grazed by a bullet in the neck and knocked on to his back. Shortly after SGT Alibrando was wounded, an RPG exploded nearby, wounding multiple members of SSG Kussart's squad and one of the Navy SEALs. SSG Kussart used mortars and direct fire to target the enemy positions and broke contact once the enemy forces were suppressed. The mission had successfully disrupted the enemy's freedom of movement and identified an infiltration route with multiple enemy positions.

On September 18th, TF Chosin pulled out of Barge Matal, leaving a 100-man Afghan police force with weapons and ammo to provide its own protection of its village. A week later, COP Keating, the nearest U.S. outpost south of Barge Matal, was attacked by an enemy force estimated at 300 personnel. Eight U.S. Soldiers were killed when the outer walls of their COP were breached and enemy forces attempted to seize the COP. Nuristan Province continued to prove difficult to install an Afghan government presence, and COP Keating was closed a few days after the attack.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Anthony Evans, who served as the Scout Platoon Leader for 1-32 Infantry, 3^d Brigade, 10th

Mountain Division. CPT Evans' monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: During the fighting season of 2009 in Afghanistan, CPT Anthony Evans and his scout platoon were given the task of confirming the location of a large enemy force preceding a battalion-level offensive operation. The battalion commander would use the information that CPT Evans' platoon provided to orient his forces and destroy the enemy force. This is an example of reconnaissance pull. The recon force provides data that answers the battalion commander's priority information requirements, allowing the commander to execute a course of action when the enemy situation is uncertain.

CPT Evans was not only able to locate the enemy force, but was also able to fix them to allow follow-on forces to land and continue the assault. CPT Evans used combined arms to suppress a superior force and prevent interdiction of the battalion main body. He remained oriented on the force to be protected, a fundamental of security operations, denying the enemy the ability to strike the main body before it could deploy.

CONCLUSION: No matter the operations military units are conducting—whether combat or humanitarian—they require information best gathered by trained and experienced Soldiers conducting reconnaissance. Understanding the appropriate fundamentals and forms of reconnaissance will ensure units prevail.

CHAPTER 6

Combined Arms

We have gotten into the fashion of talking of cavalry tactics, artillery tactics, and infantry tactics. This distinction is nothing but mere abstraction. There is but one art, and that is the tactics of the combined arms. The tactics of a body of mounted troops composed of the three arms is subject to the same established principles as is that of a mixed force in which foot soldiers bulk largely. The only difference is one of mobility."

— Major Gerald Gilbert
British Army, 1907

INTRODUCTION: According to ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, “close combat is indispensable and unique to land operations” and requires the synchronization and application of forces in a direct fire fight “supported by indirect fires and other assets.” While the application of combined arms is an enduring lesson of military history, units control and employ them at lower levels than ever before, allowing unprecedented precision. This capability is possible because of the skill of Army leaders in their core competencies and rigorous training prior to and throughout deployments.

During September 2005, elements of the 3^d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) conducted operations in Tal Afar, Iraq. The 2^d Squadron, 3^d ACR, and the Iraqi 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3^d Infantry Division, supported by elements of 3/3 U.S. Special Forces Group (Airborne) were charged with conducting a cordon and search of the Hai al Sarai district of Tal Afar. The purpose was to defeat the Islamic extremist elements’ operation in the area, protect the civilians and infrastructure, and set the conditions for political and economic development.

Tal Afar and the Ninewa Province had been virtually unattended since OIF I due to the priority for coalition forces to be in the populated areas of Iraq, like Baghdad and Mosul. Places like Tal Afar became breeding grounds for insurgent activity, and terrorists were able to bring arms, munitions, and other supplies through the area at will. Tal Afar, in

particular, served as an insurgent base of operations, and, devoid of legitimate security forces, it was littered with insurgent forces who used it as a safe haven to facilitate enemy operations throughout Iraq.

In June, H Company, G Troop, and O Troop (Air Cavalry), 2^d Squadron, and Iraqi Army elements began to conduct shaping operations in preparation for the larger assault. During the searches, the companies discovered IED-making materials, Fadayeen Saddam documents, former Iraqi military equipment, receipts for vehicles under different names, passports, old Iraqi military identification cards, 20 AK-47s, and one 9-mm pistol. Throughout the summer, many of these shaping operations occurred throughout Tal Afar and the neighboring areas, while, at the same time, we worked hard at integrating the Iraqi 1st Battalion and its U.S. Special Forces' trainers and advisors. With all attachments, the squadron's combat power totaled over 3,000 personnel, 11 M1A2 tank platoons, 6 M3A2 scout platoons, 3 M109A6 Paladin howitzer platoons, and 32 Iraqi Infantry platoons.

On 2 September 2005, the 2^d Squadron ACR commenced operations in the eastern portion of the city. It began with a three-day zone reconnaissance from the northern and southern edges of eastern Tal Afar designed to force the enemy into the Hai al Sarai, in the southeastern section of Tal Afar, and allow the anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) who did not want to fight only one means of leaving the combat zone—a predetermined path to a location south of the city. The citizens were given access to this route at the end of the three-day reconnaissance but had to pass through a series of checkpoints along the path. The Soldiers there had lists of known or suspected terrorists who were then detained if they attempted to leave the area.

H Company began our zone reconnaissance operations in the northeastern portion of the city to identify the AIF and prevent attacks on the supply routes and the rear areas of our forces. During the first day, we saw limited enemy contact until we reached our limit of advance for the day. The AIF detonated an IED in front of a tank belonging to an adjacent unit to the west and then began a coordinated attack of machine gun fire from the south. I was at the location of the enemy ambush as it began, and my sister tank platoon and I quickly arrayed our vehicles to maximize cover and concealment for our dismounted Soldiers and to establish fields of fire for ourselves. After suppressing the enemy and securing the area, we

established a hasty cordon around the target building where we believed the trigger man was. With armored vehicles in the cordon and support by fire role, dismounted forces were able to clear the building of enemy. During the second day, we continued to push south toward the enemy occupied area and cleared to our next phase line with no enemy contact.

On the third day, I maneuvered my tank platoon along the streets and alleyways that provided avenues of approach in the city, while the dismounted forces cleared over 200 homes with no casualties. As the dismounted elements, including the Iraqi Army soldiers with their U.S. Special Forces advisors, continued their movement south, my tanks and I provided an armored mobile screen line ahead of them. The dismounted soldiers would clear each block of houses and then wait until all were complete before they would move across a street and enter the next set of buildings. This act mitigated fratricide and provided commanders with clear situational awareness as to the front trace of the units. Even though my platoon maintained its integrity, my tanks were geographically separate from one another; each took a separate road or alleyway parallel to one another. Where the enemy barricaded themselves in buildings, preventing entry by dismounted forces, I used my tanks to create a breach site for the dismounts to enter. This approach allowed us to economize our forces while providing overwhelming fire power to the dismounts when and where they needed it. This approach also allowed each tank to have smaller sectors to support; if one tank needed to move to support another unit, the remaining tanks could easily cover the gap that the displaced tank created.

As we approached our company's limit of advance, we began to receive intense and consistent small arms fire and sniper fire from within the enemy stronghold in the Surai District. The enemy's precision fire pinned down our forces in and around the buildings, preventing them from advancing on their final objective. My tanks and I engaged the insurgents within the building with .50-caliber fire, but the insurgents continued to shoot. When our lower caliber weapons did not achieve the effect we desired, we escalated our response. Engaging the building with 120-mm MPAT-OR rounds, we destroyed the building and the insurgents within, allowing our dismounts the freedom to maneuver.

During one specific engagement, U.S. and Iraqi forces became pinned down by heavy and accurate small arms, machine gun, and sniper fire. I was one city block away when I heard the gunfire and received contact

report. I maneuvered my tank down a narrow alleyway to our friendly location, positioned my tank in an intersection, and pivot steered the vehicle, effectively blocking the enemy's field of fire and avenue of approach. The protection provided by my vehicle afforded me a sense of security despite positioning myself in the line of fire. Blocking the enemy's field of fire and suppressing his location allowed friendly forces to disengage and maneuver to a more advantageous location.

In this operation, the largest conducted by coalition forces during OIF III, the 2^d Squadron crushed the heart of the insurgency in the Hai al Sarai neighborhood of Tal Afar, ultimately allowing the 2^d Squadron to provide security for the citizens and gain their trust to ensure political and economic development.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Robert Hoffman, who served as the Platoon Leader for 3^d Platoon, H Company, 2^d Squadron, 3^d ACR. CPT Hoffman's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: General George S. Patton once wrote, "To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins." While deployed to Iraq in 2005, 2^d Squadron, 3^d ACR, demonstrated the value of combined arms maneuver as defined in ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. Light Infantry units have a tremendous amount of flexibility and often access areas vehicular forces cannot access. However, they are extremely vulnerable, limited in long range mobility, and lack firepower. Armored forces have a great deal of protection and long range mobility and provide shock effect through their speed and firepower. However, they require a significant amount of logistical support and limited local security, and some types of terrain (such as urban) can limit their mobility. A team, consisting of the two types of elements, provides the commander with a significant amount of options to apply pressure on enemy forces and employ the fundamentals of the offense or defense to accomplish missions. The two elements combined maximize strengths and mitigate weaknesses.

CPT Hoffman provides a specific example of the effectiveness of combined arms maneuver in his monograph. When enemy forces fixed friendly light Infantry forces in a building, CPT Hoffman reacted quickly by maneuvering his tank to provide cover with its mobile protection. Additionally, he employed his overwhelming firepower to destroy the

threat, allowing friendly forces to continue advancing. Having dismounted friendly forces in adjacent buildings also provided CPT Hoffman protection from enemy maneuvering into vehicle blind spots to destroy or neutralize one of his tanks.

The multiple applications of mounted and dismounted forces were deconflicted by the use of clear graphic control measures, contributing to the situational awareness of friendly forces. H Company was given smaller sectors of fire, and the practice of handing off one sector of fire to another element contributed to the company remaining agile in urban terrain. The fact that H Company was able to move quickly to support other elements during the operation is a testimony to the importance of synchronized combined arms.

Finally, this unit did not conduct this operation unilaterally. With the assistance of host-nation forces, the commander generated even more options for solving tactical problems. Additionally, by including host-nation forces, CPT Hoffman's company assisted in building the legitimacy of the local government in accordance with FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* which our doctrine describes as the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining international support.

In April-May 2008, coalition forces built a wall in an area of northeast Baghdad, known as Sadr City, to deny Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia the ability to fire rockets into the Green Zone. Initially, two separate brigades took part in the construction; however, after several catastrophic vehicle and personnel losses, Army leaders found it necessary to send a mechanized battalion, 1-6 Infantry.

In April 2008, 1-6 Infantry deployed to Kuwait assigned to 2^d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, out of Baumholder, Germany. Once in Kuwait, 1-6 was detached from 2^d Brigade and attached to 3^d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, to provide additional combat power in Sadr City where heavy fighting was occurring. The 3^d Platoon, Charlie Company, 1-6 Infantry, was the first element in 1-6 sent to augment forces there, arriving in Sadr City on 30 April.

Three different companies built the wall in 12-hour shifts. The barriers were 4 x 12-foot slabs, each weighing a half of a ton. Drivers in flatbed trucks would deliver the barriers to a predetermined checkpoint, and the barriers were then moved by forklift to within 150 meters of the wall build site where U.S. Army Engineers and Iraqi soldiers would then

emplace the barriers. Meanwhile, Infantrymen and armored vehicles would overwatch the construction from security locations, providing protection to the soldiers who were doing the construction and sometimes actually assisting in the construction. One company would build and fight for 12 hours and then rest and refit for 24 hours.

The urban terrain surrounding the build site was standard mass construction. Because there were roughly 2.5 million people living in Sadr City's nine square miles, the people would build new houses on top of pre-existing buildings; the people were essentially living on top of one another. Without enforced building codes, the only limit to the height of the buildings was their ability to bear the weight. This created a safe haven for snipers, RPG teams, and mortar teams. In one square block, there were a thousand different places for the enemy to hide.

At 2130, 1 May, the Engineer assets broke; the crane and forklift had been so over-used in the previous three weeks that they would require 24 hours off for maintenance. Instead of building that night, our task was to secure the area around the wall to prevent enemy freedom of movement throughout the area. The ROE were clear: shoot to kill anything that moved north of the wall. My platoon consisted of four Bradleys, two tanks, and three dismounted squads. The night sights on the vehicles allowed us to maintain eyes on the objective during hours of limited visibility, and the dismounted squads provided local security. I was in my Bradley, conducting command and control from within the turret. My gunner was responsible for a sector of fire that included buildings to the south and north of the wall.

Within 15 minutes of being on the objective, my Platoon Sergeant identified five enemy observation posts anywhere from 50 to 500 meters north of the wall. Through his thermal sights on his vehicle, he could spot a nine-man enemy element observing and moving toward our location. He fired his 25-mm chain gun, killing all nine personnel. For the next several hours, we continued to destroy the enemy in their overwatch positions until the dismounted squads identified the enemy trying to envelop our positions from the southeast. This enemy element managed to move to a six-story apartment building to our southeast which overlooked all friendly forces. I fired at the building with my 25 mm but did not have the best angle to destroy the enemy. I directed the dismounted squads to engage with 40-mm, machine gun, and small arms fire. They soon reported hearing bodies being

dragged through the building and requested permission to clear the building and destroy the remaining enemy. Because the size of the building required at least a company to clear, I told the squad leaders to remain in their support by fire positions and continue to engage. Despite the fact that we could not physically clear the apartment building, throughout the night, we destroyed dozens of enemy OPs.

For the next 36 hours, my platoon moved back to JSS Sadr City, rested, and refitted for future operations. Meanwhile, the company at the wall came under heavy enemy fire, and the Engineers and Iraqi soldiers refused to assist in emplacing the barriers because of it. After the Company Commander, CPT Erik Oksenvaag, and I war gamed a plan, at 1200, 3 May, we moved to the wall build site. Although we had heard the sound of 25 mm and small arms all night, when we arrived, all was silent. After moving our vehicles into their predesignated fighting positions and conducting a relief in place with the Armor company there, we began to drop ramps to allow the dismounted squads to move to their positions and immediately came under fire from the enemy in buildings 25–50 meters away. Although the enemy was careful not to expose themselves, we destroyed those positions with tank rounds and 25–mm and 40–mm rounds.

At this point, the Route Clearance Platoon (RCP), consisting of engineers in heavily armored vehicles, moved up to clear the route of IEDs. As it moved, one dismounted squad, clearing the nearby buildings, found weapons, ammunition, and detonation devices. Another detained six individuals who had weapons and \$10,000 in U.S. cash. In the end, the RCP, found and destroyed eight EFPs, and construction of the wall resumed.

The Soldiers on the wall had to expose themselves while disconnecting the slabs from the crane's wires, and the enemy exploited this vulnerability by using .50-caliber rifles to engage these Soldiers. To limit this, we provided suppressing fire on all possible enemy sniper positions. Furthermore, we had the support of four Apaches that patrolled the area to the north of the wall and could see the enemy moving to new fighting positions or setting up mortar positions. The Apaches remained five kilometers away, so we could draw out the enemy, but because the range of the Hellfire missiles was seven kilometers, they could engage any target they or we saw fit. At one point, we were taking significant fire from one particular building, and even though we pounded the building with 25-mm fire from the Bradleys, we continued to take fire, so I called for the support

of an Apache. I marked the building with smoke shot from an M203, and the Apache put a Hellfire missile straight through the roof; the enemy fire stopped immediately.

We also had the support of ISR assets which observed enemy supply routes. While the Predator could identify small groups of enemy, the controllers would wait until these smaller groups came together in groups of 30-40 individuals to meet with their commanders. At this point, the controller would release the Predator's Hellfire missile, killing all 40 individuals.

At the end of our day, we returned to JSS Sadr City to begin recovery operations and discovered that during that day, the Iraqi government and the Mahdi Army agreed on a cease fire: The coalition forces would not move north of the wall, and the Mahdi Army would stop attacking forces working on the wall.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Ryan Poole, who served as the Platoon Leader for 3^d Platoon, Charlie Company, 1-6 Infantry, CPT Poole's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: The ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*, defines the area defense as a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. During the emplacement of obstacles to achieve a strategic purpose, CPT Poole used combined arms in an area defense at the platoon level and in an urban environment with a mixed platoon of M1A1 Abrams Tanks, M2A2 BFV, dismounted Infantry, and overhead Apache and predator coverage. CPT Poole was tasked to deny enemy forces' access to the battalion's obstacle emplacement location and planned obstacle route and to protect the engineer equipment during emplacement of these obstacles and while undergoing repairs. He identified and exploited the advantages in the urban terrain by positioning the BFVs and tanks in locations that allowed the dismounted Infantrymen to maneuver to necessary locations and overwatch the blind spots of the mounted force aiding in his success in the defense. CPT Poole effectively employed the Apaches in limited areas and engagements where he did not wish to irrevocably commit his ground forces. The Predator was efficiently used as part of information collection on enemy movements into and out of CPT

Poole's engagement areas and allowed CPT Poole's superiors to counter enemy activities in their support areas.

CPT Poole's vignette is an excellent example of combined arms in the defense at the platoon level. His actions allowed the host-nation's forces and engineers to clear the route and complete their emplacement of the linear obstacle. His effective use of combined arms led to a cease fire between the Iraqi government and the Mahdi Army inside Sadr City that would last until U.S. troop withdrawal in 2011.

In September of 2009, the 5th Stryker Brigade was planning a large-scale operation to clear enemy forces out of the Arghandab River Valley. The 1-17 IN was having difficulty conducting counterinsurgency operations in the area because its elements could hardly move without hitting large improvised explosive devices or coming under complex small arms attacks. A Troop, 8-1 Cavalry, had deployed in July and was attached to 2-1 Infantry. LTC Jeffrey French, Commander of 2-1, further task organized A Troop once it arrived into Afghanistan. Two of the reconnaissance platoons moved under the control of A and B companies of 2-1 IN, and A Troop received two Infantry platoons. In early September, A Troop was temporarily attached to 1-17 IN.

The intent behind the operation was to clear out enough enemy forces and caches in the river valley to give 1-17 IN the opportunity to maneuver and set up combat outposts that would allow access to the population. However, during its clearing operations on the west side of the river valley, B Company of 1-17 IN was unable to reach Objective Marshall, a village named Khosrow-e Olya that bordered the western edge of the river. Currently, B Company was set in a patrol base just outside of the village of Babur about nine hundred meters north of Objective Marshall. The company was low on supplies due to fighting against significant numbers of insurgents for the past four days. My troop's mission was to move southwest from our battle positions and clear Objective Marshall. To accomplish this mission, 1-17 IN gave us extra assets to assist in the clearing operation. Joining us would be a squad of engineers; an Infantry platoon from A Company, 1-17 IN; a JTAC; and the 1-17 IN Battalion S-3, MAJ Ryan O'Conner.

CPT Matthew Quiggle, my Troop commander, gathered the leadership and explained the enemy situation around the town we were

going to clear. The enemy knew that even dismounted forces' movements were restricted in and around the villages and orchards. Insurgents were placing IEDs in branches of the pomegranate trees to force units to move to trails where larger IEDs were buried. Enemy forces had evacuated nearly all of the local population from the villages and placed IEDs in most of the openings in the large earthen walls that surrounded most of the villages. We knew of at least two machine gun teams in the area, accompanied by one or two rocket propelled grenade teams and an IED emplacement team. We also knew that the orchards in this area probably contained large caches of weapons and explosives, so the enemy would fight hard to retain this area.

After 2-1 IN had task organized us, A Troop had only one of its original platoons that had trained and worked with the Troop. A Troop had never trained with the two platoons that were currently attached to us, and we had to quickly adjust to each other's way of operating. For instance, as a cavalry unit, A Troop was limited to the amount of personnel we could place on the ground and had never really conducted true dismounted operations. However, the two new Infantry platoons saw the Stryker as a vehicle that could quickly get their dismounts to the objective to conduct dismounted operations. The Infantry platoons also had different equipment load outs and different Stryker vehicle variants. Our Troop had never employed some of the sniper rifles that the Infantry platoons had, and we were not accustomed to the relatively short observation range of the Infantry variant of the Stryker due to its lack of optical equipment that our reconnaissance variants had equipped. The skill sets of the Soldiers also differed. Our 19D scouts were experts in vehicle maneuver and observation techniques, while the 11B Infantrymen were experts in dismounted maneuvers and employing machine gun fires. All of these factors affected the way A Troop planned and operated. CPT Quiggle and I came up with a technique to operate with such a new team. For large, troop-scale operations such as this, CPT Quiggle would dismount with the Infantry platoons to synchronize their efforts, and I would control the mounted elements since most of the Infantry leadership dismounted with their platoons.

Our plan was to move our vehicles southwest in the riverbed and establish a support by fire position on the east side of the village. The Infantrymen and engineers would dismount and enter the village from the north side. They would then clear the village from north to south, staying off natural lines of drift. CPT Quiggle directed our forces not to use gates,

trails, or roadways. If a wall or obstacle was in the way, we would use our engineers to breach it with C4 explosives. We were going to search and secure the village first to ensure any remaining villagers were safe and then move to clear the surrounding orchards. A local Afghan police unit would move at the front of formations and show the local populace that Afghan security forces were committed to their safety.

By late morning, the Troop began movement down the riverbed towards Objective Marshall. The river was fairly dry, so we were able to avoid getting vehicles stuck in the loose rock and sand of the riverbed. Once we arrived at Objective Marshall, I quickly took control of the platoons' vehicles as CPT Quiggle and the Infantry platoons dismounted and prepared to enter the west side of the valley. As the Infantry platoons moved, I adjusted the positions of the support by fire vehicles to ensure the best fields of fire and observation. I centered my Stryker on the formation and placed 3^d Platoon overwatching the orchards to the north of the village. The 2^d Platoon, in the center with my vehicle, would overwatch the village itself, while 1st Platoon set up to overwatch the orchards to the south of the village.

After the dismounted elements crossed the river and moved out of our sight toward the town, CPT Quiggle relayed his position to me on the radio: they were approaching a trail that paralleled the western wall of the village. Immediately following the report, it seemed as if the whole river valley erupted in gunfire. I remember hearing heavy machine gun fire, RPGs, hand-held grenades, and AK-47 fire all at once. What amazed me was how sustained the gunfire was. I had heard bursts or pot-shots from enemy before, but this time it was constant firing, as if the insurgents were just holding down the trigger. CPT Quiggle reported that the gunfire was coming from an orchard across the open area. As I heard the Infantry machine gun teams beginning to return fire, I immediately began requesting air support on station and sending mortar fire missions back to our 120-mm mortar Strykers, which were set up in a mortar firing point at the logistics resupply point on Hilltop 1046. That way, once CPT Quiggle got a better idea of where the enemy was, we could immediately place mortar fire on them. The 3^d Platoon Strykers reported contact with enemy in the orchards north of the village from where the machine gun was firing. The 1st Platoon also reported contact in the orchards south of the village. I figured 1st

Platoon was most likely seeing the element engaging CPT Quiggle and the dismounts.

Receiving fire from the orchard, the elements in the support by fire positions began to suppress, but I had to be very careful about suppression for two reasons; we were still close to CPT Quiggle and the Infantry platoons, and we still didn't know how many villagers were in the village. The 3^d Platoon began suppressing the enemy in the orchards to the north with MK-19 grenade fire, and 1st Platoon suppressed the southern orchards with .50-caliber machine gun fires.

The Soldiers in the support by fire position had successfully suppressed the orchards and were no longer receiving effective fire. However, CPT Quiggle and the dismounts were still pinned down by effective machine gun and RPG fire. Ten minutes after the first shots were fired, the OH-58D Kiowa helicopters (call sign Cheymus) arrived on station. CPT Quiggle told me to control the helicopters as per our troop standard operating procedure. Since there was more than one enemy element, we figured it would be more effective if just one person talked to Cheymus, and I had a better picture of the entire enemy situation. The JTAC then notified me that an F-16 jet would soon be on station also. In the back of my head, I started thinking about how to employ an F-16 in this fight.

I checked my Land Warrior and got a better glimpse of where CPT Quiggle's forces were located. They had moved around to get cover but were not far from where they had been taking fire. I began working with Cheymus to start some gun runs on where we thought the enemy was to take some pressure from CPT Quiggle's position. Cheymus began firing Hellfire missiles into the orchards but couldn't really spot the enemy; the canopy on the orchards was too thick. The Hellfire missiles must have missed because CPT Quiggle, and now one of the helicopters, was still receiving fire. The JTAC told me the F-16 was almost on station. We decided to use the F-16 as a show of force and not drop any ordnance due to the proximity of our forces to the enemy. The F-16 would fly as low as possible over the orchard and drop a few flares to get the enemy's head down for a few seconds, so that Cheymus could move in lower in an attempt to put more effective fires on them.

I pulled the helicopters over to the eastern side of the riverbed to give the F-16 plenty of room to work. The JTAC then lost communications with the jet, so we didn't know exactly when it was going to fly over. When it

did, it surprised us all. I had never seen a jet fly so low nor had I ever heard anything that loud before. A few flares fell off the back of it and dropped into the orchard. The enemy must have been surprised too because they stopped shooting. I immediately sent Cheymus back over the orchard to see if he could spot the enemy.

Cheymus was able to get much lower over the orchard on his next gun run because enemy fire had let up significantly. He located the enemy that had been engaging our dismounts and began to fire Hellfire missiles at them. CPT Quiggle was now able to move to a better location, and he set up the platoons across the road in a building overlooking the open area to the west. Cheymus reported the enemy fleeing and that he had lost contact as they ran west deeper into the orchards. I was now able to bring him over to the orchards north of the village to search for the machine gun team that had been engaging the support by fire position. Cheymus located the enemy hiding in a hut and engaged with Hellfire rockets and M4 fire. It was amazing to see the co-pilot hang out of his helicopter and engage the enemy with his personal weapon. Cheymus soon reported the enemy in the northern orchard destroyed.

For the next several hours, CPT Quiggle began to clear the open area across from his position and search the northern orchards trying to regain contact with the enemy. The dismounts could not find them, and CPT Quiggle decided that we should establish a patrol base on the northwest edge of the village and continue clearing in the morning since it was getting dark.

During that first night, illumination was horribly low, and nobody could see through the thick trees of the orchards even with thermal sights. Late in the night, we all started hearing strange howling noises, but they didn't sound like they were coming from a dog or a coyote. We asked B Company Soldiers if they heard it too, and they responded that they had been hearing it all week. One of the enemy tactics to probe patrol bases was to move to a position where he thought he could see our forces and then howl at his other teammates to let them know his location. We used 120-mm mortar illumination rounds to try to either spot the "howlers" or at least impede their movement, and while this proved to be effective, I don't think anyone got any sleep that first night.

The next morning, CPT Quiggle developed a plan to clear the orchard: the air weapons team would lay suppressive fires and then call in mortar

fire on the orchard, the engineers would breach the wall, and a platoon would clear the orchard. I had Cheymus do another gun run and then pulled him back over to the east side of the river to clear the airspace. The FSO, who was with CPT Quiggle, then called for ten rounds of 120-mm HE rounds on the center of the orchard. As the rounds came in, 2^d Platoon began moving across the open area towards the orchard. Once the mortar rounds were complete, 2^d Platoon established a near-side security position as the engineers, who were right behind 2^d Platoon, rushed up and quickly placed a C4 charge on the wall. As the wall crumbled down, 3^d Platoon moved in and established a foothold in the orchard. The enemy was no longer firing at us. CPT Quiggle and the dismounts searched the orchard and uncovered a large cache loaded with RPG rounds, mortar rounds, 7.62-mm ammunition, and IED materials. The platoons gathered the materials in a pile, and the engineers destroyed the pile with C4 charges.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Patrick Mitchell, who served as the XO of A Troop, 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment CPT Mitchell's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: During their TLPs, CPT Quiggle and CPT Mitchell displayed a solid grasp of IPB, in particular Step 2, *Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations*, with their analysis and understanding of the military aspects of terrain (OAKOC). This analysis allowed them to make maximum use of their mounted platforms by utilizing a nonstandard avenue of approach (in this case the bed of the Arghandab River) to get as close to their objective as possible and to position their heaviest weapons in a way to support their dismounted movement.

Additionally, their analysis of the Mission Variables (METT-TC)—in particular their analysis of their own troops, complicated by their drastic change in task organization—and their understanding of the advantages of combined arms maneuver, drove their mission planning and were ultimately instrumental in the successful accomplishment of their operation. CPT Quiggle was able to maximize the strengths of his remaining Scout platoon (advanced optics, experienced and proficient gunners, etc.) while also incorporating the strengths of his attached Infantry platoons (significant dismount capability) to create a combined arms team that was ultimately more capable than either a Cavalry troop or Infantry company

would have been operating organically. CPT Quiggle and CPT Mitchell's simultaneous employment of their mounted, dismounted, indirect fire, and rotary-wing assets forced the enemy to operate in multiple directions at once and ultimately forced the Taliban to displace from a naturally strong and fortified position.

CPT Quiggle and CPT Mitchell's ability to understand their operating environment (through detailed IPB and applying the Mission Variables), visualize how they wanted to accomplish their mission, and then describe and direct this vision to their subordinates through mission orders provides a clear example of the successful application of the commander's activities within the operations process per ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*. This resulted in decentralized, yet synchronized execution on the objective, and the defeat of the enemy on OBJ Marshall.

On 31 August 2010, as part of the surge of forces ordered by President Obama, Bravo Troop, 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment, assumed control of its AO in the Pashmul subdistrict of Afghanistan. The troop, in conjunction with the rest of the squadron, immediately began offensive operations to destroy Taliban elements that had complete freedom of maneuver and held the initiative throughout the subdistrict. These operations were preparatory efforts designed to set the conditions for 2^d Brigade Combat Team, 101st ABN (AASLT)'s Operation Dragon Strike, a BCT-level operation to clear the insurgent held Zharay District.

Prior to our deployment, we conducted a live fire "Walk and Shoot" during which all the maneuver companies in the brigade executed an attack on an objective, employing only our squad leaders and above. The intent was to train the leaders in each company and troop to plan, prepare, and execute offensive operations, using all of the indirect fire assets organic to our brigade. These assets ranged from our 60 mm, 81 mm, and 120 mm to the Field Artillery battalion's 105-mm howitzers. We also employed OH-58 Kiowa scout helicopters to improve our ability to safely employ our direct, indirect, and aviation assets simultaneously. This leader training event was an excellent precursor to the CALFEX we conducted in November and our rotation through the Joint Readiness Training Center in February. Executing this training was a confidence booster and proved crucial to our success in combat a year later.

In late August 2010, we conducted a short relief in place with B/1-502 IN at COP JFM, and while the Soldiers of Bulldog Company did an outstanding job of introducing us to the challenges of our new AO, the situation was pretty bleak. The two nearest villages, each approximately 300 meters east and west of the COP, were flying Taliban flags above them and were inaccessible to U.S. or ANA forces. Route Summit, COP JFM's only LOC for sustainment operations, could be travelled safely only at night, and small arms, RPG, and recoilless rifle attacks on the COP itself were now a daily occurrence.

As our Combined Squadron Task Force assumed what had been a lone company's AO, our first priority was to wrest the initiative from the Taliban in preparation for major clearance operations as part of Operation Dragon Strike, and we decided to target certain objectives to trigger a significant Taliban response. On 3 September 2010, just three days after assuming responsibility for our AO, B Troop conducted a platoon-sized patrol to clear a pomegranate orchard and a bunker within it that was traditionally used by Taliban forces to launch attacks on B/1-502 Infantry.

My 3^d PLT Leader, LT Bradley Portwood, and Fire Support Officer, LT Jake Gatewood, developed targets to support our movement to and actions on the objective. We decided to support our maneuver element with the 155-mm cannon section we were going to have in direct support while using our Squadron's organic 120-mm mortars to provide suppression on the locations the Taliban had historically used for their attack by fire positions. LT Portwood developed his scheme of maneuver to move dismounted, taking advantage of covered and concealed avenues of approach, towards our objective that we had deemed likely free of obstacles based on our assessment of the threat and the terrain. Additionally, LT Portwood's Platoon Sergeant, SFC Christian Lopez, decided to bring double the basic load for the platoon's M240B machine guns. My 2^d PLT, led by LT Alex Zeller, would serve as the troop reserve, with planning priorities to provide a mounted CASEVAC element or a support by fire position to support 3^d PLT's movement, if necessary. In addition, I coordinated for support from the Canadian Task Force on our southern boundary because our allies had positioned a Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank on Masum Ghar Mountain. With its advanced optics and dominant position on the highest terrain in the area, the Leopard would be able to provide reconnaissance and precision direct fires in support of our movement.

Finally, LT Stephen Draheim, whose 1st PLT was on COP defense at this time, pre-positioned his squad-designated marksmen with their M14s in Tower 1 to assist with spotting and to place precision fires on any Taliban elements that attacked our outpost.

We exited COP JFM under the cover of darkness at 0500 and moved in a canal along our avenue of approach to our assault position, reaching it at approximately 0700. We then began a very deliberate movement through some partially destroyed structures, with the Bravo Section of 3^d Platoon and its associated ANA soldiers establishing a support by fire position approximately 250 meters south of the objective. At 0735, SSG Ramey led A Section as we began our movement to clear the pomegranate field; however, as we crossed an open area 200 meters south of our objective, we received our first contact. Initially, this consisted of only a few rounds of small arms fire, likely a sentry sending out the alarm, but it quickly grew in intensity as additional fighters mobilized in the village and began engaging us with automatic weapons from a second fighting position. At this time, I decided not to maneuver on the enemy for a number of reasons: the IED threat in proximity to such a heavily defended enemy position; the dense grape fields and a six-foot canal between us and the enemy; and anticipated enemy reinforcements from Taliban support zones to the southwest which could potentially expose my flank and rear to these elements. Instead, we quickly called in our preplanned 155-mm target and immediately had rounds impacting on the enemy's fighting positions.

Within ten minutes of first contact, we received SWT support. LT Portwood placed the aircraft in a holding area to keep the enemy off the gun target line of our supporting artillery and the Canadians on Masum Ghar. He tasked the SWT to spot and adjust the rounds from the 155s firing from FOB Wilson and to over-watch templated insurgent lines of communication to the west of our position. Both of 3^d PLT's sections continued to place effective fires on these two fighting positions, essentially serving as "the bait," while we waited for our indirect fire systems to take their toll on the enemy.

At 0755, we observed a Taliban fire team enter a grape hut, likely seeking cover from the indirect fire that was continuing to fall on it. Up until this time, the Canadian Leopard crew was unable to positively identify enemy combatants. However, using yellow smoke from our M203/320 grenade launchers, we were able to mark the grape hut the Taliban had

entered, and from a distance of about 1800 meters, the Canadians destroyed the grape hut with two HEAT rounds. We received no more fire from the remnants of this grape hut.

Shortly after this, at 0820, we began receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire from what I assessed to be a reinforcing squad-sized Taliban element moving along lines of communication from its support zones to our southwest. LT Portwood retasked the SWT to target these two locations. He used his M203 and M320 40-mm smoke grenades to mark the targets and deconflicted these gun runs with our inbound 155 mm indirect fire support, continuing to fire on Taliban elements that were engaging us from multiple fighting positions within the objective itself. The .50-caliber rounds and 2.75" rockets from the Kiowas were effective in suppressing the enemy, but they soon ran out of ammo and had to break station to re-arm and refuel at FOB Wilson.

The Taliban used this lapse in air support well. Just minutes after the SWT departed, I received a report that the Taliban were attacking COP JFM with small arms and automatic weapons fire from roughly the same locations B/1-502 had indicated during its previous engagement. Due to the continued enemy fire from the objective itself, I assessed that this was yet another separate, squad-sized element, likely originating from a nearby village. SGT Juan Carrion, one of the troop's squad designated marksmen positioned in Tower 1, quickly identified and killed two Taliban gunmen. Also, the crew manning a MK-19 positioned at the southern entry control point identified another Taliban team, engaging the COP, and put a burst of 40-mm grenades into its position. The enemy gunmen at this location attempted to displace after only a few bursts due to the effective fire of the MK-19 gunner, SGT Michael Bolsinger, but were caught in the open, and at least two more of the enemy were killed as they moved back into the village from where they had come. Simultaneously, my XO, LT Cordell Hachinsky, who was manning the Troop CP, and LT Gatewood requested a fire mission from the squadron's 120-mm mortars along the linear target we had established on the enemy's templated attack by fire positions. We had rounds on target within minutes of the enemy opening fire on the COP, and between this indirect fire and the effects we had achieved with our direct fire weapons, the Taliban force engaging our COP was neutralized and really never capable of more than harassment fire from this point forward.

At this time, we were simultaneously engaging three distinct enemy elements with a number of indirect fire, direct fire, and aerial platforms. By 0910, however, the Taliban elements engaging the COP had broken contact to the west, and small arms fire from the vicinity of the pomegranate field had decreased considerably. The SWT had to break station to refuel and re-arm after, again, expending all of its munitions on fighting positions in the area. We halted our 120-mm mortar fire and 155-mm artillery fire on their respective targets as we prepared to continue our movement to clear the objective upon the return of the SWT. As the SWT was returning to support our movement, we learned that we were also receiving fixed-wing support in the form of an FA-18.

As we began our movement towards the objective, our element and the SWT reconnoitering in front of us came under intense fire from Taliban elements which had regrouped, either for a concentrated action against us or simply in preparation for withdrawal. Whatever their intent, the SWT immediately conducted multiple gun runs while we got our fixed wing assets oriented. We then had the SWT conduct a rocket attack on the fighting position to mark the target for the fixed-wing aircraft. The fixed-wing aircraft was able to positively identify the rocket strikes and the subsequent return fire by the Taliban on the ground. Within minutes of the rockets impacting on the enemy, the FA-18 dropped a 1,000 lb GBU on the same position, effectively ending Taliban fire from this location for the rest of the action. It was now approximately 1015; we had been in continuous contact for about three hours, and many of my Soldiers were short on ammunition. Our objective during these initial patrols was strictly to attrit the enemy. We had accomplished this without suffering any casualties.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Brett Matzenbacher, who served as Commander of Bravo Troop, 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment. CPT Matzenbacher's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: Combined arms maneuver falls under the tenet of *Integration* found in ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. As a tenet, *Integration* influences “activities with joint, interagency, and multinational partners.” CPT Matzenbacher’s vignette provides a great example of this use of combined arms tactics, “the employment and ordered arrangement of

forces in relation to each other” to close with and destroy enemy forces. (ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*)

Tactics change based on the leader’s ability to leverage enablers and attachments to his organization during battle. Within the definition of integration, the ADRP states, “...commanders consider their own capabilities as well as joint capabilities and limitations.” CPT Matzenbacher used 155-mm artillery to support maneuver in agricultural areas and 120-mm mortars closer to his own Soldiers to allow him to migrate risk estimated distances. He used a Canadian Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank to provide continual observation and precision fires, with great lethality, on enemy fighting positions that his organic unit could not reduce. Also, he used SWTs not only to suppress enemy positions, allowing friendly units to maneuver; but also to provide observation and direction for fixed wing assets to identify enemy protective obstacles. By doing this, CPT Matzenbacher was able to employ “...Army capabilities to complement those of their unified action partners.” The success of this mission was not only the identification of shortfalls in his own combat power, but also CPT Matzenbacher’s ability to synchronize the efforts of these elements while under fire. He was able to “sequence and synchronize operations in time and space to achieve simultaneous effects throughout an operational area,” covering multiple villages and his own COP. (ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*.)

Finally, CPT Matzenbacher and his company were able to execute a mission of this complexity and depth because they had used similar assets in their training. That training allowed his company to create a shared understanding and purpose with his joint/international partners.

CONCLUSION: These vignettes illustrate success at the platoon and company levels based on the application of combined arms. The effectiveness of ground forces is dependent on leaders who are competent, trained, able to leverage assets, and courageous enough to seek and exploit opportunities in dynamic operational environments.

CHAPTER 7

Terrain

We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

— Sun Tzu

INTRODUCTION: Over the past 14 years, our Soldiers have fought in the most challenging of terrains. In dense urban areas, featuring hard-clad structures, many times built one on top of another, to the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan, they have fought not just an adaptive enemy but also the terrain on which the enemy operates. When we consider that terrain is only one of the six mission variables that leaders must consider when planning operations, we appreciate the requirement for leaders to be smart, precise, and adaptive.

During the surge of forces in Iraq in 2006, elements of the 1-506th, 101st Airborne were operating out of COP Eagle's Nest in Ar Ramadi, Iraq. On 18 October, 1st Platoon, Charlie Company, 1-6 Infantry, conducted Operation Last Call: a dismounted movement to contact in the volatile P10 sector in eastern Ramadi. The operation had two purposes: first, to make contact and destroy the enemy and, second, to introduce the sector to the leaders of the 1ID company that was conducting a relief in place with Charlie Company. The elements on the mission included two squads, two BFVs, two M1114s, and a squad-size element of the incoming company's leadership.

The P10 sector in the Ma'laab District of Ar Ramadi is a dense urban area with two and three story houses built one to three meters apart. Almost every home has a six-foot-high perimeter wall made of hollow cinderblocks. The gates to the courtyards are typically made of 1/8" sheet metal and feature a dead-bolt lock. The houses themselves are made of concrete or reinforced rebar. Although a 25-mm HE round and higher will penetrate, even 120-mm HE rounds will not be enough to completely collapse a house. The roofs can sustain a 120-mm mortar attack without penetration.

Rooftops and windows offer 100-200 meters for observation and fields of fire along alleys and 300-600 meters along main roads. Almost all roofs and balconies have a two-to four-foot-high perimeter wall. Most roofs have decorative bricks that create loopholes, which can be used by snipers to fire from a recessed position while reducing their muzzle flash.

Upon dismounting from the BFVs, my lead squad received inaccurate small arms and RPG fire. Immediately, I maneuvered the squads through the streets, using available cover, and sought to close with the enemy. We moved, using houses as strong points, and either maneuvered house to house, which provided cover and concealment, or used bounding overwatch, with squads on either side of the road to gain speed.

After the initial contact when dismounting the BFVs, AH-64s arrived in our AO. The pilots were unable to identify the shooters, so I called them off the objective. We continued moving east, stopping at the few occupied houses in P10. The majority of the houses in this sector were abandoned and used by enemy fighters to conduct attacks against COP Eagle's Nest.

We finally occupied the final target house in the operation. I had positioned myself on the first tier of a two-tiered rooftop which faced north into the P10 sector. I had positioned Soldiers on the second tier of the rooftop above me and a squad on the street to provide security. Shortly after placing them there, I heard a single shot ring out, and all of us immediately recognized it as having come from a sniper rifle. My first concern after hearing the shot was for the squad securing the street. I grabbed my ICOM radio and asked, "Red 2, are you receiving fire?" Red 2 replied in the negative. Almost immediately, I heard someone call for a medic. When I heard the call for a medic the second time, I realized it was coming from above my position. All of this happened in the space of about five seconds. I immediately ran up the stairs to my right, and my First Squad leader, who was securing the rooftop, popped his head around the corner and called, "I need a medic!" I called down to my platoon sergeant to send up the platoon medic, and I then made my way to the rooftop.

The scene on the rooftop was surreal. Ten feet to my front, next to the 'shoot' hole in the wall that he had been covering, lay the lifeless body of SPC Jose Perez. His buddy, SPC Tyler Kuhnle, and the commo sergeant, who was attached to the squad, knelt next to him. My squad leader was in front of me, looking a little dazed. I asked him what happened, and he stated that he heard the rifle shot as he was making another shoot hole.

I called for my CASEVAC BFV and prepared to evacuate SPC Perez. Unfortunately, there was no aerial MEDEVAC capability within the Ma'laab District due to a lack of HLZs and the presence of the enemy threat. The only way I could evacuate his body was with one of my BFVs. Very few overwatch routes existed within the AO, and the BFV was more likely to survive an IED strike and be able to respond to an enemy ambush. Enemy TTPs for direct fire, IEDs, and VBIED attacks within Ramadi included targeting CASEVAC elements moving to CCPs during offensive operations.

After the BFV departed, I positioned myself on the rooftop with my squad in its security positions and weighed the tactical advantages of attempting to pursue the sniper. I knew it was a trained sniper because he took the shot within a hundred meters of a BFV in a blocking position and was able to hit a hole about 10" x 12." He needed to be contained before he caused more casualties. Our only advantage that we had was our firepower. An overwhelming disadvantage was that we would have to travel into an open area with little or no cover when the sniper's hide position could have been in a hundred different places. Most likely, the sniper was not aware that he had gotten a kill; I believe he took a shot at the hole in an effort to draw us out into the open where he would have a clearer shot. The other possibility was that the sniper attack was a bait technique designed to draw out our vehicles and Soldiers into a complex attack. Regardless, we only had two dismounted platoons available, and battalion had made it clear that we would not receive additional troops.

Following the CASEVAC, we continued scanning for any movement in the direction from which the sniper engaged. After about an hour, we detected no movement, and I decided that it was not tactically sound to continue the operation. The area we would have had to search consisted of over 100 dwellings with limited vehicle access. Not only did I not have the troops available to conduct the search, but I would not have been covered by my most casualty-producing weapons. Probably the most damning drawback was the 300+-meter-open ground that we would have had to cover dismounted to reach the area where the sniper was located. We departed the area and returned to Eagle's Nest without the solace of having found the sniper. This was assuaged when elements of 1ID successfully destroyed a sniper operating in P10.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Matthew Arabian, who served as the Platoon Leader for 1st Platoon, 1-6 IN. CPT Arabian's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: In the discussion of terrain analysis and the military aspects of terrain, it must be underscored that terrain favors neither friendly nor enemy until one combatant is able to understand its effects on operations and leverage that knowledge into his decisionmaking process.

Thorough terrain analysis by either combatant undoubtedly exposes opportunities that can be seized to affect the outcome of a battle or engagement. Too often, we readily quantify data, such as number of operations conducted, but are ignorant to the number of opportunities seized or lost, opportunities that come from understanding our operational environment. Although it is more difficult to quantify an "opportunity," it does not make it any less valuable to the mission.

Terrain analysis is defined in FM 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, as "the collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of geographic information on the natural and manmade features of the terrain, combined with other relevant factors, to predict the effect of the terrain on military operations." In the case of CPT Matthew Arabian and his platoon, they had to account for the effects of manmade obstacles on dismounted and mounted movement. They also had to deal with the aspects of observation and fields of fire, where friendly and enemy forces could see and shoot. While weather conditions were not a critical factor, the fact that most of the houses had been abandoned multiplied the number of potential enemy positions.

In CPT Arabian's account, the enemy sniper exploited the three dimensional aspect of the urban area to maximize his cover and concealment, while positioning himself to take a successful shot. In a dense residential area of two- to three-story houses and a myriad of apertures from which to fire, Soldiers were unable to identify the direction of fire, much less pinpoint a window or structure.

CPT Arabian's thorough terrain analysis of the P10 sector allowed him to evacuate SPC Perez and continue the operation. He decided not to chase the sniper, citing the enemy tactic of baiting Soldiers into a complex attack. He executed Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield by applying

his analysis, familiarity, and experiences to the streets of Ramadi and accounting for other operational variables, such as his own troops and the enemy. The enemy sniper engagement on 1st Platoon further emphasizes that terrain is neutral, favoring only those who take advantage of an opportunity.

In January 2007 the 4-73^d Cavalry Squadron, 4th BCT, 82^d Airborne, deployed to Afghanistan, beginning its deployment in the southern portion of RCEast but shifting its AO north to Paktia Province in July and August 2007. The 4-73 Cavalry was the Cavalry squadron in the newly formed 4th BCT, composed of two Cavalry troops—Alpha and Bravo; one dismounted Infantry reconnaissance troop—Charlie; and a Forward Support Company and HHT elements.

Paktia is a province with variable terrain, ranging from desert areas to extremely steep mountains. Team Charlie's AO was located in the southeastern portion of the 4-73^d battlespace. The main area of note in this AO was the Khowst-Gardez (K-G) Pass which was the most direct way to travel by vehicle from Khowst, which borders Pakistan, to Gardez, one of the more developed cities in the RC-East. Limited operations occurred in this area due to the severely restricted terrain and the insurgents' domination of the people and terrain. The K-G Pass crosses the center of three districts and is the only drivable road through the districts except for some limited wadis.

The majority of locals in the area had limited knowledge of the world outside of their particular wadi. The weather and terrain forced many of the communities to function almost independently. Very few homes had electricity. We found the farther one lived from the pass road, the less aware he was of his country's current situation. The people tended to support whoever could provide security for the little commerce they did have, and because coalition forces only passed through the area, the people supported the insurgents.

In August 2007, in an effort to develop commerce and ultimately pave the road to, hopefully, expand commerce, Team Charlie was sent to this AO with the task of interdicting and clearing it to allow the expansion of the Afghan development zones in Khowst and Gardez. Our dismounted troop was selected because the terrain was severely restrictive for vehicle movement. During our stay, we developed the small outpost, used as a

stopping point for vehicles moving in the area, into a small but fully functioning FOB, called Wilderness.

The enemy in the area had always been strong; the pass was adjacent to the mountains where Operation Anaconda had taken place. Prior to Charlie Company's occupation of Wilderness, the enemy had never been seriously challenged in the area, and when they were, they were comfortable massing large numbers. In September and October, Charlie Company defeated two large scale attacks and forced the enemy to change tactics from large scale attacks to smaller, better planned hit-and-run attacks. Despite the defeats and the decline in attacks, the enemy wanted to maintain control of the pass to show the local people that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan could not be successful in protecting the area.

The enemy always had access to indirect fire platforms in the AO, but after the insurgents suffered more than 70 dead and many more wounded in September 2007, they began to rely more heavily on them. In October, the IDF attacks began to increase, occurring with as many as ten to twelve 107-mm rockets and twelve to fifteen 82-mm mortars. The enemy's accuracy increased as well, with most rounds landing in the FOB. As these attacks became more frequent, the S-2 analysts observed that the most intense attacks occurred between 0900 and 1000 on Wednesdays, after paydays, leading us to conclude insurgents were buying rockets with the very money we were paying them to work on the local road project. By November, we had a pretty good notion as to the points of origin of the fire and began to think about ways to eliminate the IDF team.

The plan was to insert a small team—so that the locals would not notice its Soldiers' absence from patrols or from the FOB—into an ambush position with a lot of firepower and constant communication with our two 105-mm howitzers. Six personnel would make up the team: two snipers, each with an XM-110 suppressed sniper rifle; a spotter, armed with an M4 with M203 for the dead space, to assist the snipers; one 13F to control indirect fires; and two additional Soldiers for C2 and security—the Company Commander, CPT Paul Grant, and me. CPT Grant carried an M-14, and I carried the M249 for direct fire suppression in case we were caught off-guard during the mission. We would be inserted by way of blacked-out HMMWVs after dark several days early to within about seven kilometers of the planned engagement area. We would exit the vehicles, move into a concealed position, wait for the vehicles to leave, and then conduct our foot

movement down the wadi and into our position before sunrise on Monday, 12 November to wait for the enemy to appear the next Wednesday.

We conducted terrain analysis to ensure the kill zone would support the enemy avenue of approach. We were able to sneak in an aerial reconnaissance on the brigade commander's UH-60 while he was conducting a RIP TOA familiarization flight with the incoming 4/101st commander. It helped, but not much. We also requested that no type of air asset come into the airspace so as not to spook the enemy. We believed that due to the extremely high elevation and normally clear skies, the audible and visual signature of any aircraft would discourage the enemy fire team from conducting its mission.

On the night of 11 November, our six-man team conducted our final pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections and loaded onto the HMMWVs to be inserted. The drive took approximately one hour, and around 1830z, we arrived at the drop-off position. We decided we had not been compromised and could begin moving toward our engagement area. The terrain on both sides of the wadi was jagged, high, and severely restricted. Knowing that any position in the wadi would make a great place for an enemy ambush, we moved slowly in zero percent illumination and hugged the walls of the wadi so we would at least have some cover if engaged. Even with night vision devices, vision was greatly hindered by both the complete lack of moonlight and the thick clouds, masking the stars. It took three hours, with numerous security halts, to move approximately four kilometers.

Once we reached the last area of flat ground, we took a break in a tight, six-man perimeter before beginning our climb. At approximately 2130z, we began to climb the last 300 horizontal meters which also happened to be about 150 meters vertically. This proved difficult, considering that we all had our Individual Body Armor, weapons, basic loads, radios, batteries, food, water, and clothing for three-plus days of operations. The lack of visibility and the fact that we were carrying heavy weapons or several weapons caused the movement to be extremely slow. The loose shale caused every few steps forward to result in several steps' worth of sliding back. About a quarter of the way up the hill, part of our element had to cache our rucks and move with just our weapons. We later retrieved the rucks by pulling overwatch for one another, moving down, and grabbing the rucks. After a seemingly endless climb up what, at times, felt

to be a vertical wall, our element and our equipment were in position at sunrise. It had taken four hours to move 300 meters. Incidentally, when the time came for us to extract, we realized the path we took was nearly a cliff and decided it was far too steep to climb down.

The position was a rocky outcrop near the top of a small mountain connected to the rear by several larger mountains in a continuously elevating ridgeline. There was a cliff on one side and a very steep slope on the other. The only threats we faced were from behind us on the other side of the mountain which caused us to split into two three-man elements. The position provided excellent observation not only into the kill zone below us, but also on the majority of the wadi for several kilometers in each direction. The fields of fire were excellent, and with a few discreet turns of our heads, we could cover all avenues of approach.

We began to improve our position by better concealing our locations, all done by low and high crawl due to the lack of vegetation for concealment. We spent the next two-and-a-half days either crawling to relieve ourselves a few meters away or alternating between the prone position, lying on our sides, or laying on our backs. On the second night, we dug up some of the sharper rocks on which we had been laying.

Our engagement area was approximately 400 meters from our position and 100 meters in length. From the enemy's perspective, there were mountains rising to his reverse flank, and the open wadi was to his front flank toward our position. We were so high above yet so close laterally that the enemy would have to look up into the sun to have a chance at spotting our position. The only possible cover was a gentle draw that we had looked at from our position via Google Earth before the mission, but the engagement area chosen was the best considering our other choices. We plotted a 105-mm target in the draw to regain some of the tactical advantage lost by it being there.

Over the next two days, we observed our engagement area, suspected enemy avenues of approach, and the surrounding mountains for any signs of mortar or rocket firing positions. Finally, on Wednesday at 0940, three men, without any sheep, came walking directly down the suspected avenue of approach. We were able to confirm that all three men were carrying AK-47-style assault rifles and various types of chest rigs. The Leupold spotting scope allowed the spotter to see the tennis shoes that we had all become accustomed to seeing on enemy dead after contacts.

The CO gave the signal to attack as soon as the enemy entered the kill zone. We initiated the ambush with precise, silenced shots from the XM-110s. We had hoped to eliminate two of the targets with the first silenced shot and kill the third with a second silenced shot. The first shot impacted the ground near the enemy element, but due to the effects of the suppressor, the enemy did not notice. We realized at this time that we needed to take the extreme slope of the firing angle into account, so the sniper adjusted his sights and fired again. The impact drove one insurgent to the ground, but he continued to move with his weapon. The other two, seeing him go down, jumped for cover just as I began to engage with the M249. The insurgents were now in the small draw in the kill zone.

As we continued to engage the enemy with the M249 and precision shots from the snipers, CPT Grant called for one the 105s at FOB Wilderness to fire the target in the draw. We saw it impact short of the draw on the gun target line. CPT Grant quickly called in adjustments, and the adjusted round came in and landed about 30 meters to our south; fortunately 30 meters to our south was also at the bottom of the very steep cliff where we were. It became apparent why our counter-battery always seemed to be ineffective. Even the slightest change in the guns (and the correction was 100 percent correct) resulted in massive change due to the drastically sharp elevation changes and terrain relief around the wadi and the draw. To hit the target, the artillery rounds had to come in high over a ridge and drop straight down against the side of a hill on the reverse slope from the artillery position. Even using the standard high angle fire that we were used to proved difficult, but after making some slight corrections to the adjustments and using open-and-closed-sheaf patterns, we soon had the rounds in the draw where we needed them.

At this time, the enemy began to try to move to better cover, but every move was met with sniper and M249 fire. Ten minutes into the engagement, all three insurgents were dead. For all intents and purposes, the mission was a success. The enemy now knew they were no longer safe in their own support zone.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Greg Cormier, who served as the Executive Officer for Charlie Company, 4-73 Cavalry Squadron. CPT Cormier's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)—the analysis of terrain, enemy, and civil considerations—is key to the development of any tactical plan. CPT Cormier’s experience highlights the importance of detailed terrain analysis and the resulting success in doing so.

The FM 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, defines analysis of terrain as “the collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of geographic information on the natural and manmade features of the terrain, combined with other relevant factors, to predict the effect of the terrain on military operations.” Charlie Troop’s analysis of the military aspects of terrain—Obstacles, Avenues of Approach, Key Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, and Cover and Concealment—went further than simply identifying these aspects. C Troop’s leaders visualized and described the effects of terrain and weather, with regard to the position of the sun, on both friendly and enemy operations. This allowed C Troop to understand the environment and direct a tactical plan that took advantage of the effects of terrain and the capabilities of their Soldiers, weapons, and equipment, while simultaneously exploiting the enemy’s weaknesses.

CPT Cormier emphasized the effects of the elevation and steep slopes on movement rates, weapons positioning, and trajectories. Furthermore, the identification of the hilltop as an excellent observation post and ambush position, due to its observation and fields of fire into the engagement area and cover and concealment from lower elevations, demonstrates a firm comprehension of the importance of key terrain. Lastly, the understanding of the cover and concealment from the wadi system led C Troop to deny this space to the enemy through integration of indirect fires. Undoubtedly, this fight was won, not through firepower, but through effective IPB.

Bull Company, 1st Squadron, 2^d Stryker Cavalry, was serving in Sadr City during the uprising that began on 25 March 2008. Fighting raged over the next three days: EFPs destroyed multiple vehicles and the enemy launched recurring rocket attacks against the Green Zone. On 28 March, 2^d Platoon, Bull Company, was told to secure a key traffic circle to disrupt the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) attacks.

I decided to dismount some of my men and establish a high side security site. Immediately to the north of the traffic circle was a large multi-story abandoned building. I knew this building well; it was a famous Sadr City landmark. Draped across most of the southern facing façade of the

building was an enormous picture of Muqtada al-Sadr's father. This building, known informally among my platoon as the "Daddy Sadr" Building, would offer us good observation on the streets below.

I passed the order to my squad leaders. I was only going to take 1st Squad and one M240B machine gun team from the weapons squad into the building. SGT Robert Hanson maneuvered the Stryker as close as he could to the entrance to minimize the amount of exposure time on the street. SGT Daniel Hullet, the vehicle commander of B24, did the same. Despite the precaution, we would still have to make a 50-meter dash to the building. Once the conditions were set, I gave the order to drop the ramp. Apparently, the militiamen were waiting for us to dismount because, as soon as we hit the street, all hell broke loose. They fired at us from what seemed like every direction. I heard the bullets snapping past my head and ricocheting off the concrete and asphalt. I was running as fast as I could, yet it seemed like I was going nowhere. Finally, I was inside the building and racing up the steps.

When we reached the top floor, I quickly placed my men in defensive positions. There were chunks of broken concrete and twisted rebar scattered across the floor and tall rectangular window sills (without glass, of course) spaced evenly along the walls. I put SSG Stephen Pickus with his squad on the western facing end and the gun team from the weapons squad on the eastern facing end. I covered the southern approach along with my RTO.

On the streets below, JAM militiamen attempted to surround the building. Initially, 1st Squad had a very clear view of the enemy and was able to kill several militiamen. Even my RTO shot and killed a lone gunman dressed in a blue jacket as he ran across Route Florida. My machine gun team, led by SGT Daniel Nava, targeted the houses and alleyways along Route Delta where militiamen had been launching RPGs at my Strykers just five minutes prior. Eventually, the militiamen fell back, discouraged by the accurate shooting from my men. It appeared as if we had defeated the enemy attack. Little did we know that the attack was just getting started.

A very loud explosion rocked the Daddy Sadr Building, and dust fell from the poorly constructed ceiling. SSG Ronnie Lappie saw the explosion from his Stryker and reported over the radio, "You're getting mortared! That one hit just north of the building."

“Roger,” I answered back. Another huge explosion landed behind us, not hitting the building but landing close enough so that we could hear the shrapnel shredding walls below us.

“They’re bracketing you. They’re probably shooting from Sadr City. I can’t PID any shooters.”

A few more thunderous explosions blasted our ear drums and shook the old building. Something definitely hit the northern side of the structure. However, these explosions sounded different. These weren’t mortar rounds, but RPG rounds. The bastards were lobbing rockets at us from long range.

“Can anyone see the goddamn shooters?” I yelled. “Nava, you have to be able to see something!”

“I can’t see shit!” Nava yelled back. “They’re firing them from long range, across Route Gold!”

Another mortar round landed close by. This was the only time during the battle, and during the entire deployment, that I remember being scared. I was lying prone on that dirty floor, listening to the sounds of war resonate outside the building. I was sure that the next RPG would come flying through the window and hit me square in the head, and the worst part was that we could not do a damn thing about it. This building was untenable. The large window sills provided little cover against the exploding mortar shells and rockets outside. Because the enemy had a perfect view of our position and could hit us from over a thousand meters away, I decided to seek another, more suitable, building to establish my defense.

We ran down the stairs and out into the streets once more. This time, thankfully, there was no one shooting at us. I eventually chose a more durable tenement building that was large enough to safely accommodate all of my infantrymen.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Matthew Apostol, who served as the Platoon Leader of 2^d Platoon, Bull Company, 1st Squadron, 2^d Stryker Cavalry. CPT Apostol’s monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: When conducting his Troop Leading Procedures, CPT Apostol undoubtedly conducted a thorough IPB to develop his plan. In accordance with Step 2 of IPB, he attempted to understand the environmental effects on his, as well as the enemy’s, operations. Based on his terrain analysis, he determined that the “Daddy Sadr” Building was key

terrain, due to its ability to observe and control the routes below. However, ATP 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace*, warns us that terrain that proves the best observation also draws the threat's attention. The manual goes on to state that one of the four components of understanding terrain is analyzing areas where friendly forces are most vulnerable to observation. By deciding to occupy key terrain that dominated the area, he was also tremendously conspicuous to threat forces. While his observation was good, the threat's observation of him was better. This is why ATP 2-01.3 presents a requirement to identify areas that are vulnerable to observation so that steps can be taken to mitigate the vulnerability. Unfortunately, CPT Apostol did not have sufficient resources to overcome the threat posed to him in this position and was instead forced to change his scheme of maneuver.

From February to September 2011, the 3-2 Marines were responsible for overseeing operations in two districts of Helmand Province where the Marines had enjoyed great success in integrating sniper teams with tank sections. The battalion commander wanted to exploit this success by integrating tanks and snipers on a larger scale. Operation Comanche Moon was a company-sized raid with the battalion's sniper platoon acting as the assault element and a tank platoon acting as the support element. The purpose of the operation was to disrupt insurgent operations and shape the battlespace in preparation for relief by 2-4 Marines. The company's task was to destroy insurgents in the town of Katz.

The operation began around 2030 on 23 August 2011. We left the assembly area and crossed the line of the departure from FOB Edinburgh under blackout conditions. Vehicles drove either by FLIR cameras or through the use of night vision goggles. The order of movement was the security element; the snipers, riding on the armadillo variant MTRVs; and then the tank platoon. The tanks were in the rear of the formation, so they could drive through a path proofed for improvised explosive devices by the security element's mine rollers. My vehicle was third in the order of movement.

The route that we took had never, to our knowledge, been travelled by coalition forces. This allowed us to use the local national routes to bypass the insurgent obstacle belts and flank his defenses. The route covered approximately 22 kilometers through uninhabited desert, crossed a major

wadi system, and traversed the base of a mountain. During our analysis and planning of the route, I believed the greatest obstacle would be the wadi crossing. I spent much time looking at the terrain through various sources of imagery and even had a Scan Eagle UAV fly over the area to confirm the imagery. The wadi crossing turned out to be uneventful, and I felt relieved after crossing it. The base of the mountain was another story. What looked like shallow, sandy washes on the imagery turned out to be rock-filled ditches. We crossed about half a dozen of them, and the 7-ton trucks had difficulty on each one. We had to stop and pull one out with a wrecker, and another blew a tire. This put us behind our schedule and was eating away at the sniper platoon's time to conduct its dismounted infiltration. I asked the tank platoon commander to move his tanks alongside our formation and to place a tank near each one of the ditch crossings to rapidly extricate any vehicle which became stuck.

We arrived at the ORP around 0045 on the morning of 24 August. Once at the ORP, I set in the security elements and released the snipers to begin their dismounted infiltration to their hide sites. Our security elements covered not only all-around security for the ORP, but also the flanks of the sniper platoon with crew-served weapons oriented to the north and south along the wadi that separated the ORP from the sniper positions on the next ridgeline. During the operation, I remained in the command and control vehicle at the ORP to maneuver the forces on the objective and to coordinate the maneuver and fires through the battalion command post.

The infiltration route for the snipers covered two kilometers through a wadi and up to a ridgeline. The original plan was for the sniper team, with the JTAC, to occupy a rural hide site, overlooking the other two teams and the entire objective area, and for the other two teams to occupy urban hide sites within abandoned compounds on the forward slopes of the ridgeline overlooking the objective area. However, during the infiltration, a Scan Eagle UAV detected a number of local nationals in the two planned urban hide sites. I talked to the sniper platoon commander, and we decided that all teams would occupy rural hides on the ridge overlooking the objective area. By 0400 on the 24th, all the sniper teams were in place.

At dawn on the 24th, there were over 100 Marines and sailors poised to strike at the insurgents in the upper Musa Qa'leh River Valley. Throughout the early morning hours, we watched as the insurgent fighters conducted their usual business of moving down from their homes and

gathering around their commanders to receive their assignments. During this time, we ensured that the Scan Eagle UAV was not overhead because the sound of its engines would discourage the insurgents from gathering in the open. It was obvious who the insurgents were because of their actions; roughly six of them would stand together with weapons slung across their shoulders, and one would be talking over his ICOM radio. Through ICOM scanner intercepts, we knew that the fighters had not detected the three sniper teams on the ridgeline.

At 0630, the southern team, seeing insurgents observing the ridgelines, believed its position had been compromised and initiated contact with the insurgent fighters. Perhaps not realizing the firepower we possessed, the insurgents decided to attack into our ambush. For approximately the next 90 minutes, the sniper teams developed the situation as the insurgents committed themselves to the fight, massing behind cover and returning fire towards the sniper positions.

I then committed the tank platoon to the fight. The tanks moved to an attack by fire position on the northern end of the objective. During their movement, we heard the insurgents say, "Don't worry about the tanks; they will drive into the minefield." The Marines who heard this passed the information over the radio net that I had established as the primary channel for the operation. I confirmed that the tank platoon heard the transmission and that it would adjust its position. The tankers were tracking and had positioned themselves in two attack by fire positions near the original planned location. For the next two-and-a-half hours, the tank platoon, in coordination with the northernmost sniper team, prosecuted targets with machine guns at distances up to 2,000 meters. We kept hearing the insurgent commanders telling their troops to attack the tanks, but not surprisingly, none of them obliged.

Around 1100, all contact had ceased. The sniper platoon commander requested to exfiltrate from the ambush positions, but I decided to wait another 45 minutes until a KC-130J Harvest Hawk arrived overhead to ensure that there was no more enemy in the objective area and then to cover the exfiltration. The Harvest Hawk came on station and made one pass of the objective area but had communication problems and ended up returning to base. Shortly after, we began the exfiltration, firing an artillery smoke mission for obscuration, and leaving an estimated 27 dead enemy fighters on the objective.

From the personal experience monograph written by Capt Timothy Hichak who served as the Assistant Operations Officer for 3-2 Marines. Capt Hichak's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: It can sometimes be alluring to a commander to believe that we have entered into an age when the impact of terrain on military operations has somehow been muted by the fielding of technology and military equipment. This is not a new phenomenon; commanders have believed this from Gaugamela to Tora Bora. In this operation, Capt Hichak conducted a thorough terrain analysis that afforded him the most covered and concealed avenue of approach into the target objective. This analysis, in regard to the military aspects of terrain, put Capt Hichak's force within striking distance of an enemy that would otherwise not wish to join decisive battle with such a superior force. Catching the enemy in such canalizing terrain and isolating them from their egress routes allowed 3-2 Marines to fix the enemy and ultimately inflict heavy losses in both manpower and equipment.

Technology can be leveraged to conduct a better analysis of terrain, but it cannot replace the understanding that comes with that analysis. A UAV placed overhead with live feed provided to the commander does not replace a thorough understanding of the terrain and its effects on how the enemy and we will fight.

Undoubtedly, the enemy knew the terrain well in this fight, quite possibly fighting on it for years against any number of enemies. Perhaps even his father before him had done the same and taught him how the terrain could be leveraged against a foe with greater force of arms or numbers. On this day, he would learn another lesson of terrain: that it is the sword, which cuts both ways, and it can just as easily provide the same advantages to an enemy.

CONCLUSION: These vignettes offer an insight into the many variables leaders consider when planning operations. Rather than fighting the terrain, the best leaders consider its impact on operations and turn even the most austere of areas into an advantage.

CHAPTER 8

Maneuver

“Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter.”

— Winston Churchill

INTRODUCTION: According to ADRP 3-0, “The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats.” In other words, effective maneuver demands that friendly forces move in relation to enemy weakness. To ensure this occurs, the leader must take the time to analyze factors of METT-TC and the Principles of the IPB. Once he does so, he can plan his movement and integrate his fires because “direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver” (ADRP 3-0). Thoughtful analysis ensures effective maneuver.

From 18 February until 24 February 2007, TF 1-9 Infantry, conducted Operation Murfreesboro in the Ma’laab District of Ar Ramadi, Iraq, an operation designed to target AQIZ; limit the insurgents’ ability to reinforce or retrograde; and then clear the district, building by building, to kill or capture any insurgents left behind. The first part of the operation called for a series of raids targeting AQIZ leadership and safe houses to disrupt al Qaeda operations in the city. The next called for the construction of an obstacle belt, in the form of cement barriers, eight feet tall and five feet wide, to be placed at every intersection along RTE Easy Street, a four-lane road that spanned from the north of the Ma’laab District to the south and served as a border between it and its neighboring district, Al Iskan. On 22 February, Able Company, 1-9 IN, was ordered to secure an 800-meter stretch of RTE Easy Street no later than 0100, 24 February, to allow the route clearance team to clear RTE Easy Street and to allow the TF Sappers to emplace an obstacle belt running the length of Easy Street.

A mechanized Infantry company, B/1-26, call sign Bushmaster, was to move south along Route Easy Street to our west and, with the advanced optics systems and superior firepower afforded by its Bradley Fighting Vehicles, screen one block south of our front line trace through Ma'laab. Once we reached our positions along central Easy Street, Bushmaster would secure to our north and Dog Company, 1-9, would secure to our south. The end result was a continuous line of security on both sides of Route Easy Street, setting the conditions for the engineers to complete their tasks.

The 3^d Platoon, Able Company, led by 1LT Andrew Hightower, was to lead the company along its approach. His platoon, as well as each platoon that followed, task organized into three rifle squads with one section of gun trucks in support. Following 3^d Platoon was the company command post in the commander's gun truck, which was outfitted with the Blue Force Tracker and the best radios the company had. The command post consisted of the commander, CPT John Tate; the FSO, 1LT David McMahon; the RTO, SPC Garrison; and the driver gunner team. Next came the TF 1-9 Commander, LTC Charles Ferry, in his Assault Command Post, who was seeking high ground from which to direct the maneuver companies and external aviation and fire support assets.

1LT Reed Markham led the 2^d Platoon, which was second in the order of movement. Along with my RTO, SPC Craig Fletcher, and the FSNCO, SSG Michael Garcia, I moved on foot with 2^d Platoon. The 1st Platoon, led by 1LT Curtis Daniels, rounded out the company in the order of movement. The HQ Platoon, with 1SG James Spikes and the HQ Platoon Sergeant, SFC Hugh Simmons, staged the CASEVAC in a section of M113 APCs at OP Hotel, our preposition point, until our movement was complete and would then reposition to OP Eagle's Nest, a coalition OP on the southern side of Ma'laab.

Bushmaster, with a complement of M1 Abrams tanks from the TF Armor company, began its clearance approximately one hour prior to our scheduled LD time. Almost immediately after its departure, we could hear the thuds of the 120-mm main guns and the repetitive thumps of the 25-mm Bushmasters, magnified by the urban terrain. Because of the significant contact that Bushmaster was experiencing, we started about an hour late, with 3^d Platoon departing the hotel parking lot just before midnight.

Just as 2^d Platoon was crossing the LD, an explosion to our front shook the ground, and the unintelligible transmission from a panicked and

screaming 3^d Platoon RTO confirmed the worst. An IED cell had positioned an IED inside of a crease created by the courtyard walls surrounding a house in such a manner that it was not visible to the unit approaching from the north but was completely visible to anyone positioned to the south. The cell had detonated the IED at the precise moment to cause maximum damage. In all, nine Soldiers, including 1LT Hightower, were wounded so severely that all but one required immediate evacuation. The wounds ranged from shrapnel to the legs to partial, full, and double amputations. To avoid adding to the confusion caused by the explosion and the subsequent triage and treatment of the wounded, 2^d Platoon and the ACP stopped, which allowed me to guide the CASEVAC into position. Forty minutes later, all the casualties had arrived back at the Battalion Aid Station.

With the evacuation complete, the situation required reassessment. Knowing there was enemy to the south and that 3^d Platoon had sustained the loss of one-third of its combat power, CPT Tate decided to pass 2^d Platoon through the area of the blast, followed by 1st Platoon, and hold 3^d Platoon in trail to consolidate and secure our rear. I passed to the front with 2^d Platoon, CPT Tate resumed his position between the lead and middle platoon, and the ACP continued to move in an independent manner, pausing to take positions on rooftops and direct the engagement.

During our movement south, when we were engaged by machine gun fire, the commander would call in AH-64 Apache gunships, and the enemy would then break contact and continue their mobile defense south. Despite receiving sporadic PKM and AK-47 small arms fire, we continued our movement south in bounding overwatch. Our deliberate speed was causing some consternation to the commander because it was already nearing 0200—one hour past our intended time on target. I understood his point of view and knew we had to maintain initiative to meet the battalion commander's intent; however I radioed him and told him the necessity of the security posture, and he agreed that it was necessary.

1LT Markham used standard urban tactics and techniques. Clearing intersections with his lead fire team on foot, he would move his section of gun trucks, commanded by his weapons squad leader, SSG Shawn Thomas, to secure the intersection to the east and west. Finally, the rest of the platoon would pass through the intersection in a quick, orderly fashion. Moving through the alleys, the platoons would use a form of bounding overwatch adapted to the urban terrain. One squad would move down the road as

another squad provided overwatch from the rooftop of a building on the opposing side of the road. This allowed the Soldiers on the roof to return fire if the enemy engaged the squad on the road, giving that squad crucial seconds to breach a courtyard gate and find cover within. Once the squad moved into the courtyard, SSG Thomas would clear to destroy any remaining enemy with a .50 caliber or M240B mounted on either of his two trucks.

The 2^d Platoon continued cautiously but steadily south with the rest of the company. Upon crossing the next east-west axis, Market Street, 2^d Platoon was engaged from the south by machine gun fires that moved up the long axis 2^d Platoon was on. CPT Tate then passed 1st Platoon one block west, creating a two-pronged penetration south. With 1st and 2^d platoons advancing abreast or slightly staggered in a modified “L,” and 3^d Platoon in reserve, the insurgents had no route of exfiltration if they allowed the company to get within the standard 150-200 meters they had been engaging from all night.

We soon consolidated because we had to leave our route of infiltration due to complex IEDs along the route, and again, 2^d Platoon took its position in the front. Almost immediately, we were engaged by enemy machine gun fire coming from a mosque approximately 250 meters from our front line. The gunfire was high above our heads, and we were able to continue to move forward and take a position about 100 meters from the mosque. 1LT Markham’s lead fire team, however, had moved too far forward and was less than 75 meters from the mosque. The team leader, SGT Stephen Beard, ordered immediate suppression, and a 40-mm high explosive grenade fired by his M203 gunner killed one insurgent and seriously injured another at the doorway of the mosque. We received no more rounds from that location during our movement.

We consolidated in a building adjacent to the mosque, and the commander moved 1st Platoon into a position overwatching our movement south past the mosque. At this point, it was 0530, and we were 200 meters from our intended objective. We moved to Easy Street, having bypassed an IED positioned south of the mosque. At this time, 3^d and 2^d platoons crossed Easy Street and began taking up positions of dominance on the western side, and 1st Platoon followed shortly after it broke down its overwatch position. Each platoon maintained one position on the east and west sides of the street.

At this time, while under sporadic small fire, the company was in its intended position along Easy Street; it spanned an 800 meter length along East Street, with 3^d Platoon tied into the Bushmaster perimeter and 2^d Platoon tied into the Dog Company perimeter. During the day, the Sappers emplaced barriers from the train tracks in the south to RTE Michigan in the north. The effect was that neither vehicle nor human was able to walk or drive into or out of the Ma'laab district without the knowledge of coalition forces.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Adam Armstrong, who served as the Executive Officer of Able Company, TF 1-9. CPT Armstrong's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: CPT Armstrong's experience illustrates the importance of small-unit leaders remaining adaptive, agile, and flexible and how critical it is to conduct analysis of the Mission Variables (METT-TC). In particular, they clearly understood and applied the principles of IPB. CPT Armstrong's company was able to successfully execute Step 2 of IPB, *Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations*. Specifically, the leadership considered the aspects of OAKOC as they applied to the urban terrain to mitigate the threat from the insurgents while taking advantage of the terrain to support friendly movement.

After the initial IED strike, the unit adjusted and anticipated, identified, and bypassed additional obstacles (IEDs) along its axis of advance. Additionally, CPT Armstrong's company understood that the lateral avenues of approach provided the insurgents with their best observation and fields of fire; therefore, the company occupied the tallest structures along its axis of advance (key terrain) to establish support by fire positions and deny this advantage to the enemy. The company's deliberate use of the terrain and ability to analyze the aspects of OAKOC resulted in a successful movement to its objective, despite considerable resistance.

Additionally, CPT Armstrong's company displayed tremendous agility during the execution of its mission. After suffering a mass casualty event, it was able to adapt to the enemy's actions, transitioning from an attack on a single axis (more predictable and easier to ambush) to an attack on multiple axis (making the enemy fight in multiple directions and making it more difficult for the enemy to mass on their formation) and back again

as the enemy situation and the terrain dictated. These techniques were contained in FM 3-06.1, *Urban Operations*; unfortunately, this document has been superseded by ATTP 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain*, which does not discuss these different Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for executing operations in an urban environment.

Finally, CPT Armstrong's commander demonstrated that, as part of his analysis of METT-TC, he understood his own troops and their capabilities. He demonstrated this in his use of the mounted section of gun trucks as mobile protected firepower to facilitate movement along the more exposed portions of the axis of advance. This commander's ability to analyze METT-TC considerations through the use of IPB and the flexible application of doctrinal TTPs for operations in an urban environment undoubtedly contributed to the successful execution of the company's mission with a minimum of additional casualties.

In June 2007, 3-509 Infantry left Anbar Province for the city of Haswah, Iraq, with the mission of ending sectarian violence and defeating JAM and AQIZ in the area. The commander, LTC Val Keaveny, assigned A Company to control Haswah, D Company to control the neighboring city of Iskandiriyah, and B Company to control Chaka Four.

My company AO was in an area predominately occupied by a tribe called the Janabi. This tribe, known as one of Saddam Hussein's "Golden Tribes," had been severely disenfranchised upon his defeat, and its tribesmen were some of the initial insurgents to begin fighting against American forces. Eventually, the Janabi became so intertwined with AQIZ in the southern Baghdad area that the entire tribal leadership fell under the control of the al Qaeda terrorists and the Wahhabis. The AQIZ used Chaka Four as a base to conduct its attacks against Shia civilians in Haswah and coalition forces along MSR Tampa.

Our company's mission in Chaka Four was to disrupt AQIZ, creating enough space and confidence to establish a Concerned Citizens Program in our AO. Rather than operating out of combat outposts in the middle of our assigned sector, our company operated out of FOB Kalsu, a large installation 30 kilometers from Chaka Four. The disadvantages of operating out of FOB Kalsu were two-fold. First, the distance between the FOB and our sector forced us to conduct long mounted movements on IED-laden routes. Second, the lack of a permanent CF presence in Chaka Four allowed

insurgents to freely threaten the population during our absence. In the western portion of Chaka Four was an oil pipeline that AQIZ frequently targeted both to steal oil to sell on the black market and to sabotage the local economy.

On 31 October 2007, my platoon's mission was to destroy AQIZ along Route Oilway to prevent enemy forces from destroying this key infrastructure. The most significant obstacle that would affect our maneuver was a large concrete canal that ran from east to west and was approximately 20 meters in width and 15 meters in depth. This canal was not fordable except for a single bridge that ran north-south along Route Oilway, the road along which the pipeline ran. The entire area featured IED hotspots, and, in fact, a month prior, AQIZ detonated an IED against my platoon at this bridge.

Taking into account the terrain and the intelligence I had received that the insurgents normally conducted operations against the pipeline between 0700 and 1000, I determined that we needed to initiate movement from FOB Kalsu by 0500 to make the 30-minute drive to Iraqi Checkpoint 46 where we would leave our HMMWVs with minimal security under the control of my acting weapons squad leader, SGT Josh Thill. From that point, we would walk two kilometers under the cover of darkness and then conduct an area ambush along the pipeline as well as multiple avenues of approach leading toward the pipeline.

After encountering a few mishaps, including a HMMWV that required repair, we did not leave FOB Kalsu until 0600. By the time we reached our vehicle drop-off point, it was 0630, well into BMNT, and my platoon still had to conduct two kilometers of foot movement. I left the HMMWVs in a tight 360 perimeter with SGT Thrill and one of my FOs manning the radio to relay reports back to the company CP at FOB Kalsu. During infiltration, none of my squad leaders believed he was compromised, and to this day, I am unsure if we were successful moving undetected or not.

I occupied an ambush position with 2^d Squad, under the leadership of SSG Jamie Tarrant, which could conduct a linear ambush from a canal that overlooked the pipeline. The range to the pipeline was approximately 50 meters, and even though there were 11 men on the canal line, we were totally concealed by the high canal grass. My 1st Squad, with a total of nine men, under the leadership of SSG Steve Secor, occupied a three-story home to the west of 2^d Squad to provide overwatch and early warning of enemy

movement. SSG Secor and his men entered the home in complete silence and awoke the family in their beds. He used an interpreter to explain the situation to the family and moved it to the living room for the duration of the operation.

The next several hours passed uneventfully; we saw nothing more significant than school children and local farmers traveling the roads. At 1000, I ordered the two squads to break down and begin movement to our link-up position. Shortly before breaking down our positions, I received word that air had gone to red status, and there would be no CCA available. By the time the 1st and 2^d squads conducted link-up approximately 200 meters from the bridge, it was 1015. To avoid a possible IED along the bridge, we conducted visual sweeps of the area, looking for wires or disturbed earth. Following the sweeps, I sent a two-man element, SGT Samuel Palmer and SGT Christopher Campbell, to move forward and continue the search before signaling the rest of the platoon across. After SGT Palmer indicated by hand and arm signal that the bridge was clear, the remainder of his fire team, Alpha Team, 1st Squad, moved across the bridge to check the other side for IEDs, while the remainder of the platoon remained in overwatch on the north side of the bridge. After SGT Palmer sent word that the far side of the bridge was clear, I set in far and near security of the bridge and had the squads successively bound across the bridge.

Almost immediately after 1st Squad crossed, it came under heavy automatic weapons fire from the canal grass 150 meters to the southwest. SSG Secor and his squad began to lay down suppressive fire from a defilade on the side of the road toward the enemy ambush line. While 1st Squad kept the enemy suppressed, I moved with the rest of the platoon that remained on the bridge toward the south to come on line with 1st Squad. After my 2^d Squad and our Alpha M240B machine gun team, consisting of SGT Hank Gibson and SPC Alva Conklin, came on line with 1st Squad, we began to suppress the canal line at a rapid rate of fire. After I believed we had gained fire superiority, I told my platoon to go into a watch and shoot posture and prepare to maneuver on the insurgents since it was my experience that AQIZ usually broke contact after their initial contact with coalition forces. This, however, was not the case, and as soon as we dropped our rate of fire, the enemy picked up their rate of suppression against us.

Since we had 150 meters of open ground to cover under heavy suppression, I decided that a frontal assault toward the enemy position was out of the question; however, I did need to get my platoon out of the open area. SGT Campbell, the Bravo, 1st Squad Team Leader, took the initiative and identified two two-story homes 50 meters to the east. I had my machine gun team and my 2^d Squad transition to a rapid rate of suppressive fire and ordered the rest of my platoon to bound toward the Iraqi homes. As my lead fire team, under SGT Campbell, began to move east to the houses, the platoon began to take fire from a second direction—from a multiple story building 100 meters south of the two houses that I had just ordered my 1st Squad to occupy. The 1st Squad had to fire on the move and then transition from suppressive fire, on the outside of the Iraqi homes, directly to room clearance. The 1st Squad quickly secured the civilians in the home, and once it occupied the rooftops of the two buildings, it provided small arms fire and 40-mm grenade fire toward the initial enemy position and the new threat to the south. I moved the rest of the platoon to the rooftop of the second house and occupied a defensive perimeter.

I had been in contact with higher almost immediately after we began to receive fire. Since air was red, there was no available CCA. Higher was unwilling to drop rounds because of my proximity to the target. While my FO was dealing with the fires net, I contacted SGT Thill at the IA checkpoint. It had also come under RPG and heavy machine gun fire from an insurgent element. I had left only enough troops with SGT Thill to man radios and machine guns, and as a result, they could not move the vehicles to my position to provide additional fire support.

Meanwhile, battalion ordered a platoon from our heavy weapons company to move to my position with an Iraqi Army unit. They arrived at 1045, and their arrival, along with several short bursts from its .50-caliber machine guns, forced the enemy to break contact. Despite the enemy fire, my unit only suffered one casualty, a minor fragmentation wound.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT David Coulombe, who served as the Platoon Leader of 1st Platoon, B Company, 3-509th Infantry. CPT Coulombe's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: CPT Coulombe's experience demonstrates the importance of small-unit leaders executing a deliberate planning process and retaining

the ability to adapt to a changing operational environment. As he went through the Troop Leading Procedure process, CPT Coulombe's application of analysis of IPB supported the development of a flexible plan. As his company occupied a new sector in Haswah, he began to develop his IPB analysis. In particular, he understood that the terrain in his platoon's AO would have an impact on both threat and friendly operations. In Step 2 of IPB, the identification of the canal and its potential for enemy forces to use it to canalize his platoon was a key factor in understanding how the enemy fought. CPT Coulombe took the information available to him, including threat patterns and recent activity and his own analysis and evaluated the threat, Step 3 of IPB. The analysis he applied in Step 4 created a threat course of action and completed the IPB prior to developing his own friendly COA. CPT Coulombe's experience demonstrates the importance of a logical planning process, starting with terrain, then threat analysis, and finally friendly planning to prepare for changes to his environment.

Throughout his fight, CPT Coulombe transitioned between Characteristics of the Offense to quickly adapt to enemy responses. The offense is characterized by Surprise, Concentration, Audacity, and Tempo, allowing leaders to capitalize on intelligence and gain and maintain initiative during the fight (FM 3-90, *Tactics*, 2001). Initially, CPT Coulombe planned to execute an ambush, focusing on surprise and violence of action to disrupt enemy attacks in the area. However, as the situation developed, his platoon temporarily lost initiative in the operation. To regain that initiative, CPT Coulombe shifted emphasis to an audacious movement by bounding small elements to a more advantageous position. Simultaneously, his platoon increased the tempo by increasing rates of fire and using multiple direct fire systems. As the fight progressed, the transitions between Characteristics of the Offense allowed the platoon to seize the initiative from the enemy. Finally, the communication with his higher command and the arrival of additional forces allowed CPT Coulombe's element to exploit the initiative and force the enemy to break contact. CPT Coulombe's experience highlights the importance of small unit leaders remaining agile and adaptable through changing situations to meet mission success.

In early December, 2011, the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, deployed to the Zhari District in Afghanistan. In early May 2012, the Battalion Commander tasked the Recon Platoon to plan and

execute a two-day operation in conjunction with Alpha Company in and around the villages of Siah Choy to disrupt insurgent operations. Alpha Company was the battlespace owner for this area, and it had recently suffered upwards of ten WIA and one KIA. This area, adjacent to the Arghandab River, was extremely hostile and controlled by the Taliban. At this time, coalition forces could not safely conduct key leader or street-level engagements. Alpha Company would walk out of its COP a few hundred meters, get in a firefight, and then retrograde back. International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) had never entered many of these villages until the spring of 2012.

From 1-3 May 2012, my PSG, team leaders, and I worked closely with the Alpha Company Commander to develop a scheme of maneuver to disrupt insurgent operations in this area. We devised Operation Southern Sweep in which my platoon and our Afghan National Army (ANA) partners from 4th Company, 2^d Kandak, 3^d Brigade, 205th Corps, would move at night south into the Arghandab riverbed and then east to establish an over-watch position in an abandoned school built by the Canadians in 2008. Another platoon from Alpha Company would clear south through the villages of Siah Choy to push known insurgents towards our location. A second platoon from Alpha Company would escort Sappers generally along our same route the next night to reduce the Karam Khan Bridge. This bridge was over a “triple wadi” that skirted the riverbed and was a known insurgent supply line, allowing insurgents to move IED-making materials across the river from Panjwai District. There were two other crossing points in Zhari; however, this was the only one that did not have an Afghan National Police (ANP) checkpoint.

Our task organization consisted of three organic recon teams, two organic sniper teams, and a squad of our ANA partners from 4th Company. We conducted detailed planning and Troop Leading Procedures, to include an Operations Order (OPORD) brief to the entire platoon, on 2 May with a thorough assessment of the enemy situation and friendly scheme of maneuver.

On 3 May 2012, my PSG, SFC Neil Moore, and I conducted final coordination with Alpha Company on COP Siah Choy, while the team leaders conducted final pre-combat checks and inspections. In particular, we checked our counter-IED detection equipment, crew-served weapons, and communication equipment.

Once complete with our final coordination, inspections, and checks, we began our dismounted movement at 2345 on 3 May and headed south on Route Victoria from COP Siah Choy towards the riverbed. Everyone was carrying three days of supplies in addition to a double basic load of ammunition, an exhausting endeavor to say the least. We crossed the “triple wadi,” entered the riverbed, and headed east, hand-railing the water. The route was about three kilometers long and forced us to cross many deep canals along the way. We established our Objective Rally Point approximately 200 meters south of the school and sent two clearing teams to sweep the school for IEDs before we brought up the entire platoon. By 0300, we cleared the school and moved to occupy it. I then established communication with Alpha Company.

Later on that morning, I received word from the Alpha Company Commander that one of his platoons was no longer clearing south towards our position because it did not have enough time to plan and prepare for the mission, nor did it have the assets required to clear through this IED-laden area to reach our location from the north. His other platoon would still be out the next night to blow the bridge. That definitely changed our situation and diminished the effectiveness of the mission; nevertheless, we continued to over-watch the villages and the Karam Khan Bridge crossing.

By 0900 on May 4th, we noted that local farmers were observing our position, so we suspected the Taliban would soon know we were there. Over the next 12 hours, we received sporadic contact which ceased once the enemy broke contact when we returned fire. At approximately 1700, the Alpha Company reported to me on the radio that it had PID on two individuals with weapons walking over the bridge towards our position. We conducted a PID transfer over the radio with Alpha Company and continued to watch these individuals. When they were approximately 500 meters away, I reconfirmed PID with Alpha Company one last time and gave my Sniper Section Leader the go-ahead to engage them. He engaged them with one round each from his M24, and one insurgent was killed instantly. The second was shot in the stomach and eventually made it across the river where he was picked up by 1-23 IN in Panjwai and later died. Later that night, we conducted a ground BDA as per brigade policy and confirmed one to be a known insurgent from Panjwai. Our Brigade later confirmed the second individual was also a known insurgent.

That night, despite my concerns that our position had been compromised and the fact that we were running low on 40-mm HEDP rounds, the Battalion Operations Officer ordered our platoon to stay out an additional day because he wanted to gather patterns of life on the area after the bridge was blown. At approximately 0300, the platoon from Alpha Company arrived and resupplied us with much-needed 40-mm HEDP rounds and additional water. At 0400, the Sappers blew the bridge with two cratering charges, and at my request, the Alpha Platoon left its weapons squad, led by SSG Andrew Fain, at our position to give us additional support now that every insurgent in the area knew we were there.

The morning of May 5th was quiet, and many of the local nationals came out to see what the large explosion was the prior night. At approximately 1230, the Alpha Company RTO reported that he had observed insurgents moving an 82-mm recoilless rifle and two PKM machine guns into a mosque only 400 meters to our east. At 1400, the Alpha Company Commander relayed an order from the Battalion Operations Officer to maneuver on that mosque and clear it. The only way to approach the mosque was from an open poppy field to the mosque's south. To the mosque's east and west, there were known IED belts, and we could not circumvent the IEDs because the "triple wadi" was flooded with twelve foot deep water, blocking our path. I explained over the radio to the Alpha Company Commander that the southern approach was not advisable and that we were likely going to walk into an ambush; however, the battalion leadership would not alter the original order. I was also denied CCA overhead because we were not in contact yet, and there were other Troops in Contact (TIC) that needed the support.

My TLs, PSG, and I quickly came up with a plan for attack. We would leave a security element in the school and establish a support by fire, with three M240B machine guns and the two sniper teams, to the west of the mosque on a small hill. We would then establish a local SBF southwest of the mosque on a berm with another M240B, the Carl Gustav Recoilless Rifle, AT-4s, an M14, and my PSG and Medic. I would maneuver with the ANA and my remaining Soldiers to the mosque with the intent that the ANA search it since U.S. forces were not permitted to enter a mosque.

At approximately 1420, we established our SBF, and my assault element maneuvered across a large waist-deep canal towards the objective. I ordered my first team to push up into the field to make room; however,

when I got up to the field, I realized the situation was worse than I had thought. The mosque was less than one hundred meters from our location and was not just one building; it was a part of a multi-building compound with 10-foot mud walls and thick vegetation. I ordered my lead team back into cover along the canal to establish a hasty attack by fire position until we could determine a better course of action to clear the mosque. I was out in the field with my interpreter briefing our ANA partners on the new plan when the first rounds began to tear up the poppy field immediately to my right. This was followed by that always-unforgettable sound of incoming machine gun rounds. I immediately got in the prone with my interpreter and yelled at our ANA partners to do the same. I called up a spot report to Alpha Company and had an immediate sense of sheer anger at the situation we were in. Now, with the insurgents in front and my maneuver element behind me, both firing, our ANA partners and I were totally pinned down, with rounds snapping directly overhead.

After a minute or two, there was a lull in the incoming rounds, so I called to my interpreter to follow me back to cover and to tell the ANA to do the same. We got up, and I did my doctrinally-sound twenty-second rush back to cover through the waist-high poppies. My interpreter flopped down next to me; however, the ANA squad was frozen in the field. I got up and started screaming and waving to them; they finally got the picture and ran back towards me. The firefight was raging at this point, with the Carl Gustav and all our machine guns firing, coupled with the sound of almost continuous 40-mm HEDP rounds hitting the objective. Unbeknownst to me, while I was in the field, the last two of my Soldiers who were running back to cover had suffered gunshot wounds; SPC Tri Trinh was shot through the ankle and Achilles tendon, and SGT Brendan Cole was shot right above his plate in his lower left shoulder. Three of my Soldiers—SSG Mike Ferguson, their Team Leader; my Third Team Leader, SGT Brett Mensink; and another of my Soldiers, PFC Jacob Fritz—ran out into the field under this intense fire and, with almost complete disregard for their own safety, pulled the wounded back to safety. In addition, both team leaders dragged and carried each of the wounded through the waist-deep canal down to the LZ and continued to treat them while still controlling their teams.

After several more minutes, the incoming rounds had begun to trail off, and I called cease-fire and yelled for an update on personnel. At this point, I found out about our two casualties, and we moved back into the

riverbed where I called up the NATO ten-line MEDEVAC request and my PSG talked to the CCA as it finally came on station. My remaining Second Team Leader, SSG Dallas Chance, established security around our position. SPC Trinh was essentially fine besides the fact that he could not walk. Conversely, SGT Cole was bleeding profusely, and we had to shove gauze completely through his shoulder to stop the bleeding. We could not give him morphine because his heartbeat was so faint; he eventually lost half of his blood.

I attempted to get clearance from higher for the CCA on station to fire a Hellfire missile into those compounds; however, the Brigade Deputy Commander denied it because there were civilians approximately 250 meters north of the objective. He was watching the engagement via the feed on the COP Siah Choy Persistent Ground Surveillance System balloon from the brigade TOC. In reality, there was little danger to those civilians, since the Hellfire had a 10% probability of injury at 125 meters, and there were a number of compounds and buildings between the civilians and the proposed Hellfire strike.

The UH-60 MEDEVAC called that it was two minutes out, and SSG Chance popped purple hand grenade smoke to mark the LZ. The helicopter came in very fast and overshot the LZ; it had to circle around at about 15 feet off the ground, actually knocking Soldiers over by the force of the rotor wash. It circled around and eventually landed approximately 15 minutes after the first call, and the casualties were loaded and evacuated.

We later learned that four insurgents were killed during our operation, the two from the sniper engagement and two from the firefight on the second day. In addition, two insurgents were reported wounded, one so severely he had to go to Kandahar City for treatment. In addition, the Taliban commander sent a local national representative to COP Siah Choy two days later to ask for a two-week cease-fire. All this did not alleviate the pain of taking two casualties; nevertheless, we knew they were not wounded in vain.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Mark Seleen, who served as the Recon Platoon Leader for 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment. CPT Seleen's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.


DISCUSSION: In early May 2012, while conducting a joint operation with A/5-20 IN, CPT Mark Seleen led his scout platoon on a hasty reconnaissance mission of a mosque to confirm or deny insurgent activity. CPT Seleen conducted a mission planning session in accordance with the Troop Leading Procedures highlighted in ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*. Upon analyzing his relative combat power, he quickly noticed that he needed additional personnel, and he requested additional support in the form of an Alpha Company weapons squad. Upon receipt of the attached weapons squad, he task organized his reconnaissance element into an assault and support element in accordance with FM 3-21.8, *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*. This allowed him to maintain overwatch of his maneuver element while simultaneously being able to continuously observe the mosque reconnaissance objective in accordance with FM 3-55, *Information Collection*.


CPT Seleen carefully chose the bounding overwatch movement technique for his assault element after analyzing the terrain and the current enemy threat. ATP 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance Platoon*, states that the bounding overwatch technique is the most deliberate and secure movement technique employed when enemy contact is expected. While conducting his movement to the objective, CPT Seleen allowed his lead fire team and host nation support force element to make their way between his support by fire position and the reconnaissance objective where the enemy activity was suspected. Just short of reaching the mosque, the lead element was momentarily caught in a cross-fire which decreased the lethality of his support by fire element due to their inability to fully suppress the enemy for fear of fratricide. However, he was eventually able to break contact and assess the situation by successfully using the principles outlined in FM 3-21.8 and only making contact with the smallest sized element possible.

Overall, CPT Seleen's ability to understand the operational environment and adapt to changing conditions allowed him to maneuver his reconnaissance element out of a potentially fatal situation. He quickly made the transition from information collection to maintaining violence of action and effective suppression on the enemy element to allow his wounded Soldiers to be carried out of the enemy engagement area. His maneuver plan was tied directly to his analysis of the military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) discussed in ATP 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace* and FM 3-21.10 *The Infantry Rifle Company*.

Although he was unable to complete his original reconnaissance mission, his knowledge of maneuver warfare and understanding of tactics limited the casualties taken by his unit and host nation forces.

CONCLUSION: The previous vignettes illustrate the need for leaders to conduct thoughtful analysis prior to planning for movement and integration of fires. It is only through situational understanding that we can ensure our maneuver forces are smart, fast, lethal, and precise.





Iraq map




Afghanistan

Courtesy of CPT Michael Thompson



Afghanistan, Park-Hunter Flag, short halt

Courtesy of CPT Daniel Plumb



Afghanistan, grape rows

Courtesy of CPT Daniel Plumb



Afghanistan, grape rows

Courtesy of CPT Daniel Plumb



CP Bari Alai, Afghanistan

Courtesy of CPT Edward Bachar



Afghanistan, 40-mm contact

Courtesy of CPT Mark Seelen



Afghanistan poppy fields

Courtesy of CPT Mark Seelen



Afghanistan

Courtesy of CPT Mark Seelen



Afghanistan

Courtesy of CPT Mark Seelen



Afghanistan, overwatch

Courtesy of CPT Michael Thompson



Iraq intersection checkpoint

Courtesy of CPT Allen Rooney



Iraqi fuel station

Courtesy of CPT Allen Rooney



Iraq, 2-1 CAV vehicles

Courtesy of CPT Allen Rooney



Iraq, 2-1 CAV vehicles

Courtesy of CPT Allen Rooney



Iraq, HMMWV

Courtesy of CPT Matthew Hohl




Iraq

Courtesy of CPT Wilford Garvin



Iraq, SVBIED Route Buick

Courtesy of CPT Allen Rooney



Kirkuk, Iraq

Courtesy of CPT Edward Van Buren



Iraqi children playing in the canal

Courtesy of CPT Marcus Craig



CPT Scott Young, Company Commander near PB Olsen, Iraq

Courtesy of CPT Scott Young



Haiti

Courtesy of CPT Jason Rafoth

Haiti command post

Courtesy of CPT Jason Rafoth

CHAPTER 9

Tactical Patience

“Patience is bitter, but its fruit is sweet.”

— Aristotle

INTRODUCTION: While preparing for this chapter, we had many conversations concerning its title—“do the stories within speak to patience or to restraint?” The consensus was that they illustrate tactical patience. The JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, refers to restraint as the prudent and disciplined application of military capability within the rules of engagement. Patience, on the other hand, refers to time... waiting for the appropriate time to deliver whatever military capability is appropriate for the mission and within the rules of engagement. For our offensive-minded forces, tactical patience may be difficult, but as these vignettes illustrate, it is a valuable tool for forces to employ.

The Scout Platoon for 1-187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, served in Iraq from September 2005 until September 2006 and conducted patrols in the city of Bayji, located north of Baghdad. During this phase of the war, the local citizens, the Iraqi police, and even the Iraqi soldiers were not willing to assist U.S. Soldiers because they were not confident that the U.S. forces could protect them from insurgent violence.

The citizens’ reluctance to assist us was due, in part, to the fact that no matter what type of operation we were conducting, we always returned to the FOB when our operations were complete. Once we left, the insurgents would use terror and violence to control the people; these acts included assassinations and attacks on political leaders. The insurgents knew that it would take us at least 15 minutes for us to respond from the FOB, which gave them plenty of time to get away.

After receiving information from battalion that an individual, known as Hassan the Barber, was acting as a recruiter and trainer of IED makers, my Scout Platoon was tasked to go find him. After speaking to the company commander who was responsible for the area, we decided there was no reason for Hassan to know we were looking for him; the intelligence we had received was new, and no other unit that we knew of was looking for him. We didn’t know where his home was, only its general location, but we

did know where his barber shop was. If we raided the barber shop and he wasn't there, he would know we were looking for him and we would have lost him. We decided to go to his neighborhood and conduct a fake census, going house to house and checking identification cards in the hope he would just open the door to his house and show us his ID.

On the afternoon of the operation, which was in late January 2006, my Platoon and I cordoned off the section of the city where we knew his house was located. We put our trucks on the outer cordon, and then my dismounts and I went door to door, starting at the home located in the northeast section of the area—we simply chose a corner and worked our way through the town from there. We were welcomed into each home and treated to chai, and it was just after dark when we reached the final house of the night. Again, we were warmly welcomed by a family having a party, and as we inspected everyone's ID card, we were again invited to share chai. Afterwards, we mounted up and moved to the next part of the city.

About an hour later, we came back through the area where we had conducted the fake census and found the locals in a panic. They waved us down and told us that an improvised explosive had gone off, and I soon discovered it had exploded at the last house we had visited. The entire family was there, now crying; the front door of their home had been blown off, and there was blood all over the area. We found out that the eldest man in the house had gone to answer a knock at the door when the IED exploded. He was severely injured, and his sons had taken him to a local hospital. We quickly gathered what evidence from the scene and moved to the hospital.

When I arrived, I sent in my medic to help treat the man, and I entered the room and waited to talk to the brothers. The old man would have to have both legs amputated, and as the doctors and my medic were attempting to treat him, the brothers were arguing. At one point, the old man gestured toward me, and my interpreter informed me that they were arguing over whether they should tell me who was responsible for the IED. Finally, the old man ended the argument, and the brothers proceeded to tell me who was responsible and where the perpetrators lived. We realized that we knew exactly who they were talking about and headed out immediately to our new target house.

The raid was simple and quick; the trucks isolated the house as the dismounts approached the front gate of the courtyard. The lead truck drove through the gate, allowing the dismounts and me to enter the house. Within

minutes, the targets were zip-tied and tested positive for explosives. After searching their house, we brought them to the FOB for questioning and processing, believing we had put a face to the enemy. Those responsible had been caught and would pay for what they had done, thanks to the statements of the old man's family.

The next day, I had to make sure that no one knew that the family had helped us; after talking to my Colonel, we decided to make flyers displaying the pictures of the men we had arrested next to the damaged house. We put a message on the flyers that we had caught the men using U.S. aviation assets. The Iraqi police distributed the flyers, and one of the patrols I sent out ensured the family had received the flyer and felt safer that we had done this. I also found out from the EOD that the evidence I collected was shrapnel from a mortar round with a time delay fuse. The perpetrators had simply placed the round at the door, lit it, knocked, and ran away.

Several days later, we went back to the family to check on the old man and see if they had any further information for us. We infiltrated at night and left the trucks far away to ensure that no one knew we were there. The family reported that the man was moved to a hospital in Tikrit and was still in serious condition. I offered the family some money to help with the expenses of traveling back and forth to Tikrit, and only after some convincing, did they take it. The family then gave us information on other members of the IED cell, all of which proved very accurate. However after receiving the information, I decided to sit on it for a while. We had just arrested several members of the cell and conducted a lot of operations in the area, and I was concerned that the cell members in the area would have already fled or changed their routine to avoid detection. We had a house location and a specific car that belonged to the individual, so over the next few weeks, with the exception of keeping surveillance on the house and car, we conducted operations elsewhere.

Several weeks later, we conducted raids and apprehended Hassan the Barber and other elements of the cell.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT David Elliot, who served as the Scout Platoon Leader for 1-187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: CPT Elliot, serving as a Scout Platoon Leader, was tasked to detect a HVI. In FM 3-60, *The Targeting Process*, the find, fix, finish,

exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) process, within the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) targeting methodology, is especially well suited to engage an HVI. This process assists units, staffs, and leaders in developing the situation in a deliberate and systematic manner to achieve specific results. Using the F3EAD process, CPT Elliot gained timely, specific, and reliable intelligence at the tactical level that informed effective decision making.

Restraint is inherently involved in targeting and military operations; thus, the Department of Defense added *Restraint*, *Perseverance*, and *Legitimacy* to the Principles of War, when introducing the Principles of Joint Operations, discussed in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*. Adding *Restraint* as a principle represents an understanding of the complexity of the operational environment. Because a single act can have significant military and political consequences, leaders must ensure that the enemy and potential threats are no longer removed from the battlefield indiscriminately. Therefore, leaders at all levels must exercise Restraint while maintaining sufficient Tempo to understand and shape conditions to achieve a desired endstate.

CPT Elliot exercised tremendous patience while targeting an HVI. He carefully balanced the Tempo of his operations to maintain momentum while developing a greater understanding of the situation. As a result, CPT Elliot confirmed and even generated new information that led to the successful targeting and removal of a high-payoff target using precise and limited application of force and minimal collateral damage.

In April 2006, the base of operations for 3-67 Armor, 4th BCT, 4th ID, was FOB Rustamiyah, a medium-sized former Iraqi Army compound located in eastern Baghdad. From there, the Soldiers of 3-67 Armor conducted patrols and other operations with one primary mission: to gather intelligence and then act on it to bring stability to the area and legitimacy to the Iraqi government.

The Mahdi Army, a militant Shiite organization controlled by the cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, was the dominant enemy force in the area due the proximity to its base in Sadr City. In an effort to gain greater control over the mixed population within my company sector, which included Sunni, Shia, and Christian people, the group had steadily expanded its operations over many months through intimidation, smuggling, and murder. The local

citizens were terrified, and other sectarian groups were competing for power, adding to the already volatile situation.

Night after night, my platoon patrolled an area known to the Iraqis as the neighborhoods of Sumer and Muthana. In talking to the people, we discovered that many of the problems were imported, and there was little information that the people could provide. We realized we had to create our own success instead of waiting for a lucky tip or clue. We did this quickly, thanks to the Baghdad-wide curfew, and throughout February and March, 2006, my platoon arrested death squads and even a bomb-making cell as they broke curfew.

These incidents, coupled with similar progress throughout the battalion's AO, put a lot of pressure on the insurgents, causing them to change tactics and use more surveillance to cover their operations. On the night of 31 March, SSG Jose Fernandez discovered that the enemy had been using a number of fruit stands as observation posts to counter our aggressive patrolling. He tore down the fruit stands using a tow strap attached to the bumper of his HMMWV. Because the curfew was in effect, he received no resistance. To determine how successful we had been, we decided to return on the next night to see if the insurgents were going to try to rebuild. Without these observation posts, it would be difficult for the insurgents to continue their clandestine kidnapping and smuggling.

The night began with a quick mission brief, and the NCOs and I reviewed maps and analyzed routes to take. We settled on a series of winding turns throughout the dense neighborhoods that would eventually take us to the northern reaches of the battalion's AO but south of the sensitive and restricted Sadr City. We then left the FOB's gate with 18 men and one Iraqi interpreter in four vehicles. Upon reaching the site, at around 2140, I stepped out of my truck into the wide intersection that marked the corner of our AO. The scene was clear and quiet, in stark contrast to the hot, chaotic, traffic-filled scene earlier in the day. We decided to establish a traffic control point to catch anyone breaking curfew which had begun an hour earlier. The two lead HMMWVs took their positions toward the northeast corner of the intersection, and the trail section occupied the southwest. The drivers shut off their engines, and we waited.

While SSG Fernandez and I inspected the still-crushed fruit stands on the eastern corner of the intersection, a white sedan, with a family inside on the way to the hospital, pulled up to the TCP, and my Soldiers quickly and

methodically searched it. We all felt pretty safe in the quiet night because not 400 meters to our right, Iraqi policemen in the guard towers of a National Police compound watched over us with floodlights.

What we didn't know at the time was that two dark sedans had moved into position approximately 300-350 meters to our right. Additionally, the insurgents had set up crew-served weapons on rooftops to our right front at approximately 400 meters and to our left, at approximately 500 meters, outside of our sector. As we watched the white sedan pull away from the checkpoint, CPL Benjamin Lower shouted, "Contact!" This he followed with distance and direction and quickly returned fire. The enemy fire picked up as each enemy position joined the fight, and the insurgents in the sedans began to engage with AK-47 fire. Our night vision was completely washed out by the lights of the National Police compound right above the two sedans. We were essentially blind and could only engage blurred figures and muzzle shots instead of clear targets.

At this point, the enemy was firing from rooftop positions with small arms and 7.62-mm machine guns, and my crew-served weapons were returning fire from atop the trucks. After becoming frustrated trying to communicate with higher—the result of the distance and the urban terrain—I decided we could not remain in our positions for much longer. I did not want to wait and see what weapons they could bring to bear as we sat in the wide-open intersection, and, at this point, enemy reinforcements were only as far away as the living rooms in the neighborhoods surrounding us.

From my location behind the third truck, I contacted SSG Fernandez and told him we needed to maneuver on the enemy positions; he was one step ahead of me and had already begun to move. I could see my vehicle waiting for me, so I prepared myself for the sprint through enemy fire. Under the cover of my men, I probably broke some record for the 20-meter dash and finally was able to catch my breath as I finally closed my vehicle's door. I heard the other three trucks call in over the radio, and we sped off about 25 meters behind SSG Fernandez.

After what seemed like forever, we made a sharp right into the middle of the neighborhood from where the attack had originated. It was our Bravo Company's sector, but its Soldiers wouldn't mind if we operated there. We were habitual violators of the borders dividing the battalion AO, and it was this aggressive attitude that had brought us success. Immediately upon breaching the first line of houses, something caught my eye: two

shadowy figures were moving to the left of my vehicle. Clad all in black, with green headbands and carrying AK-47s, these individuals were clearly members of the Mahdi Army. Unfortunately, the gunner of SSG Fernandez' truck had not seen these men, and I as I yelled at my gunner to engage them, they leapt across a brick wall into the dark maze of structures of the neighborhood.

We somehow found our way through the random construction, parked cars, and junk and positioned ourselves roughly northwest from where we had taken fire. Circling our vehicles in an alley between homes, we stopped to scan the area, but before we could get a good look, we started taking poorly-aimed rifle fire from the surrounding rooftops. Once again, we returned fire, but this time, because we were out of the light, we were able to use our night vision. Despite our well-directed fire keeping the enemy's heads down, they continued to take random pot-shots and rifle bursts in our general area. I finally was able to contact battalion and learned that the heavy QRF was on the way. Upon its arrival, I contacted battalion and reported all units were in position. The response I got was that I was in charge of the eight HMMWVs, four Bradleys, and nearly sixty men on the ground.

After a quick discussion, my peers and I agreed that in the face of the augmented force, the insurgents had likely ended their attack and changed back into civilian clothes. There was no way we would be able to find out anything from the community that supported the insurgents. Additionally, we realized that trying to systematically search an entire city block was not only ridiculous, but also would infuriate and further alienate the neutral population. We decided to position the Bradleys along the main road, while maneuvering the trucks from the opposite side to sweep any remaining insurgents into the open. We reached the eastern wall of the National Police compound without seeing anything and having nothing to show for our efforts.

After all was said and done, I believe that we did the correct thing by not scouring the neighborhood for the enemy that could vanish at will. The more people we dragged out of their houses at three in the morning, the more insurgents there would be.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Joseph Kress, who served as the Platoon Leader of 2^d Platoon, A Company, 3-67 Armor, 4th

ID. CPT Kress' monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: On the night of 1 April 2006, in eastern Baghdad, CPT Kress, serving as a platoon leader, demonstrated tactical patience and an ethical application of landpower in unified action. FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, states that “unified action requires the judicious use of lethal force balanced with restraint and tempered by professional judgment.” CPT Kress’ understanding of counterinsurgency tactics helped him to make an informed decision even if it meant that a couple of insurgents would live to fight another day.

FM 3-24 also states that “without accurate and predictive intelligence, it is often better to not act rather than to act. Gaining situational understanding before action is often essential in avoiding long term damage to mission objectives.” With the lack of effective and timely intelligence on the ground, CPT Kress rightly assessed that his platoon would have done more harm to his unit’s long-term goals if he had systematically searched an entire urban community at night.

CPT Kress and his men exercised tactical patience after being attacked in a counterinsurgency environment. Even though they did not kill or capture any insurgents, CPT Kress made sure that he and his men did not create anymore insurgents. He understood that “all interactions between security forces and the population directly impact legitimacy, and if the counterinsurgent security forces show restraint in the eyes of the population, the entire counterinsurgency effort is further legitimized” (FM 3-24).

CONCLUSION: Although closely tied, patience and restraint have very different definitions, but their application can very well have the same result. Because a single act can have strategic and even political consequences, the judicious use of force is necessary and can result in setting the conditions to pacify a particular region. Likewise, sometimes simply pulling back and waiting can result in a better situation in which to attack or may make the attack unnecessary—both contributing to strategic ends.

CHAPTER 10

Fires

*"You can't describe the moral lift,
When in the fight your spirits weary
Hears above the hostile fire,
Your own artillery...
A roaring furnace, giving all,
She sears a path for the infantry...."*

— Aleksandr Tvardovsky
from the poem "Vasili Tyorkin," 1943

INTRODUCTION: Mastering both the art of command and the science of control requires commanders to be smart, lethal, and precise—the products of training, education, and experience. The writers of ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, address the commander's responsibility to conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power which includes the application of fires. Some of the processes the commander employs to apply combat power fall into the art domain and others into the science domain. The effective application of fires requires mastery of both. As is evident in the following vignettes, the commander who employs the fires with the most precision will be the victor.

Company A, 2-503 IBCT (ABN, participated in Operation Snaketooth in the vicinity of the village of Qowru, Watapor Valley, Afghanistan, from 25–26 September 2007. The purpose of Operation Snaketooth was to improve relations between the locals and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). A secondary purpose of the operation was to identify and destroy anti-Afghan forces (AAF) as they maneuvered to attack coalition forces moving to and from the village. The seizure of key terrain, therefore, was essential. A section from 1st Platoon, Company A, a 60-mm mortar section, one of the platoon's gun teams, and the A Company XO conducted an air assault and seized key terrain at BP Redskins to deny the enemy freedom of movement.

At approximately 0330Z, SPC Jon Barth and PFC Jeremy Drenski, who were providing security for the southern segment of our patrol base, identified one AAF armed with an AK-47 maneuvering on their position. They engaged the enemy with direct fire, but the enemy broke contact. Our

mortar team immediately began firing 60-mm mortars via direct lay, and we marked the area with green smoke and directed our maneuver force at the bottom of the ridge to engage with 81-mm mortars, MK 19, and .50-caliber fire. Meanwhile, we began receiving fire from an element that had maneuvered uphill 35 meters to our east. We engaged with direct fire, hand grenades, and 60-mm mortars. The 1st PLT's PSG grabbed the weapon team and had it assist in engaging. Ten minutes into this fight, CPT Louis Frketic's mounted element began to take accurate RPG and machine gun fire, and ICOM intercepts indicated that another enemy element was maneuvering to high ground that overlooked our position 300 meters to our north.

I relayed our situation to CPT Frketic and told him that we needed indirect fire on the hill to our north and on the enemy position to the east. While the FO and I worked to get 120-mm mortars from COP Able Main to fire to our north, I had SGT Josh Cecil lay his 60-mm tube to our north where I believed the flanking enemy fighters were moving. I had him keep a sustained rate of fire of one round every 15-30 seconds while we continued to echelon indirect fires around our position. Even though we were laying down a heavy volume of direct fire on the enemy position the entire time, we continued to hear the AAF leaders over the ICOM order their fighters forward to flank us to the north and then kill us.

As PFC Timothy Locklear, the FO, called up the grids of enemy locations to our east and north, I called 1LT Josh Harrison down at the base of the valley and told him I needed more fire on the enemy and that I wanted his gun trucks to start shooting below our position. I then began to "walk" his MK 19 and .50-caliber weapon systems danger close to us and onto the enemy to our east. At approximately 0430, 3^d Platoon, 1LT Harrison's Delta platoon, and the HQ element at the base of the valley began receiving heavy small arms and machine gun fire from both sides of the valley and were decisively engaged. CPT Frketic called in 120-mm and 155-mm indirect fire on enemy fighting positions that were concentrating on the mounted element. The CAS was slow in coming on station, so for the first two hours of the fight, we pinned down the enemy in the west with our fire and used 1LT Harrison's weapon systems and 120-mm mortar rounds from COP Able Main. As I walked 1LT Harrison's weapons closer to our position, I had all Soldiers on the eastern side of our perimeter get down behind cover. At one point, we had MK-19 rounds exploding inside our defensive

perimeter from the mounted element below as we tried to get effects on the enemy between 2^d Platoon and our position. I called down to 1LT Harrison and told him to cease fire at the enemy below our position, and we resumed our machine gun fire on the enemy.

During the two-hour fight that ensued, the maneuver element at the base of the valley took three casualties and began to exfiltrate back to COP Honaker-Miracle at 0530Z to MEDEVAC the casualties. As CPT Frketic left the valley, he told me that I had control of all elements still in the valley. This left just 1st Platoon, split between two BPs (Redskins and Proposed), as the only elements left in the valley. We still had no CAS, and we were low on ammunition—we had thrown all but two hand grenades and were getting close to being out of M240B ammunition.

By this point, I was talking directly to my battalion commander, LTC William Ostlund, and updating him on our situation. We were still taking effective machine gun fire from the east, and from ICOM intercepts, we could hear the enemy discuss how they knew we were isolated on the ridgeline and that there was no more than a platoon at our position. They began to make plans to attack our position from multiple locations with the express intent of overrunning our position and taking some of us captive. Because I knew our ammunition was getting low and that the enemy was going to try to overrun our location, I told my FO to begin plotting grids danger close to our position for 155-mm, 120-mm, and GBU bombs. We'd mitigate some of the risk of calling in the indirect fire by having all of the Soldiers get behind cover when "splash" for the incoming rounds was ten seconds out. Altogether, we sent to my BN CP ten GBU targets from which we would adjust; PFC Locklear sent up another dozen targets for the artillery and mortars; and, as the fight continued, we continued to cross-load ammunition.

As the fight continued, PFC Locklear successfully called in 120-mm and 155-mm WP rounds danger close to our position to destroy the attacking AAF. A B-1 bomber and an F-15 came on station shortly after the mounted element left the valley. Our position behind large boulders allowed us to call in 120-mm WP rounds approximately 50 meters from us—so close that the smoke from the round engulfed our position seconds after the explosion. These rounds successfully fixed the enemy and allowed us to redirect mortar and CAS assets onto other enemy fighters who were answering the ICOM net call to attack our position. Shortly after the CAS

came on station, CCA, in the form of two AH-64s, came on station, and we immediately put them to work.

PFC Locklear and SGT Cecil began planning fire missions for the bomber, the CCA, and the 155s that now supported our fight. We successfully called for fire on the hill 300 meters to our north where the second group of enemy fighters was maneuvering to attack, which kept the enemy from flanking our position and gaining the high ground. We directed the AH-64s to both draws the fighters had been using to move men and weapons during the fight, both east of our location. The AH-64s also conducted four 30-mm gun runs on the enemy to our east, coming in danger close all four times. The bomber dropped the GBU's on the draws as well—danger close on the enemy to the east and also on cave systems west of Qowru Village where 1LT Jeff Goines had seen enemy fighters hiding out during the firefight earlier in the day. We continued to echelon fires from artillery, CAS, and CCA for the next hour until the CAS and CCA went off station.

The CAS, CCA, and 155s had a devastating effect on the enemy. Through ICOM intercepts, we heard that at least two fighters were killed during the Apache gun runs to our east, and four other fighters were killed from GBU bombs, with an unknown number of enemy injured. The fight continued until approximately 0730Z, at which time we were no longer receiving fire.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Gregory Ambrosia, who served as the Executive Officer of A/2-503d. CPT Ambrosia's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: CPT Ambrosia's ability to exploit the responsiveness of his company mortars in handheld mode gave him the ability to direct immediate fire support on enemy positions. Handheld employment has the obvious benefits of increased responsiveness by engaging enemy either through the direct lay method of a mortar element with visual contact of the enemy or the direct alignment method through a forward observer who adjusts fires directly without the use of a fire direction center (FM 3-22.90, *Mortars*). While the elimination of a "middle man" in this scenario increases responsiveness, there are also risks employing mortars without conventional firing data processed by a fire direction center.

Accuracy of initial rounds may be an issue and even dangerous in a close fight if fired by an inexperienced crew. Although the ATP 3-09.32, *JFIRE Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower*, does not differentiate danger close or risk estimate distances for handheld versus conventional mortar employment, commanders should weigh intangibles, such as training and experience of mortar personnel and friendly troop distance from the target, as a part of their analysis of troops before employing mortars without conventional firing data. Commanders should balance the increased responsiveness operating without a Fire Direction Center with the difficulty of massing fires and possible direct fire exposure for their mortar teams, specifically operating in the direct lay method.

CPT Ambrosia was able to effectively fix enemy fighters with his 60-mm mortars which allowed him to echelon fires on the enemy force. While the FM 3-21.10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*, states that the concept of echeloning fires is “to begin attacking targets on or around the objective using the weapons system with the largest risk estimate distance (RED)...,” CPT Ambrosia used his understanding of the capabilities, specifically of his organic indirect assets, to ensure continuous pressure on the enemy while he echeloned other direct and indirect systems. It is also noteworthy that he balanced the ability to fix enemy forces with his attention to ammunition constraints to enable his element to maintain contact over a two-hour period.

CPT Ambrosia and his fire support team brought indirect fire assets danger close and well within the RED during this fight. CPT Ambrosia clearly understood the risk of firing within these REDs established by the ATP 3-09.32 but clearly mitigated these risks by bracketing indirect and direct fires while ensuring protective cover for his Soldiers. Risk estimate distances are only a safety recommendation to commanders and leaders that must be balanced with the risk of troops to enemy fire. CPT Ambrosia’s actions embodied the success of a combined arms leader with the ability to synchronize all war fighting functions through his knowledge of his capabilities, faith in his subordinates, and clear guidance to fire supporters.

Company C, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, deployed to Kunduz Province, Afghanistan, in July 2010. On 29 July, C Company was tasked to clear anti-Afghan forces (AAF) from OBJs Lexington and Tampa to deny AAF safe haven and to increase

the legitimacy of ANSF within the region. OBJ Lexington included the village of Baghi Shirkot, and OBJ Tampa—the village of Isa Kahn.

I controlled the company's movement to Isa Kahn on the first day and then attached myself to 3^d Platoon on the second day. While in the process of clearing Isa Kahn, I heard the familiar MK-19 sound off in the distance. About eight seconds later, five or six rounds impacted west of 1st Platoon's position. More MK-19s sounded off in the distance, and about eight seconds later, the rounds impacted into Isa Kahn, flying over our vehicles. It seemed that the AAF had an automatic grenade launcher and a spotter walking rounds in towards the vehicles.

1LT David Provencher, the Platoon Leader for 4th Platoon, observed dirt coming out of a tree line to his west just after the grenade launcher would fire. He called and requested the 60-mm mortar. 1LT Provencher passed me the grid location to his position and an estimated distance and direction to the dirt cloud. I gave my notebook to my 11C, and he looked at me and laughed, "I don't know calculus!" I told him he was about to learn something; I pulled out a map and told him to watch. I plotted 4th Platoon's position and drew a line along the azimuth it observed to the estimated distance. The line ended in between two tree lines, so I picked the closest tree line, since it was unlikely that 4th Platoon could see through it, and plotted the point. Then I plotted my location and drew a line from my location to the point. I used the protractor and got the estimated angle to the grenade launcher, neglecting the G-M angle since I did not have it for the area. Good enough for a rural combat situation: "270 degrees for about 800 meters, let's do this!" Holding a lensatic compass, I directed the 60-mm mortar tube left, then right. I then told my 11C to only use charge 1 and drop it to 800 meters. He shot the first round. After the splash, 1LT Provencher came across the net and said we were a little to the right and short. After a small adjustment left and down, my 11C shot the second round: splash. 1LT Provencher responded with, "That's good." We sent four more 60-mm mortar rounds and then waited—nothing. A few weeks later, a Ranger unit recovered a MK-19 from the area on one of their raids.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Samuel Butler, who served as the Executive Officer for C/1-87, 10th Mountain Division. CPT Butler's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: CPT Butler used the direct alignment method to adjust his 60-mm fire based on 1LT Provencher's spotting. While it is not confirmed by his monograph, he likely used the company mortars in handheld mode. In this method, the mortar team estimates range to the target using a bubble that displays the tube's angle. CPT Butler then used a lensatic compass to "lay" the mortar on the correct deflection (the setting on the scale of a weapon sight to place the line of fire in the desired direction, according to FM 6-40, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery*). CPT Butler's quick decision making and ability to increase the responsiveness of his organic assets allowed him to place effective indirect fires on the enemy. Normally, in whatever manner indirect fire systems are "laid" and fired, using the M2 compass and Aiming circle, or similar means using "MILS" (a more precise unit of measure for angles that is based on the angle subtended by 1/6400 of the circumference of a circle, FM 6-40) instead of degrees, ensures greater accuracy and precision. In this circumstance, CPT Butler made the decision to ensure responsive fires over accuracy to suppress enemy forces and later adjust to ensure accurate fires.

Beginning on 12 June 2010, 2^d Platoon, Abu Company, Task Force Rakkasan, conducted operations on OBJ Cognac to disrupt enemy mortar and rocket firing teams that had effectively engaged COP Margah, Paktika Province, Afghanistan.

My platoon had been in contact with the enemy numerous times since I arrived in Afghanistan in January of 2010. The insurgent attacks at COP Margah consisted of both direct and indirect fire; however, the indirect fire was usually much more effective on us than the direct fire. The enemy could easily reach the outpost with mortars and rockets from the Pakistan side of the border, and coalition fires into Pakistan required high levels of approval, making it difficult for us to quickly conduct counter fire operations before insurgent teams moved.

In June of 2010, COP Margah received effective indirect fire attacks for 16 days straight, one of which obliterated the fuel point and set fire to three MRAPs parked nearby. This constant threat of indirect fire took a mental toll on the Soldiers. With the use of counter-fire radar—which plots a ten-digit grid to indirect fire origins—we observed the enemy firing points slowly creep over to the Afghan side of the border as they gained confidence that we could not effectively stop them. We saw this as our

opportunity to throw an effective counterpunch, and we began planning an operation.

My platoon was to secure Objective Cognac and establish attack-by-fire positions overwatching NAIs 1 and 2 over the course of two days to deny the enemy freedom of movement from Pakistan to the mortar firing points. We would overwatch the NAIs sequentially: NAI 1 on the first day and NAI 2 on the second day.

My platoon departed under darkness at 2300 on 12 June 2010 and began the 2,300 foot ascent up the southern ridgeline of OBJ Cognac. The 1st Platoon departed at 0001 on 13 June for OBJ Bushmills. We reached our first position on the southern ridgeline in about three hours. After securing the location, I established two attack by fire positions with good fields of fire on NAI 1. I placed the Afghan Army soldiers in positions that were not in view of the enemy because I had difficulty keeping the Afghans quiet.

Early in the afternoon, my LLVI team intercepted enemy traffic via push-to-talk radios. Two groups of insurgents discussed a meeting location and bringing “supplies,” which was often a code word for weapons or mortars. They then mentioned attending a “party” together, which usually meant an attack on coalition forces of some sort. If they had identified our positions, they surely would have alerted each other over radio before discussing a meeting, so I was confident that they did not know we were overwatching their recent firing positions.

The insurgent chatter continued on and off until about 1600 when the enemy fired the first round. The round flew over our heads and exploded just outside the COP Margah walls. I started scanning NAI 1 and found a plume of smoke coming from behind a small crest on the eastern edge of NAI 1. This area was not within range of any of my organic weapons, so I called a fire mission from the 155-mm howitzer at FOB Boris; however, the enemy quickly fired four more rounds before our fire mission was executed. Our rounds landed within about 300 meters of the insurgents, but the extremely mountainous terrain contained the blast to a small area, and I realized that a more precise weapon system would be required to effectively eliminate the insurgent element. I adjusted rounds for two more fire missions onto the insurgents’ firing point until an AWT of two Apaches arrived on station. As I talked the team on to the enemy location, I heard a machine gun firing from another location near the border and realized the insurgents were trying to hit our Apaches. Using the enemy’s muzzle

flashes, I was able to identify two machine gun positions on the mountaintops across the valley. The vegetation was extremely dense, making it difficult to identify anything more than that, and it was difficult to talk the Apaches onto the targets without any unique landmarks besides the abundant hilltops. I requested the Apaches fire a smoke rocket where they thought the enemy was, and I used that location to adjust their fires. Every time one of the Apaches would fly near the valley, several machine guns would attempt to shoot it down, giving away their position. This worked to our advantage because the Apaches were still well outside of the range of a PKM machine gun. The pilots engaged with Hellfire missiles, 2.75" rockets, and 30-mm rounds.

Once darkness hit, I moved the platoon to Objective Cognac, at the peak of the mountain, and we established two attack-by-fire positions overwatching NAI 2. The jagged rock formation I selected for the CP was centrally located on the mountain, provided great cover from enemy fire, and had excellent observation of the entire valley. Shortly after sunrise, my LLVI team reported a significant amount of insurgent radio traffic; according to the traffic, hundreds of insurgents were moving from a training camp in Pakistan to the enemy's location.

SSG Conniff and I adjusted the machine gun teams slightly to provide better fires on the most dangerous enemy avenue of approach—the saddle connecting Objective Cognac to Pakistan. The handheld 60-mm mortar was located at my command post, so I could easily direct it as needed. It was platoon SOP for everyone to carry at least one 60-mm round on missions to maximize our organic firepower. Although the extra weight made the movement much more difficult, it was well worth it; I had a total of 22 60-mm rounds with me at the CP. My FO, SGT Eric Butler, established four targets for the 155-mm Howitzer on the peaks that stood between the platoon and the border to expedite the process of getting fires once we made contact. This was vital to our security plan because I knew we would not receive any air assets for at least twenty minutes after making contact (it took about twenty minutes for helicopters to fly from Khowst to Bermel). My plan was to use the howitzers to suppress the enemy until the assets arrived. I had my JTAC, an Air Force sergeant who coordinated with fixed-wing aircraft for aerial fires, prepare several nine-line fire missions once we were able to get support. I used a set of vector binoculars that had a built-in compass and rangefinder to establish sectors of fire and limitations

on our weapons systems; it was easy for Soldiers to try to engage targets well out of the range of their weapons systems in the mountains because we could see much further than we could engage from the top of the mountain.

In an instant, I found myself on all fours looking at the ground. My eyes stung from the smoke and my ears were ringing. An RPG had detonated at my CP, and, just then, enemy machine guns engaged from several locations across the valley, and I could see rounds hitting the side of the mountain above me. I identified muzzle flashes across the top of the ridgelines near TRPs 2 and 3 and requested immediate suppression fire missions with 155s on both. The initial RPG was fired from TRP 1, about 300 meters away and on the Pakistan side. The 155s were not a great choice for this location because it was danger close, and they would be firing right over our heads; one short round would be deadly for us. However, prior to deploying, I had read at least a dozen accounts and reports of small outposts near the Pakistan border being overrun, and I was determined to prevent that.

My M240s and the ANA PKMs were already suppressing TRP 1. I wanted to drop some 60-mm mortars on TRPs 2 and 3, hoping the enemy had an assault force massed and waiting for an opportunity to assault Objective Cognac. I became angry knowing that if I had the assets I requested I would be able to confirm my suspicion. I looked around and found my mortar man lying face down behind the rock face with his hands over his head. I grabbed him to see if he was injured, and he wasn't; he was just protecting himself from the enemy fire. Frustrated, I grabbed his handheld 60-mm mortar, dropped a round in the tube, and started aiming it at the peak. Before I got the chance to engage, my mortar man summoned his courage and took over the weapon system. I told him to engage the far side of the hilltop, from where the RPG engaged us and where I believed the enemy was massed. I knew he couldn't hear me very well over all of the gunfire, but he knew what I wanted as soon as I pointed in that direction. His first shot was perfect, landing just on the backside of the hill.

My JTAC tapped me on the shoulder and said CAS (F16s in this case) was being pushed to our location in about ten minutes; I let out a small sigh of relief. "Shot over," came over the radio from my Company Commander. "Shot out," I replied. The 155 rounds from the fire mission began impacting all over the near side of the enemy ridgeline. Despite the comforting feeling the explosions provided, the effects weren't as good as

I had hoped because the mission was adjusted slightly further away from the Pakistan border by higher headquarters. I knew this would happen and was ready to send up an adjust fire to get the rounds where I needed them, hoping that the approvals would go through to let us engage on the other side of the border.

The AWT arrived in about half the time we expected them and immediately drew enemy machine gun fire. This time, however, the enemy was engaging with a heavy DSHK machine gun. They had saved it specifically to take down our air support, but they were over-zealous and engaged the helicopters too far out. The DSHK was easy to locate because the sound was very distinct and the muzzle flash much larger than that of the PKM. It was across the valley about 2500 meters away—too far to effectively engage with any of my organic weapons. I talked the pilots on to this DSHK position, and they engaged with a volley of Hellfires from as far away as possible. I wasn't able to see through the dense vegetation around their position, but the DSHK fire ceased and the pilots sounded confident that they had struck the weapon system.

The F-16s arrived on station, and my JTAC had them prepare to drop a GBU on the DSHK position within minutes. The AWT, already keeping its distance from the DSHK position, moved further out of the area to make way for the munition. Moments after I received the final approval, the F16s were cleared hot, and a 1,000-pound bomb shook the valley. All of the machine gun fire stopped momentarily. It was as if the enemy was taking a moment to admire the firepower we were capable of bringing. After about 30 seconds, however, the enemy fire picked up again, and another RPG engaged us from the ridgeline. This one was a little bit low, and I felt it detonate as it exploded on the mountainside below us. A small cloud of smoke surrounded the insurgent's location, and I had my JTAC dial up another fire mission from CAS. This time, the approval was much quicker despite this request being right on top of the border. I believe the commanders were much more comfortable approving the GPS guided munitions from the F16s over artillery fires. In less than two minutes, F16s dropped a 500-pound GBU on top of the ridgeline, and we heard nothing but silence after it exploded. Even the enemy radio communication went down to nothing. The AWT informed me that it had about 30 minutes left on station, so I gave the call to break down our positions under its cover.

From the personal experience monograph written by *CPT Adam Jarmusz who served as the Platoon Leader of 2^d Platoon in Abu Company, Task Force Rakkasan, 101st Airborne Division. CPT Jarmusz' monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.*

DISCUSSION: Targeting is one of the critical tasks of the Fires Warfighting Function. "Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities" (JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*). The Army uses the Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess Methodology to conduct targeting. The Soldiers of COP Margah clearly identified the enemy's rocket and mortar teams as significant threats. After determining the most significant threat to Coalition forces, the Soldiers on COP Margah used counterfire radar to detect the POO used by the enemy indirect fire teams. Upon locating the POOs, CPT Jarmusz developed a plan to apply combat power against the detected enemy positions. Following the development of NAIs and his subsequent execution of a plan to perform surveillance of the NAIs, CPT Jarmusz effectively synchronized his organic direct fire weapons along with CAS, CCA, and Artillery to deliver lethal fires against the targeted enemy positions.

The vast and undulating terrain of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan undoubtedly limited the effects of 2^d Platoon's organic weapons systems to unilaterally deliver lethal effects to the targeted NAIs. The maximum effective ranges of 2^d Platoon's machine guns were limited to 800-1000 meters. CPT Jarmusz realized that these ranges did not provide him the depth in firepower that would be necessary to achieve desired effects on the enemy. Accordingly, he planned on using Artillery and CAS/CCA to ensure he could deliver lethal effects at ranges beyond the limitations of his organic weapon systems. "Fires provide...depth and breadth to the battlefield through long-range acquisition and early engagement of targets" (ADRP 3-09, *Fires*). CPT Jarmusz's ability to leverage the extended range of indirect and air-to-surface systems was a critical component in the successful targeting of the enemy's mortar and rocket teams.

In November 2010, C Company, 1st Ranger Battalion, participated in Operation Bulldog Bite, an operation conducted in

Kunar Province, Afghanistan, by elements of 1-101st ID (Air Assault). The 1-101st had met with fierce resistance and had taken several casualties while defeating the enemy in each successive village, and CPT Nelson's unit was tasked with clearing two villages that comprised the final objective.

Moments before our arrival, the crew of a supporting AC-130 gunship observed 15 men scatter from a structure in our targeted village and run down the mountainside before disappearing from view under thick vegetation. We didn't know it at the time, but this group had taken a route to a small cave and alerted an enemy force that we later assessed to be about a company in strength. This cave, 200 meters downhill from the village, had a small opening, about the size of a car's door, and vegetation obscured the observation from above and from the side.

We sent a reinforced squad downhill to interdict the one group of runners that we managed to track, while the rest of the platoon remained to clear the village. That squad, led by SSG Kevin Pape, received small-arms fire while nearing the last known position of the runners which was, unbeknownst to us at the time, the cave which contained the enemy's TOC. SSG Pape returned fire and killed both men who had engaged him. While Pape led the fight on the ground, our gunship destroyed eight to ten armed enemy personnel whom the crew had identified maneuvering towards our interdiction squad.

Anxiety washed over me in a way that I imagine is common among all combat leaders who encounter a willing enemy. Shortly after the first exchange, I initiated the rest of the platoon's movement to consolidate with our interdiction squad. Pape lobbed a hand grenade into the engagement area and, after the explosion, took point as his squad moved forward. The squad identified and killed several more of the enemy while the rest of us were moving as quickly as possible to join the fight. All who were among the platoon's main body would agree that there was no greater desire than to be with 1st Squad and in the fight as quickly as possible. Conversely, there was no greater despair than that caused by the separation between us as the gunfire increased. Pape's Alpha Team Leader, SGT Dylan Maynard, affirmed my unease when he answered my next radio call to Pape, saying, "3-1 is down."

The sun was rising as the rest of the platoon arrived at the cave, approximately fifteen minutes after our gunship's initial engagement. After

a rushed face-to-face meeting with SFC Matthew Figley, my PSG, I moved to establish a medical evacuation HLZ at a clearing approximately 50 meters away. Immediately after occupying the clearing as our HLZ, we came under concentrated and well-aimed small-arms fire from several elevated positions in the surrounding valley and from the vegetation immediately around us.

SSG Michael Shinholser positioned his Rangers around the clearing and led them in returning fire. We were arranged in an L-shape around the clearing's western and southern edges, oriented towards what seemed to be our greatest threat. While my Rangers engaged the Taliban nearest the HLZ, my forward observer, SGT J. Craig Jones, and I maneuvered around the clearing to direct the fire of our crew-served weapon and identify structures on the opposite side of the valley from where we were receiving more distant fire. With help from our gunship, we positively identified several enemy shooters scattered across the landscape and destroyed them with 40-mm and 105-mm fire missions.

With our organic weapons proving insufficient to conclusively destroy the enemy in the cave, SFC Figley and his men continued to engage the cave while withdrawing to a safe distance from where to employ the gunship's 105-mm howitzer. The Rangers withdrew approximately 40 meters to the crest of a gentle slope that overlooked the cave's entrance. From here, they had direct line of sight to the cave and continued to engage targets from behind cover. As the gunship loomed overhead in full daylight, CPT Daniel Mahoney and SSG Adam Lutterman identified the cave as a target in another call for fire. This time, their guidance to the gunship crew included the initials of company commander, MAJ Stephen Dobbins, to acknowledge that the rounds would be "danger- close". The gunship simultaneously engaged the cave with its 105-mm howitzer and all remaining external enemy personnel with its 40-mm cannon. The fire missions were accurate and precise. The Rangers fighting at the cave were close enough to feel the effects of the rounds but were safe behind their covered positions. The enemy's fire from the cave decreased significantly, which allowed SFC Figley to move our wounded interpreter to the HLZ for evacuation.

To give us the fire superiority that we needed on the HLZ, two OH-58 Kiowa Warrior helicopters checked in with us after being dispatched by our higher headquarters. We welcomed the two .50-caliber machine guns that

they brought to the fight. My forward observer, SGT Jones, had been with me throughout the entire morning and was next to me in the outcropping. He did not need to confer with me before giving the Kiowas their guidance and immediately tasked them with a fire mission against the enemy in the vegetation to our front.

We continued to engage the enemy with our own weapons, anxiously anticipating the Kiowas' effects, while our Senior Medic, SSG Luis Aponte treated SGT Eric Cox, who had been wounded defending the HLZ. The Kiowas passed over the enemy without firing and then feebly reported to Jones that they were unable to ascertain our position and distinguish us from the enemy. After frustrated attempts to orient the Kiowas, SGT Jones stood up amongst the enemy's fire with an orange VS-17 panel held over his head to identify our position to the pilots. This was another extraordinary act of selflessness that had become commonplace that day. SSG Pape had given us all that he could, and as I watched the Rangers around me, I realized that each of them would do the same in doing their jobs to the best of their ability. Instead of tackling Jones and rebuking him for his seeming carelessness, we increased our rate of fire to suppress the enemy as much as possible.

After multiple fire missions, the Kiowas achieved our desired effect, and the enemy was reduced to the point that we were receiving only sporadic and ineffective small-arms fire. I reported to MAJ Dobbins that the HLZ was now safe for the evacuation and as serviceable as it would ever be. After fashioning a rope by connecting our safety lanyards and tossing one end to the Rangers on the landing surface, we pulled and pushed SGT Cox up to the surface, where he joined our wounded interpreter and SSG Pape.

When we initially made contact with the enemy, our joint task force's headquarters sent us every available air asset. Despite the daylight, we were supported by two AC-130 gunships in addition to teams of close combat attack helicopters and fixed-wing close air support. Our fire supporters employed both gunship crews to the fullest extent possible around the valley, while the low-flying helicopters serviced all visible targets in the vegetation around the HLZ and the cave. My Rangers fought well in their own right and inflicted many casualties on the enemy, but the support we received from the gunships and helicopters was essential. The enemy's fire

did not subside until we brought the effects of our fire missions to within only a few meters of our positions at the cave and HLZ.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Craig Nelson, who served as the Platoon Leader for 3^d Platoon, C Company, 1st Ranger Battalion. CPT Nelson's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: "In any ground combat situation, the benefits of rapid and efficient enemy attrition afforded by surface-to-surface and air-to-surface supporting arms must be balanced with the possibility that munitions effects will yield fratricide" (ATP 3-09.32, *JFire Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower*). Air-to-surface fires can provide precise and responsive fires to Army units, even when Army units are forced to operate in severely restricted terrain. However, the ground force commander must be acutely aware of the potential effects of air-to-surface fires on friendly forces when fires are used in proximity to friendly force locations. Risk Estimate Distances (REDs) provide the ground force commander key information regarding the lethality of a specific weapon system. This information is vital when weighing the benefits of air-to-surface fires with the risk of fratricide.

Based on his assessment of the enemy, his knowledge of the terrain, and his awareness of the capabilities of his organic weapons, CPT Nelson determined that he needed additional firepower to achieve fire superiority against the enemy occupying the cave. CPT Nelson employed the AC-130's 105-mm howitzer within 40 meters from his Soldiers, well inside of the 100 meter RED for that weapon system. However, REDs are a tool for leaders on the ground to make risk decisions; they are not a constraint. "A commander may maneuver their units into the RED-combat area based on the mission...he is making a command decision to accept the additional risk to friendly forces" (FM 3-21.10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*). Using solid judgment and good analysis of the situation on the ground, CPT Nelson's deliberate decision to employ fires close in to friendly positions proved decisive in achieving fire superiority over a numerically larger enemy force. **Alpha Company, 2^d Battalion, 27th Infantry, 3-25 ID, deployed to Kunar Province, Afghanistan, in April 2011. Alpha Company was stationed at COP Pirtle-King and sent 2^d Platoon, Alpha Company, to occupy OP Bari Alai. Having been overrun by the enemy in 2009, OP**

Bari Alai held a certain place in the enemy's soul, a place so deeply engrained in their essence that an attack on OP Bari Alai would often serve as a "rite of passage" for the foreign insurgents who wanted to operate in the AO. Due to the small size of Bari Alai, however, only two squads were able to be on station at any given time. The remaining squads would pull COP security at Pirtle-King. On 27 May, AAF engaged OP Bari Alai with RPK, PKM, and AK-47 fire.



View from the HLZ on Bari Alai (BP 1 on the right BP 2 on the left)

— Courtesy of CPT John Meyer

After roughly five minutes of contact, we placed 120-mm mortar fire on the suspected and known enemy positions. After two rounds of adjusting fire, I ordered fire for effect on TRP 11. The enemy's fire was still heavy in volume but dissipated in accuracy. It was during the fire for effect that the OP began to take accurate Dragunov and additional PKM fire from another area close to TRP 8B, approximately 750 meters away. This fire was directed at BP 2, with the PKM used as suppression and the Dragunov

taking well-aimed precision shots every 30 seconds. Almost immediately my TOW gunner reported that one of our ITAS had been hit and was now inoperable. The ITAS system was often targeted by enemy fire due to its ability to accurately detect and destroy enemy personnel and equipment farther than any other weapon system we had at our disposal at the OP. While my FO and FSNCO focused on the threat at TRP 11, I called and observed 155 fire on the new target (TRP 8B). The RTO sent up an additional spot report updating the previous SALT (*Situation, Activity, Location, Time*) report with the new information; we believed that we were in contact with five-to-seven enemy personnel, in two separate positions, coordinating their attack with a mixture of PKMs for suppression and the Dragunov for accurate fire.

With the 120s and BP 1 focused on TRP 11 and the 155s and BP 2 focused on TRP 8B, I felt comfortable with the amount of pressure I was applying on the enemy. Nevertheless, because we were still receiving effective fire, though decreased from the initial contact, I had my JTAC submit a CAS request to ensure we eliminated the enemy's largest casualty producing weapon system. This kind of attack was familiar to the Soldiers at OP Bari Alai and me because we had seen this no less than a dozen times before. I felt secure in my defense and thought we would repel this enemy effort relatively quickly, that was, until I received my next report.

"Sir, enemy contact 150 meters out! At least one...(audible of two rounds hissed between the two of us)... at least two enemy shooters. AK-47s, extremely accurate!" Bullets began flying through my most vulnerable side, the side window of BP 2 and the corridor that ran from BP 2 to BP 3. The only weapon system we had designated to that area was the MK-48. I moved quickly to the sniper hide atop BP 2 in an attempt to confirm this report. There was no doubt in my mind that the enemy had at least three additional AK-47s in proximity to the OP, taking extremely accurate shots. I heard the whiz of the bullets flying by before the cracking noise of the bullet physically being fired. It was then I realized that the enemy's initial efforts had been a feint. The enemy used its efforts at TRP 11 and 8B to direct our attention and resources to maneuver forces in close. The one or two shooters that we had initially believed to have been placing effective fire from our dead-space turned out to be at least three or four. At this same time, however, we had 120-mm fire for effect mission on TRP 11,

addressing the two to three personnel with one machine gun, and a CAS bomb drop on TRP 8B targeting the Dragunov and PKM position.

We were now in contact from three different areas, and one of those threats we had never seen before. The enemy was no further than 100 meters away from our eastern flank, and we did not have adequate weapon systems to address the issue. Soldiers from BP 2 took to their M-4s to provide suppression on the enemy AK-47s, as the enemy attempted to move closer to the OP. With my fire supporters executing targets at TRP 11 and 8B, my JTAC preparing a bomb drop on TRP 8B, and additional surveillance on this new close threat, I loaded up my tracer magazine and began marking targets for the MK-48 weapon system and additional M4s. After directing fire onto known, suspected, and likely positions in the area, I moved to the CP to receive an update and check to see what camera angles we had covering the dead-space. Unfortunately, the camera systems in place at the first layer of wire had been destroyed the night prior due to a lightning storm, thus limiting our ability to detect the enemy positions close to our perimeter. I decided that we needed additional assets and placed a request for CCA support. The CCA was located at Jalalabad and had about a 45-minute response time. We would be left with what we had for at least that amount of time.

The fire missions and the bomb drops had successfully suppressed the fire from both TRPs 11 and 8B, but the enemy was continuing to maneuver closer to the eastern corridor. Due to the proximity of the enemy fighters, I could not fire the 120-mm or 155s nor could I drop ordnance, so I decided in an attempt to box the enemy into a known engagement area. To do that, I decided to adjust the 120-mm fire as close as I could to the OP on the northern flank, restricting enemy movement to the north, while keeping the 155s in reserve in case I came in contact with another enemy effort. I would then use the 60-mm mortar to block enemy exfiltration to the east by firing a linear target 150 meters away. I had BP 3's .50 cal prevent enemy movement to the south by firing its Final Protective Line (FPL), while BP 2's MK-48 and additional shooters continued to place direct fire on the areas I had previously marked. I instructed the JTAC to control strafing runs from 100-75 meters out, targeting the dead-space where the enemy was located.

Despite these actions, we continued receiving effective fire for approximately another fifteen minutes, so I decided to take another course of action. I needed to increase the amount of firepower on the eastern flank

and also find a way to place effective fire into the dead-space. With the enemy “boxed in,” I decided that we needed to set up an alternate fighting position towards the North Tower with the ability to place effects on the enemy.

Initially, I decided that due to my situational awareness and the inherent danger of the mission, I would take two Soldiers and a radio and establish this alternate firing position. We had a HESCO covered area approximately 100-150 meters away from the cover of the OP close to North Tower that would serve as an excellent alternate fighting position for this threat. This HESCO wall had previously been used as a dud pit for any unexploded ordnance found on the OP. After I discussed this option with my platoon sergeant, he quickly shot it down, as he stated that the mission was too dangerous, and it would affect my ability to control the fight if I were to be decisively engaged. It was upon hearing this that my BP 1 NCOIC, SSG Thomas Lemons, volunteered to undertake the task. SSG Lemons gathered his M240B machine gunner, SPC Christopher Stone, and together they made necessary preparations for their maneuver to establish the new fighting position. SSG Lemons grabbed his radio, four hand grenades (two for him and two for SPC Stone), and additional 7.62 rounds for the M240B and made his way to the last covered and concealed location. Once he gave me the call that his buddy team was ready to go, I coordinated smoke screens and suppressive fire from all of the BPs onto the enemy firing positions. SSG Lemons and SPC Stone bounded approximately 100 meters through the open, with enemy fighters less than 100 meters from their location, continuing to place accurate fire. They moved to HESCO barriers near the North Tower, resulting in the creation of a new firing position, which allowed the platoon leadership to continue to coordinate assets to bring upon the enemy and repel the attack.

SSG Lemons and SPC Stone, in position to effectively suppress the enemy in what was previously dead-space, began to take the brunt of the enemy’s efforts. The continued efforts of the rest of the BPs to gain fire superiority eventually allowed the new fighting position to place effective fire on the enemy. This additionally bought time and space for CCA to finally arrive on station.

The creation of the new fighting position took back the initiative from the enemy. With the “box method” successfully forcing the enemy into the engagement area, the new fighting position placed effective fire into that

engagement area and served as the decisive point to the victory. The enemy's fire quickly subsided, and we believed we had repelled the attack. The CCA checked on station to confirm BDA and continue to provide surveillance on any additional enemy movement or CASEVAC efforts. The CCA remained on station for approximately 30 minutes with no further fire or enemy activity to report.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Edward Bachar, who served as Platoon Leader of 2/A/2-27 IN, 3-25 ID. CPT Bachar's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: CPT Bachar used the cyclical IPB process during his deployment and the defense of his small outpost to ensure historic enemy avenues of approach and OPs were established as indirect targets and TRPs. This allowed him to fix enemy support by fire and precision small arms fire positions immediately by understanding how to increase accuracy and responsiveness of his indirect assets through clear, defensive fires planning. Preplanned and/or registered targets greatly increase the responsiveness and accuracy of fires, particularly in the defense. CPT Bachar admittedly fell into a common leadership trap. Maneuver leaders are trained to bring together the elements of combat power to mass on enemy forces. In CPT Bachar's circumstance, this led to a centralized command execution instead of the decentralized, intent-driven execution preferred under the mission command philosophy. His ability to understand this error and remove himself from the direct firefight contributed to his success.

In both offensive- and defensive-based operations, observer positioning is extremely important, particularly in the defense, ensuring coverage of high speed avenues of approach and engagement areas. According to the ATP 3-09.30, *Techniques for Observed Fire*, the FSO (in this scenario, the FSNCO or platoon FO) recommends positioning not only of organic FS assets, but also of observers to best support the maneuver commander's defense. By doing this, CPT Bachar could focus on bringing all forces to bear on the enemy instead of narrowing his situational awareness by adjusting indirect fire. CPT Bachar recognized this immediately during the operation which enabled him to remove himself from the situation and focus on massing fires at the decisive point. In hindsight, splitting the FO and FSNCO to separate OPs, along the enemy's

most likely avenue of approach, rather than co-locating the two trained observers, may have relieved CPT Bachar of his responsibilities of adjusting fires, helping him to command and control the entirety of his forces (this is assuming both observers were properly certified and experienced to successfully execute CPT Bachar's intent for fires).

CPT Bachar conducted hasty engagement area development to concentrate firepower effectively and eliminate enemy forces. He understood that bringing effects upon a moving target with indirect fires, specifically in the defense, can be challenging; he correctly uses indirect fires assets to turn and fix enemy forces into his newly identified engagement area instead of using them to neutralize or destroy the enemy. This helped him mass direct fires on the enemy at a time and location of his choosing. Counterinsurgency operations, which often feature tactical-level leaders living in small combat outposts, have mandated that platoon and squad-level leaders, like CPT Bachar, become familiar with all Warfighting Functions at an early point in their professional development. CPT Bachar displays this throughout the fight as he successfully synchronized all fires to defeat an aggressive enemy.

CONCLUSION: "Fires in support of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks apply from tactical to strategic levels, and are employed in decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations" (ADP 3-09, *Fires*). An emerging theme from the last 14 years at war is the requirement for leaders to master fires at the company and even the platoon level. The responsibility to bring this devastation is one our leaders hold seriously as is seen in our leader education and in our doctrine.

CHAPTER 11

Sustainment

“In order to make assured conquests it is necessary always to proceed within the rules: to advance, to establish yourself solidly, to advance and establish yourself again, and always prepare to have within reach of your army your resources and your requirements.”

— Frederick the Great

Instructions for His Generals, ii (1747)

INTRODUCTION: Sustainment of an armed force has been a challenge for leaders for as long as there has been organized warfare. Any study of warfighting—from the battles fought between the Greeks and Persians, to Napoleon’s defeat in Russia, to modern warfare in the 20th and 21st centuries—features the impact sustainment has on victory and on defeat. Our doctrine, in particular, ADP4-0 and ADRP 4-0, “focuses on how the elements of sustainment—the logistics, personnel services, and health services support—ensure operational success by giving Army forces operational reach, freedom of action, and prolong endurance.” Success depends on “coordination, collaboration, and synchronization...across all levels of war.”

On 9 August 2005, the 1st Battalion, 325th Parachute Infantry Regiment (1-325 PIR) conducted Operation Neptune, cordon and search and interdiction operations, in the southern Ghazni and Paktika provinces of Afghanistan. The purpose of Operation Neptune was to disrupt insurgent forces threatening the National Afghanistan Provincial Elections.

Operation Neptune focused on the southern portion of the Red Falcon’s area of operation in the districts of Dilah, Moqur, Gelan, and Nawa. Moqur, Gelan, and Nawa districts were part of the Ghazni Province. Dilah District was a part of the Paktika Province. This area was close to Pakistan and, prior to the battalion’s arrival in sector, had not been patrolled often by Coalition forces. The battalion’s operations included ANA, ANP, and Government of Afghanistan forces to build the Afghan government’s security capacity and secure the national election process. The battalion’s expanded purpose was to ensure the security of the election process by neutralizing the Anti-Afghan forces’ ability to influence the elections;

advancing the Afghan government's security through combined operations; and mentoring the ANP, ANA, and other legitimate Afghan Security Agencies.

The general concept of Operation Neptune was to conduct cordon and search and interdiction operations to neutralize AAF. To conduct this operation, LTC David Anders, Commander, 1-325 PIR, had two company teams, Bravo and Delta companies, and a scout platoon, a mortar platoon, and the combat trains. These elements operated in Nawa, Gelan, Moqur, and Dilah districts. He also had additional support elements located at Camp Red Falcon North and Red Falcon South. The two companies, along with and the Scout and Mortar platoons, would patrol these provinces and conduct cordon and search/knock operations in the numerous small villages and nomad camps in the area, searching for AAF and/or Taliban activity in the area. Operation Neptune would begin on 8 August 2005 and end on 11 August 2005.

I received a call around 2200 on 3 August 2005 from the BN XO, MAJ Greg White. He informed me that he was sending an element to pick me up and bring me to Camp Red Falcon North (CRFN) to coordinate logistics for an operation. I arrived at CRFN at around midnight, and since the camp and sleeping accommodations were limited, I grabbed a cot and slept on the front porch of the TOC.

At 0700 the next morning, MAJ White explained the overall mission and the general type of logistical support he believed the battalion needed. The battalion was going to be operating two hours away from our southern camp, and the Battalion Commander's intent was that both Bravo and Delta Companies stay in the field for the duration of the operation. I gathered the support personnel together to discuss the best way to make this happen. My support team included 1LT Dan Coulter (the medical officer), CPT Tim Wyant (the battalion adjutant), 1LT Jeremy Severn (the signal officer), and 1LT Stuart Peebles (the support platoon leader). We knew that the combat trains needed to bring in CL I, CL III, CL V, the medics, and the maintenance team.

With the BN XO overseeing our planning, we looked at the map and determined tentative locations for the CTCP. The locations needed to be central to both companies because the BN CDR wanted them out of the fight for only short periods. Next, I had CPT Wyant, 1LT Severn, and 1LT Coulter determine what supplies they would need to take with them, while

I worked with 1LT Peebles to determine the amount of fuel necessary for the operation. We based our planning on the fuel consumption of the HMMWV, the number of fuel cans each vehicle carried, and the expected duration of the operation.

This raised the first complication. To be successful, we needed at least 1,000 gallons of JP-8. We had only 34 additional fuel cans, and no fuel blivets; our 500-gallon fuel blivets had dry-rotted in the United States, so they were not brought to Afghanistan. I sent 1LT Peebles to acquire a fuel blivet from one of our adjacent units, while I called the BDE S-4 and attempted to get a fuel tanker to support our operation. MAJ Pratt informed me that fuel tankers were not armored and could not leave Bagram Airfield, but he agreed to attempt to locate two fuel blivets for me.

Another issue with fuel was a lack of fuel pumps which would force us to rely on gravity feed operations. Initially, this was not an issue because the blivets would be placed on the back of a 5-ton truck. However, I did not realize that without a fuel pump the last 60–100 gallons could not be extracted from the blivet. This meant that we would have to carry more fuel to meet our needs.

Next, the logistical staff and I discussed the personnel required for the operation. We needed personnel to repair vehicles and communications equipment, truck drivers, a fueler, the medics, the chaplain, the S-4, and the S-1. Once we had a list of necessary personnel, we began assigning them to the available vehicles and discovered we were one vehicle short. I brought this issue to the XO, and he loaned his vehicle to me with the stipulation that his driver went along. That resolved the vehicle issue.

The staff decided that each of Bravo and Delta companies' vehicles would carry a three-day supply of water and MREs for that vehicle's occupants, and the CTCP would carry an additional three-day supply for the entire battalion. Additionally, each vehicle carried four fuel cans. At this point, fuel containers were still an issue for the CTCP. We had thirty-four fuel cans but still no blivets. I called the S-4 for TF Alamo (1-41 IN, Texas National Guard) who loaned me two fuel blivets for the operation, and I coordinated with him to pick up the blivets on our way through Ghazni FOB en route to Dilah Province.

With the fuel situation seemingly resolved, I focused my energy on ensuring that all of the pertinent logistical information was included in the Concept of Operation being prepared by the Assistant S-3, CPT Brad

Parker. This information documented specifically what the convoy would carry, what assets were available, the location of all refueling sites along our route and in the AO, procedures for recovery of vehicles, and tentative location for the CTCP. I also verified that all the personnel knew the timeline for the operation, were continuing to load all necessary supplies, and were conducting pre-combat inspections.

On 9 August, at approximately 0600, we began to line up the CTCP vehicles. The final disposition was the following: the S-1 in the lead vehicle, with the FBCB2; one 5-ton with water bottles and MREs; an empty 5-ton; the medics' HMMWV, with the medical officer, the BN Surgeon, and the Chaplain; the 5-ton with fuel; the S-4's HMMWV, with the TACSAT and Signal personnel; and, finally, the maintenance HMMWV with the mechanics and the .50 cal. When they were in line and I had ensured that all necessary equipment was loaded and tied down, I gathered everyone around the hood of my HMMWV and delivered the convoy brief. After a rough day-long movement through unforgiving terrain, we reached the CTCP after dark and spent an uneventful night.

In the morning, we rearranged the 5-tons so when an element came through, it could file past the trucks and get fuel, MREs, and water if necessary. We also erected a camouflage net system to provide shade for the Forward Aid Station. The BN Surgeon informed me that several personnel had diarrhea and the leadership needed to watch them for possible heat injuries. I agreed and made sure that everyone was drinking water and eating to maintain his electrolytes.

By 1000, 75% of the battalion had passed through the CTCP to refuel. The remaining 25% said they did not need fuel. Once I had this information, I checked our fuel supply with SSG Pinckney, our fueler. He said we had approximately 150 gallons remaining in the blivet and 20 fuel cans. Of the 150 gallons in the blivet, 60-100 gallons would be hard to extract without a pump. I discussed the issue with the S-3 and decided that I needed to send someone to refuel our blivet. If we failed to get the blivet filled, the battalion would have to either stop the operation early to conserve enough fuel to reach CRFN or continue operations and run out of fuel. Knowing that the BN CDR would not allow the operation to end early, I did not have a choice. I gave the S-1 the task of returning to CRFN and refueling the blivet. I gave him two 5-tons, the HMMWV with the FBCB2, and a

HMMWV with a scrounged TACSAT radio. This convoy arrived back at the CTCF at 1700 with the fuel.

The next morning, MAJ Weisner told me it was the final day of the operation. I calculated the amount of fuel we had and evenly distributed it among all of the platoons. The Battalion Commander then instructed me to follow Bravo Company towards CRFN. We then made the three-hour drive back to CRFN where we reorganized our convoy.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Patrick Kelly, who served as the Battalion Assistant S-4, 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment. CPT Kelly's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia

DISCUSSION: During the planning process, one of the requirements necessary to produce a developed course of action is to ensure that the mission is sustainable. The ADP 4-0, *Sustainment*, lists the Principles of Sustainment as *Integration, Anticipation, Responsiveness, Simplicity, Economy, Survivability, Continuity, and Improvisation*. CPT Kelly's vignette demonstrates how the Principles of Sustainment are used to ensure that the Battalion anticipated and was responsive to logistical demands throughout Operation Neptune. The implication of not considering sustainment thoroughly is that it can become a war stopper or, at the very least, a big problem that could be avoided. This detailed foresight also ensures that the sustainment plan is as simple as possible, employs the most economic means of resupply and recovery, and is uninterrupted throughout the operation.

On 10 April 2007, Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82^d Airborne, was conducting a clearance of the Al-Fadhel neighborhood of Baghdad, an economically depressed area, composed mostly of Sunni Muslims.

A Sunni neighborhood, Al-Fadhel, is surrounded by neighborhoods of equally impoverished Shiites who curtailed the flow of critical services into the area; therefore, the Al-Fadhel became a breeding ground of anger and resentment, and foreign fighters found refuge and support there. They fortified the area, creating fighting positions, observation posts, caches, and casualty collection points stocked with medical supplies. Although we had fought skirmishes with them from time to time, until 10 April, they were not willing to become decisively engaged.

The plan for operations conducted on 10 April—called Operation Doolittle—was typical of clearing operations. Charlie Company, along with the 2/2/6 Iraqi Army and its MiTT, which acted as liaison between Charlie Company and IA element, was tasked to clear a neighborhood to reduce sectarian violence and facilitate the implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan. The 1st Platoon, Delta Company, led by 1LT Clarke Brown; the 2/4/1 IA; and the 3/8/2 National Police would secure blocking positions around the objective, and 1st and 2^d platoons, Charlie Company, and the 2/2/6 would clear the objectives, searching for weapons and contraband. The operation would begin early, at 0600, so anyone who tried to flee during the setting of the cordon could be detained for breaking curfew. Clearance would begin at 0700.

I remained at the Charlie TOC on FOB Loyalty along with a small element from Headquarters. I planned to battle track and control the situation in the TOC, informing the Battalion battle captain if there were any significant actions. Recent clearing operations had yielded few weapons, and I was skeptical that any would be found today.

Immediately after setting the cordon, the IA elements reported sporadic gunfire which quickly escalated. Soon, the IA elements reported being pinned down in their locations. Meanwhile, the insurgents began to maneuver toward the 1st and 2^d platoons and began engaging, and by 0715, all of Charlie Company and its IA partners were in contact. As we began to receive contact reports, we soon learned that two IA soldiers had been fatally wounded. 1LT Brown, receiving contact reports that his Soldiers were observing fires from a particular location along Route Kansas, moved his element there and set in to support the MiTT and the IA. From its new location, his platoon engaged the enemy both at ground level and from elevated stories. While 1LT Brown was increasing his fire from the cordon into the enemy stronghold, CPT Brian Dodd, Charlie Company's commander, moved his platoons into more advantageous positions. His clearing platoons quickly entered and secured several buildings to occupy the rooftops. From these overwatch positions, CPT Dodd was able to determine how the enemy was arrayed and direct his squads to begin to maneuver against the insurgents.

For the next two hours, all elements maneuvered and exchanged intermittent to heavy fire under the protection of AH-64s which were on station. When 2^d Platoon, led by 2LT Richard Evans, began receiving

multiple RPG and hand grenade attacks while maneuvering, CPT Dodd's Fire Support NCO identified targets for the AH-64 pilots. This allowed 2LT Evans' platoon to clear the building from which the RPG fire was coming, providing a better location for 2LT Evans to identify targets for the AH-64s to engage. Meanwhile, CPT Dodd was unable to maneuver his squads farther, but 2LT Evans' element could identify and mark targets for the AH-64s. With positive identification of targets and his friendly elements under cover, CPT Dodd requested that the AH-64s fire a final protective line 35 meters ahead of the forward line of troops. After CPT Dodd gave his initials five times, the AH-64s engaged targets, giving the company a vital reprieve to regroup.

This reprieve was short-lived, however, and the insurgents were soon intent on bringing down one of the AH-64s. They began to volley fire RPGs and automatic weapons, hitting one of the AH-64s and wounding the pilot. The Apaches then broke station to return to base, and without the air support suppressing the insurgents, the attacks against Charlie Company and its IA partners intensified. The local mosques began to broadcast calls to Jihad through their speakers which echoed throughout the area. At this point, CPT Dodd sent the ammo report over the net that the company was down to four M4 magazines per man. I had worked with the platoon sergeants to ensure that each Soldier had ten magazines per man; this report revealed that they had fired a great deal of ammunition and would require re-supply.

The S-4 had already drawn empty magazines from the supply connexes, and the Ammo NCOIC had drawn an emergency re-supply from the ammunition holding area. I told MAJ Anthony Judd, the Battalion XO, that I believed I needed to go with the QRF to take the ammunition out, and he replied, "That's where an XO needs to be; just make sure your commander knows." I met with the platoon sergeant of the QRF, SSG David Steinbeck, and learned his platoon was tasked to move to the company JSS and conduct resupply. Knowing that the ammunition still had to be loaded into the magazines, I decided we could accomplish this at the JSS.

As my vehicles approached the JSS, I established communications with the RTO and let him know that I would need a detail of about a half a dozen Soldiers and as many empty assault packs as he could muster. CPT Dodd had wisely kept 3^d Platoon at the JSS, despite the requests of its platoon leader, 2LT Ian Edgerly, to come out and help. Once I reached the

JSS, 2LT Edgerly met me, and I could tell he was chomping at the bit and knew something I did not. He said, "We've got four guys down. Allen's hit; I think it's pretty bad." Our friend, 1LT Allen Kim, had been wounded by a grenade. Understanding the gravity of the fight and that an hour before, the men were down to four magazines each, nearly everyone began pulling ammunition from the back of the truck and loading it under the SSG Steinbeck's supervision.

After only 15 minutes, we had accomplished all of our tasks. Five assault packs were cross-loaded with magazines, drums, and belts of ammunition. The .50-cal cans were dressed within reach, and water was stacked in the trailer behind the ammo. We quickly remounted, and despite the fact that I could not reach CPT Dodd because of the congestion of the neighborhood and the amount of traffic on the net, I instructed the QRF platoon to drive to the outer cordon where I believed I could reach the CO. After dropping off cans of .50 cal with an NCO from Charlie Company who was attached to the MiTT, we continued on until we reached a blocking position, manned by Soldiers from 4th Platoon, Delta Company, who assisted in contacting CPT Dodd. As soon as I received his orders regarding a link-up point, we proceeded toward his location.

At this time, only half of the vehicles in the battalion were equipped with navigation equipment, and the other half was equipped with IED countermeasures. Riding in the lead vehicle, I did not have navigational aids and had to guide the QRF to the link-up point based on graphics and my interpretation on the ground. Despite several wrong turns, at times right past enemy roadblocks, and continually sustaining and, at times, returning fire, we reached the safety of the CCP. We learned that the casualties sustained, including 1LT Kim, had been evacuated earlier, and the 1SG gave me the manpower I needed to start distributing the water and ammunition that we had fought to bring. The men were exhausted, and as I handed each man a liter of water, it seemed they could not get the water fast enough. The platoon sergeants gave me their team leaders, and I loaded them up to distribute ammunition.

At the end of Operation Doolittle, 17 U.S. Soldiers were wounded in action, the majority of which, including myself, required minor treatment and returned to duty the next day. Although an unknown number of insurgents were killed, intelligence over the next few days indicated that at least 50 insurgents had died in the fighting. Neighborhood propaganda

posters over the following weeks claimed that over 100 insurgents died as martyrs fighting the American.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Dan Sanchez, who served as the Executive Officer for Charlie Company., 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82^d Airborne. CPT Sanchez' monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: Resupply in contact is predicated on several factors: integrating logistic planners in the planning process of an operation; having a reserve of combat supplies and support services tailored to meet the needs of the operation; clearing and securing lines of communication between the fighting echelon and rear echelons; and having a range of surface and air connectors that enable the passage of supplies forward and the retrieval of casualties rearward. Running estimates generate the specific concept of sustainment necessary for the fighting echelon to seize the initiative and to exploit successes. In CPT Sanchez' experience, logistical support was critical to the completion of the mission, demonstrating logistical pull when it was required to facilitate resupply.

From 29 July through 3 August 2009, Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, participated in Operation Tora Arwa V. Its mission was to disrupt Anti-Afghan forces and Taliban operations in and to deny the insurgents the ability to disrupt the national election in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.

Brigadier General Jonathan Vance, commander of TF Kandahar, referred to Mushan Village as "The Heart of Darkness." Based on the intelligence officer's assessment in the operations order, an unknown number of fighters from out of the area were moving into Mushan following Canadian operations in Nakhonay. The enemy possessed a robust early warning system and, thus, would have ample time to either emplace and arm IEDs or move out of the area before coalition forces could clear the area.

Mushan was located approximately 35 kilometers from FOB Ramrod, from where 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, operated. Most of the villagers were farmers whose cash crops were primarily grapes, poppies, and marijuana. They lived in family compounds made of mud and hay, and although it does not sound very sturdy, this type of foundation could easily withstand a

7.62-mm round. Most of the villagers had never been outside of Mushan. It was located on a peninsula surrounded on the south and west by open desert and to the north by a wadi system.

Using the terrain to advantage, the battalion would air assault to the eastern part of the village and clear from east to west to prevent the insurgents from using the area to run operations. Charlie, Bravo, and Alpha companies would posture north to south respectively, and throughout the operation, the battalion TAC would be co-located with Charlie Company, commanded by CPT Duke Reim.

Prior to the operation, I packed and coordinated two packages of resupply of Class V (ammunition) and VIII (medical). Each Class V package for Charlie Company consisted of half a UBL per weapon system color coordinated for easy distribution to platoons. Class VIII packages included 20 bags of 1,000-ml IV kits and tourniquets. Both packages were staged for on-call resupply: one package was staged with our FSC for ground resupply and the other at Kandahar Airfield for aerial resupply. I coordinated Class I through the S-4 for daily resupply by ground and air. We planned that each Soldier would receive twelve bottles of water and three MREs a day. We set up specific times and locations for resupply based on the availability of lift assets. The FSC also had enough Class I on hand to supply the battalion for four days in case the aircrafts could not fly.

On 29 July, the Reconnaissance Platoon air inserted to the open desert southwest of Mushan to observe patterns of life and possibly locate enemy caches and staging areas. The final intelligence brief did not reveal anything out of the ordinary.

Charlie Company air inserted into LZ Robin, one kilometer east of Mushan, at 2130 on 30 July; moved one kilometer to the west; and occupied a compound, identified earlier, that was large enough to support a rifle company, the battalion TAC, a section of 60-mm mortars, and numerous enablers, totaling approximately 180 Soldiers. Learning from previous operations, we had tailored Soldier loads to only mission essential equipment to avoid Soldier fatigue and heat exhaustion. On the initial infiltration, each Soldier carried 200 ounces of water, a First Strike Ration, his individual equipment and weapon, and 1.5 UBL of ammunition. Every rifleman also carried one 60-mm mortar round, which he would drop off at the CP upon occupation, and Team leaders and above also had to carry a 1000-ml saline bag with an IV kit.

Immediately following our occupation of the compound, two platoons began patrolling Mushan Village, initially receiving no contact, while the third initiated a rest plan to allow continuous dismounted operations during the following days. Once the sun rose, the platoons began collecting intelligence from the local population on insurgent activity in the area and put out several information operation messages to gain the trust of the people. These messages detailed instances of how the Taliban's actions had caused civilian casualties within the local area. On this first day, one of the villagers revealed the location of a possible IED and warned us to avoid all of the pharmacy buildings in the area because they were used to manufacture IEDs. After our EOD attachments destroyed the IED, the same villager pointed out an IED facility which we confirmed using our bomb dog team. Since this compound was empty, we coordinated with the Canadian tank attachments to destroy the compound using their main guns.

During earlier operations, we had observed that the enemy would wait until the hottest part of the day—between 1100 and 1600—to initiate an attack. Temperatures during this time of the year often exceeded 105 degrees, and the humidity from the grape and marijuana fields made the conditions unbearable. This environment, coupled with the weight of our equipment and body armor, hindered our ability to close with and destroy an enemy conditioned to the area, lacking body armor, and carrying only his weapon and a few rounds of ammunition. To counter this trend, we had everyone come back to the CP during the heat of the day to rest and hydrate.

At dawn the next morning, we collapsed this CP and moved to the next one. Since we were to clear eight kilometers through the village, we had planned to move from one CP to the next. By moving CPs, patrols would not have to move as far in the heat, and the QRF would be within a couple of kilometers. After receiving resupply through a sling load off of a CH47, one of the patrols hit an IED, sustaining two KIAs and four WIAs, rendering the platoon mission ineffective. Since I could not reach the CO, I launched a medically heavy QRF and accompanied it to the scene. Once our two Fallen Angels and four WIAs were loaded on the MEDEVAC birds and left, the QRF, which was just leaving the HLZ, hit an IED, resulting in one KIA and three additional WIAs. As the next MEDEVAC birds were leaving with these casualties, my CO joined up with me, and we moved to the third planned CP.

To conserve the Soldiers' energy, the Battalion TAC had coordinated for a tractor to move all of our assault packs to the next CP. At this time, Soldiers were suffering from dehydration and diarrhea from drinking the local water. All of the IV bags the team leaders carried into the operation had been depleted the previous night. We received aerial resupply the next morning which brought water, MREs, and medical supply. Once the sling load was dropped, we made a human chain to transport the resupply items into the compound before dividing it up among our subordinate units.

Operations continued over the next three days, with more frequent enemy contact as we moved deeper into the area. Although we did not take any further casualties from direct fire, we had to evacuate six Soldiers due to the heat. Soldiers had to resort to eating local watermelon and grapes to keep up their sugar levels. Once we reached our limit of advance, we consolidated and prepared for exfiltration which occurred at 2100, 3 August.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Thang Tran, who served as the Executive Officer for Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment. CPT Tran's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: Charlie Company's adherence to the Fundamentals of Sustainment during this operation increased the likelihood of mission accomplishment. The executive officer's ability to anticipate future operational requirements by preparing packages of Class V and Class VIII helped his company maintain tempo and keep the initiative. Re-supply packages were delivered at the right time and to the right place with the responsiveness required to meet the needs of maneuver forces. Soldier's loads were economically tailored so each rifleman took everything he and the company required, but not an ounce more, ensuring the commander was able to employ all assets to the greatest effect possible.

In January, 2010, in the wake of a massive earthquake in Haiti, 1st Squadron, 73^d Cavalry Regiment, 2^d Brigade Combat Team, 82^d Airborne Division deployed in support of Operation Unified Response.

In the winter of 2010, 1-73 CAV (also known as the Gray Falcons of the Falcon Brigade), was serving as the ready element of the Nation's Global Response Force (GRF). The GRF was conceptualized around the

Airborne Infantry's capability of forcible entry and airfield seizure into denied terrain, using Air Force lift and Marine Corps' amphibious and air strike assets to support the ground units. The idea, at its core, is that the United States always needs a collection of units which are tasked to be prepared to go at a moment's notice, anywhere in the world, and achieve their assigned mission. Most often, this idea revolves around responding to an unannounced or unpredicted military threat via an airborne or amphibious assault to establish an initial foothold in that nation.

The GRF capability was degraded over time during the Global War on Terrorism due to high operational tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, when 2BCT returned from its Iraq Surge rotation in the spring of 2008, the FORSCOM leadership decided to reestablish and refocus the need of the GRF and tasked the brigade with this mission. We began a period of training and preparation to assume the mantle as the nation's on-call force. Between the spring of 2008 and December 2009, the mission was uneventful.

On 12 January 2010, at approximately 1700 EST, a massive 7.0-magnitude earthquake rocked the nation of Haiti. The epicenter of the earthquake was less than 20 miles from Port-au-Prince, the nation's capital and most populated city (estimated 900,000+ residents). Within hours, representatives from the American and Haitian governments, as well as United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), were planning the humanitarian assistance operation that would ensue, formally known as Operation Unified Response.

On the day of the earthquake, the entire Squadron was in the northern training areas of Fort Bragg preparing to conduct PLT STX lanes. The Gray Falcons were technically on ready status, and large training events would have been uncommon. However, the command had approved PLT STX and assumed the risk. By the morning of 12 January, the training had all been arrayed, and the first platoons were beginning their sequence. I would estimate that at least 70% of the unit's critical equipment (weapons, radios, vehicles) was in the field at this time, with only a small rear element maintaining the unit HQ. Then, in the early morning hours of 13 JAN, I received a call from MAJ Larry Jordan, the Squadron Executive Officer, directing all officers to return to the unit headquarters immediately and to direct our NCOICs to break down our positions and return as soon as possible. I, as well as CPT Nick Potter, the HHT Executive Officer, with

whom I was co-located, immediately packed our personal effects and returned to the unit area. Upon our return to the unit HQ, LTC Michael Foster briefed the key staff and commanders on the situation and informed us that we would be deploying to Haiti and the first lift would depart in no more than 48 hours.

Our immediate task was clear even if the road to success was not. We didn't know a lot about where we were going, but we knew there would be no FOBs with massive supply yards and established sustainment plans. We would have whatever we could carry and pack on the aircraft with us. Immediately, and over the next 24 hours, we coordinated for basic food, water, ammunition, and medical supplies, as well as what few comfort items we could get, such as a limited number of cots.

Simultaneously, while trying to acquire the supplies, we were supervising the plan of how to get them to Haiti. The 407th Brigade Support Battalion and 82^d Sustainment Brigade, our main support units, delivered a dozen or so 463L pallets and supplies. The unit supply sergeants, executive officers, and my team supervised the building and packing of the pallets, and the air and movement team developed and submitted load plans to the all-powerful Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (ADACG) at Pope Air Force Base for manifesting. More than a few angry phone calls were exchanged during this entire process.

It is worth pointing out at this point that we were extremely focused on the 'front side' of the operation, namely getting our people and equipment on the ground as quickly as possible. Due the hasty nature of our deployment, a full plan for out-loading of our follow-on equipment and vehicles was not well-established nor were the methods for supporting them in country. These two issues would prove challenging in the near future.

Eventually, when our essential materials were secured as well as possible, the squadron began movement to Haiti. The first chalk of personnel, consisting of key command personnel and the main effort (Bravo Troop), departed on 14 January 2012 and touched down at Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince as the lead element of the 2BCT. I arrived the following evening, on 15 January 2012, and the only thing I remember specifically about the trip was that I threw up in my water bottle during landing in Port-au-Prince from the awful anti-malaria medication that we had to take...not a stellar way to begin an operation.

Once on the ground, 1-73 CAV quickly established its 'forward' position at the Petionville Club in a small affluent suburb, approximately 13 km from the airport, which served as the Administrative and Logistics Operations Center (ALOC). The club had several tennis courts and open areas (even a 9-hole golf course, allegedly, though I never saw it) and a well-built clubhouse with kitchen and latrines. It offered a high vantage point to over-watch the local area and plenty of space to accommodate our Soldiers and establish services for the locals. This would be our FOB in Haiti and even took on the name FOB Gray during operational meetings.

My job was primarily to run the ALOC. Along with the two Logistics NCOs, SFC Darren Little and SGT Allen Robinson, and the Air Operations NCO, SSG Armand Lotman, I would acquire and push supplies, control the flow of personnel in/out of theater, and serve as the primary LNO at the airport, which was the primary movement center at this time. These tasks seemed easy enough until one considers that, as the first major unit on the ground, there was no one from whom to get supplies or with whom to liaison. Honestly, a majority of our support during the initial foothold (and throughout the operation, for that matter) came from foreign nations and civilian donors.

The airport building sat in the center of a large airstrip, and we established the U.S. presence on the west side of the flight line. As more units arrived, we would continue to push west into the grassy plain adjacent to the airport. On the far east side, however, a hodgepodge of international agencies and nations were establishing small camps. Many nations, such as Qatar, France, and Holland, sent supplies. It quickly became apparent that they had food, water, medicine, and will, but no method of delivery; we, conversely, had manpower and the ability to move rapidly all over the city but were severely lacking in supplies for locals. Immediately, a symbiotic relationship was born.

1LT Ben Schaefer, our MEDO, and our troop XO were tireless: driving up and down the flight line and stopping at any location that looked like it had a pallet of food to give. Quick deals were made, offering a can of fuel for a generator in exchange for a case of antibiotics or bandage dressings. As the first days ticked by, more and more supplies began to find their way onto the flight line. Pallets of water and food arrived daily. Our units would stop by, load up with as much as they could carry, move out to distribute, and then return and begin the process again. If there was a

method to the madness of who got what supplies when, I never saw it. There were so many people in need that we could scarcely move out of the airport without running into a borough that needed our help as much as the next.

By 15 JAN 2012, the *USS Carl Vinson* had also arrived and began its vital role in the supply and support effort. In addition to the Air Force C-130s and C-17s that were constantly landing and taking off, helicopters from the *Carl Vinson* ran from sunup to sundown. They provided food, water, and medical supplies, as well as assistance to the most badly injured locals. This phase of the operation was, by far, the most rewarding for me. We helped those in need in the purest sense of the word. There were no PowerPoint briefs, no range procedures, no meetings or debate, and minimal oversight. Each of us was expected to perform and instinctually make the right decision. We were empowered to execute with the simplest intent, to do what it took to save lives.

We did begin to see three trends develop that would shape the rest of the operation. First was the consumption of fuel. We carried as much as possible with us in anticipation of trouble, but with round the clock support and many vital services running off of generators, fuel quickly became a critical resource. Soldiers often resorted to buying gas at local gas stations, but the local supply was also running critically low due to high demand and lack of resupply through normal channels. Movement through the city was closely monitored to conserve fuel. We made most of our supply runs at night when traffic was non-existent to avoid idling at intersections. Measures were taken at the highest levels to secure fuel contracts with local producers and even import when needed. Many civilian organizations and lower priority units were unable to get fuel at controlled supply points; gassing up was on a 'need to drive' basis. After the first month or so, the situation stabilized. Local fuel supply lines began running again, and we'd supplied ourselves with enough fuel to maintain a steady state of operation. We never became ineffective due to fuel consumption, but we had certainly got closer than we preferred.

Secondly, issues began to arise in the order and timing of our follow-on equipment delivery, especially in our support units. We'd never rehearsed or conducted a full scale, no-notice deployment of the entire brigade before. As a result, we often received two of three components of a vital system, but the final component would arrive four days later, thus making the entire system inoperable. This would later be addressed in

operational reviews. A prime example was the water purification system used by our support battalion. This device can clean and purify water from local streams or wells so it can be consumed. To operate correctly, the system requires multiple components, like a pump, purifier, and blivet (often called an onion skin due to the resemblance). Without one of these pieces, the system cannot operate. As a result of poor planning and load out, we were unable to produce sustainable water for the force for several weeks, which strained our logistics' capacity by increasing demand for bottled water.

Lastly, we began to establish strong and lasting relationships with civilian organizations. Wealthy and concerned citizens proved to be the decisive point in Haiti, constantly flying in resources on smaller civilian aircraft. My issued BlackBerry phone was constantly ringing with information about incoming flights that I had to meet, key personnel that needed handling, or supplies that had arrived and needed to be located and delivered. That type of passion was refreshing; these folks were the true heroes of Haiti, and their work continues to this day.

As the days turned into weeks, the bureaucracy began to establish itself. Once any fear of violence or looting subsided, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) began to entrench itself in earnest as the chief of operations. Government-provided resources became more controlled, and requesting and receiving them became, as with all military supplies, very taxing. To its credit, USAID was taking a long view, ensuring that a steady stream of supplies was available for the next few months, rather than issuing large quantities up front and running out later. However, this point of view was hard for many to swallow. Though the initial chaos had subsided and stability was returning, there were still thousands of hungry, homeless people in displaced persons camps. It was hard to tell them we couldn't feed them today, but we would in two months; a feast in two months does no good to a man starving today.

By the middle of February, my time was filled with meetings, reporting statuses of various resources, typing emails, etc. The freedom of action and autonomy that created such a chaotic, yet successful, environment in the initial phase were gone. Our work had all but stopped. In the beginning, no one knew how the locals would respond to the disaster, and there was a sense that everyone needed a military escort to move and operate in the city. However, as people began to have faith that the city was

safe and stable, aid groups moved without escort and on their own missions. We were merely providing manpower, and as their ranks swelled with volunteers, we were needed less and less. The city still needed healing, but it needed engineers, doctors, and aid workers far more than it needed Soldiers. We began sending Soldiers and equipment back to Fort Bragg in late February. I personally departed as the last Gray Falcon on the ground in Haiti on 18 MAR 2010. Other elements of the brigade returned throughout the spring of 2010. The entire operation had lasted less than 60 days for the Soldiers of 1-73 CAV.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Jason Rafoth, who served as Squadron Logistics Officer (S-4) for 1st Squadron, 73^d Cavalry Regiment, 2^d Brigade Combat Team, 82^d Airborne Division. CPT Rafoth's monograph found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: Contingency forces have to maintain the readiness of personnel. However, an important, but often overlooked, element of contingency force operations is preparing, maintaining, and quarantining combat essential equipment and supplies at first line, second line, and third line so that, should forces be deployed, they can rapidly draw on resources necessary to implement initial conditions within the area of operations. Notably, *Anticipation and Responsiveness* are sustainment principles that have particular relevance to contingency operations. Anticipation is particularly difficult because leaders must prepare equipment, supplies, and services without knowing the scenario. This could range from disaster relief, such as in Haiti, to violent stability operations. That is why responsiveness, “the ability to react to changing requirements and respond to meet the needs [of the force]”, is so important. (ADP 4-0, *Sustainment*) The readiness of logistical supporting elements to 1/73 Cavalry Regiment was critical to the success of the Global Response Force.

CONCLUSION: The responsibility to sustain an operating force rests with the commander, who, with the help of logisticians, noncommissioned officers, and executive officers, ensures the fighting force is focused on the mission and not where the next bullets or water bottles are coming from. In this chapter, we see the challenges of ensuring the mission is accomplished and the solutions that our doctrine presents.

CHAPTER 12

Security

There is no such thing as perfect security, only varying levels of insecurity.

— *Salman Rushdie*

INTRODUCTION: The nine Principles of War, first published in the 1921 Training Regulation 10-5, and later defined in 1949, listed Security as “*Never permitting the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.*” The writers of ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*, expanded this definition and nested it in tactical enabling tasks: “Security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force.” Whatever definition one uses, it is clear that Security is an enduring element of our doctrine.

The 1-504th, 82^d Airborne Division, was the first to deploy to Baghdad in support of the surge of American troops. Since the surge began, violence had intensified, and insurgents regularly clashed with both Iraqi security forces and coalition forces. To respond to the rise in violence, American doctrine and TTPs evolved. Building Joint Security Stations and combat outposts and conducting relentless patrols allowed U.S. forces to interact with the civilian population on a daily basis. In response, insurgents frequently sought softer, high pay-off targets, namely local Iraqi nationals rather than U.S. forces.

Our patrols were always composed of dismounted and mounted elements. We used our armored HMMWVs to get to a pre-designated dismount point, and then a squad of dismounts provided local security as I talked to local nationals to acquire information on both enemy activity and how we could provide assistance to the civilian population. Meanwhile, our gun trucks provided a roving patrol and an outer layer of security. Once we had arrived at the Iraq Army headquarters, we would pick up whatever Iraqi Security Force units were available and integrate them into our formation, typically with one of their trucks in the middle of our convoy and their dismounts side by side with ours.

On July 17, 2007, we had just dismounted after driving past a market area I knew well. I led the Iraqi platoon leader down a residential street where a number of citizens, with whom I had established a small degree of rapport, lived. We had been talking to the local nationals for only about five minutes when a small child ran up to us. The little boy claimed that someone had been murdered in the market place we had just passed.

The Iraqi platoon leader hastily corralled his dismounts while his solitary vehicle did a three-point turn in the midst of my formation. In a completely disorganized fashion, they sprinted haphazardly back towards the market in the direction the child indicated. I sent a vehicle section around the block to establish security—a base of fire, if necessary—and an observation position near where I guessed the incident had taken place. The other vehicle section remained with my dismounts. I organized my last vehicle section and dismounts and moved to deliberately approach the market place. My dismounts were arrayed in our typical urban tactical road march formation—half of the dismounts on one side of the street, with half on the other, staggered, with about five meters between each Paratrooper.

I was suddenly knocked down by an enormous, concussive blast. SGT Matt Cullen described the action: “Within 30 seconds of the IA’s entry into the market area, a huge explosion very nearly decimated our platoon. I was less than 30 meters away, but I was positioned at the corner of a building; otherwise, I would have received the full effects of the blast.”

Seconds after the blast, one of my team leaders from the forward vehicles came on the radio, “VBIED! VBIED!” Not only was this my first contact of the deployment, this was the first enemy contact for most of my platoon, and our inexperience was showing. To make matters worse, I had never been trained on a react to VBIED battle drill, and I had foolishly not briefed this contingency in my convoy brief. My failure to rehearse this non-doctrinal action prior to the patrol was slowing our collective reaction. I began to see torn bodies emerge from the smoke as my subordinates looked to me for guidance. My platoon sergeant came running up to me, equally shell-shocked because of his proximity to the explosion, and asked if we had established a cordon yet.

My brain finally de-fogged, and I knew what steps to take. I began barking orders and maneuvering vehicles and personnel. Security was the first priority, as always, and I needed to get my unit consolidated, organized,

and moving into a safer position and a better vantage point. I sent my commander a SITREP and requested assistance in establishing a cordon.

Instead of a full cordon around the market area, we established perimeter security around a courtyard about 50 meters from the blast site. I put in a request via the radio to the EOD unit. I felt comfortable with our security for the time being, and we were not being engaged, so we quickly began evacuating casualties. In the center of our perimeter, my platoon sergeant established a casualty collection point, using the walls of the courtyard for additional security.

The casualties poured in. The dismounted elements of my platoon alternated between pulling security and extracting casualties who couldn't walk on their own. I expected to be nauseated by the flood of human gore, but my mind was racing too quickly to dwell on the copious amounts of blood and limbs sprinkled all over the marketplace. Many were bleeding out of their ears and seemed to be completely oblivious to their own plight. I recognized the remains of the Iraqi platoon leader's body near the hole where the blast had originated.

I attempted to question local nationals, but they seemed too distraught to provide any coherent information. I continued trying to get information, however, and eventually learned the sequence of events: A local national male had been shot by an unknown assailant; then, a crowd gathered around the victim, who was conveniently murdered right next to a car; finally, the car blew up the market place, the gathering crowd, and the IA soldiers who were attempting to investigate.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT William Wright, who served as a Rifle platoon leader in B Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Infantry, 82^d Airborne Division. CPT Wright's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: In this engagement the platoon from Bravo Company quickly transitioned to security operations in support of its partnered force. In ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*, the five Fundamentals of Security Operations are the following: *Orient on the force or facility to be secured, Provide early and accurate warning, Provide reaction time and maneuver space, Maintain enemy contact, and Perform continuous reconnaissance.* Initially, the U.S. platoon oriented on the Iraqi platoon leader and later, following the detonation of the VBIED, to the casualty collection point. It

also leveraged the mobility of its HMMWVs and employed them in a reconnaissance and security role to provide early warning.

Curiosity and emotion can draw a force into a situation for which it is unprepared, as demonstrated above. Had the Iraqi platoon sent a security element forward, it may have been able to alert the rest of the patrol to the dangers ahead. Awareness of the threat could have allowed the combined force to maneuver into a position of advantage out of contact and avoided many of the casualties. The patrol leader made a keen decision to establish a perimeter it could secure versus the entire blast site after the VBIED detonated, and shifting the platoon's efforts to securing a casualty collection point and treating casualties. His decisions demonstrate a solid understanding of the formation's capabilities and limitations in that operating environment.

The U.S. platoon first leveraged the mobility of its HMMWVs and employed them in reconnaissance and security roles to provide early warning. Then, the patrol leveraged the mobility and protection of its mounted elements to ensure continuous reconnaissance around the casualty collection point, to provide early warning, and to provide reaction time for the force working to treat and evacuate casualties. It is uncertain what additional assets the patrol leader had to assist with continuous reconnaissance of the objective or to maintain enemy contact, but a small unmanned aerial vehicle could certainly be one solution to fill gaps if larger information collection assets were unavailable.

By February 2012, Comanche Troop, 3-4 Cavalry, had been deployed in Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province for ten months and was responsible for FOB Connelly. The primary task of the troop was to develop and exploit an active partnership with the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF).

Tensions were high at the end of February as word spread that Korans had been burned at Bagram Army Airbase. An aggressive anti-coalition force campaign by the Taliban sent many locals into a rage, sparking protests and violence within days. On 22 February, large gatherings at FOB Connolly's front gates turned into small riots. Angry protesters set fires to abandoned structures just outside the FOB's barriers, destroyed cars belonging to local nationals working on the base, and randomly fired weapons to elicit a coalition response.

The 3^d ANA Kandak immediately responded to the protests by attempting to disperse the crowd. Kandak Tuller (platoon equivalent) drove outside of the FOB gates, shooting at armed people who posed a direct threat and giving verbal warnings to the locals over megaphones. Simultaneously, Comanche Troop increased security inside of the base by positioning gun trucks along the base perimeter in between the FOB's guard towers and posting snipers in the FOB's central towers overlooking the main avenue of approach to the FOB. An additional QRF, made up of one U.S. platoon and one ANA Tulle, was staged 200 meters away from the front gate, close to the fuel point, ready to respond in the event that escalated force was required. The troop's defensive posture remained elevated until late that evening when the crowd was fully dispersed.

Early the next afternoon, on the second day of the protests, I heard more shots fired. Prior to this, all the shooting had sounded distant, as it had taken place outside of the FOB gate. These shots, however, sounded different and much closer. From where I stood, near the ANA compound, it was clear that the firing was coming from inside the FOB. I ran toward where I heard the firing coming from only to see mass confusion at the QRF staging area. Over the troop radio, I heard even more confusion, but I was able to gather that there were, in fact, shots fired near the QRF staging area, and two U.S. Soldiers had been injured.

After seeing that ISG Clint Macmillan was en route to the staging area, I took up a position with our snipers in a tower overlooking the FOB. It was there that the transmissions on the radio became clear since I could now see the aftermath. The firing had come from the ANA Tulle at the staging area. One ANA soldier had shot at Comanche Troop's 4th Platoon which was there as a joint QRF. In the tower with the sniper section, I could observe a crowd to the south of the FOB along the outer perimeter close to a guard tower manned by an Afghan Security Group (ASG) contractor. The gunman had previously coordinated this gathering to mass at that location and used it as part of his escape route. At this time, both the ASG and U.S. forces were shooting toward this man, in an ANA uniform, and wounding him as he made it over the gates just before dissolving into the large body of protesters.

The two Soldiers were transported to the FOB aid station, but shortly after, we learned that both of our Soldiers had expired from their wounds. This was Comanche Troop's second green on blue incident of the

deployment; the first resulted in nothing more than a scare, but this time, a man in an ANA uniform had shot and killed two U.S. Soldiers on the very FOB he shared with them. Initially, it was unclear if the gunman had acted alone. It was also unclear if this was a result of Koran burnings or if it was an act planned well in advance just waiting for an opportune time. The only thing that remained clear that afternoon was that an individual we called a partner had murdered two U.S. Soldiers on a joint base.

By late afternoon, the troop leadership had addressed Comanche Soldiers, but there was a sense of disbelief that overtook the majority of them. After being so successful in developing an active partnership, an insider threat from a uniformed ally struck us harder than any IED or mortar attack could up to that point.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Seth Hildebrand, who served as Executive Officer of Comanche Troop, 3-4 Cavalry. CPT Hildebrand's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: The Fundamentals of Security are a key tenet in any operation. Specifically, *Orienting on the Facility or Force to be Secured* is especially critical when factoring in the variables associated with multinational operations. Disparate TTPs between forces, training levels, and leadership competency can create different challenges for partner forces than we, as Americans, will traditionally experience. By continually providing security to our own force, whether on the relative safety of a Forward Operating Base or in a more remote location for a Key Leader Engagement, a unit can best minimize the risk of such incidents occurring.

While it may seem counterintuitive to perform continuous reconnaissance on a partner force, once a threat from these units has been expressed, as in the example of Green on Blue violence, understanding the risks associated with these types of operations is important. Reconnaissance on a partner force allows commanders, leaders, and Soldiers to ensure that not only is the black and white of partner capabilities understood, but that the gray of the influence from local insurgent elements is factored in as well.

Security operations are meant to, "to protect the force from surprise and reduce the unknowns in any situation." (ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*) While Reconnaissance and Security tasks are similar in nature, the main difference is that Reconnaissance is terrain and enemy focused while

Security is focused on the force or facility to be secured. In an environment where partner forces can pose even the most minimal threat to our own organization, it is critical to focus on our own unit's security at all times.

The 2-503^d deployed in support of OEF X to Kunar Province in December 2009, replacing 1-32^d Infantry, 10th Mountain Division (TF Chosin). The Battalion's HHC, Blacksheep Company, was located at FOB Joyce and assigned an AO around the FOB, specifically in the Serkani and Marawara districts. The company was task organized with the Battalion's Scout Platoon, Wildcat, and two rifle platoons from other companies, redesignated as the 1st and 2^d platoons, Blacksheep Company.

Throughout the RIP/TOA process, TF Chosin had stressed the danger of the nearby Ganjgal Valley. Ganjgal is an off-shoot of the main Kunar River Valley just a few kilometers north of FOB Joyce. A few kilometers from the mouth of the valley are the villages of Ganjgal and Dam Darya. The Soldiers in the departing unit stressed the villagers were extremely anti-coalition and told us all attempts by TF Chosin to enter the valley had met determined resistance. Once my platoon arrived to FOB Joyce at the beginning of December 2009, we conducted nearly daily patrols to OP Yarkani, an ABP outpost, on top of the spur that separated FOB Joyce from Ganjgal. The goal was to conduct physical conditioning, get used to climbing the steep mountains in the area, and familiarize ourselves with the Ganjgal Valley. OP Yarkani provided an excellent viewpoint of the valley, and we met with the ABP members stationed at the site.

During our RIP/TOA, indirect attacks on FOB Joyce, originating from the Ganjgal Valley, became more frequent and more accurate. Eventually, 107-mm rocket rounds were landing outside of FOB Joyce, causing injuries and killing a FOB worker. The safety of the base was in jeopardy since most of the buildings were wooden. My platoon's patrols to OP Yarkani then became observation missions, trying to locate the source of the indirect fire. On one such mission, SGT Lucas Beachnaw, a senior sniper in the platoon, observed insurgents firing multiple 107-mm rockets at FOB Joyce and identified the POO as a cave located just outside Dam Darya. The Blacksheep Company commander, CPT Josh Van Etten, and I planned a company operation to enter the valley and clear the POO site and cave.

Blacksheep Sweep was planned as a night air assault into Ganjgal Valley. The 1st Platoon conducted the decisive operation. It was tasked with

clearing the cave site and conducting key leader engagements in Dam Darya to prevent future IDF attacks on FOB Joyce. The 2^d Platoon would split and secure the mouth of the Ganjgal Valley and a position east of OP Yarkani to overwatch 1st Platoon and facilitate its mission. My platoon was tasked with securing Hilltop 1458 to provide overwatch for 1st Platoon and prevent the enemy from massing to the north.

On 13 January 2010, the 2^d Platoon moved in a four-vehicle mounted patrol to the mouth of Ganjgal Valley, and a dismounted patrol, with Afghan National Army soldiers attached, established an overwatch position near OP Yarkani, looking down on the village of Dam Darya. The 1st Platoon and my platoon air assaulted, in two lifts of CH-47s, to Hilltop 1458. The 1st Platoon, with an attached ANA platoon, began movement south toward Dam Darya to conduct its mission. My platoon secured the hilltop and began setting up security and observation positions. We had an ANA platoon and Marine Exercise Evaluation Teams attached to us, along with a LLVI team, a 60-mm mortar team, and a JTAC. We set up to observe Ganjgal Village to the northwest, Shurugay Village to the east, and the surrounding mountains.

From Hill 1458, my platoon would be able to isolate Dam Darya from the north so that 1st Platoon could move freely through Dam Darya with 2^d Platoon on the ridgeline above to protect it. The drawback to using 1458 was that it is not nearly as tall as the surrounding mountains and ridgelines. However, it was the only position that would allow us to range Ganjgal with our weapon systems, and denying the hill to the enemy was critical because they would have a dominating position over 1st Platoon should they seize it.

We emplaced our weapon systems to cover the suspected enemy positions, based on the LLVI traffic, and to observe the avenues of approach the enemy could use. We spent most of the day improving our fighting positions, stacking the large rocks that were strewn around the hill three feet high, and building alternate positions. We coordinated the Kiowa SWT to observe the mountains around us and for them to test fire their weapon systems as a terrain denial tactic. Sporadically, throughout the day, we could observe enemy moving in the mountainside, but since they had not engaged us, we could not engage them. The LLVI team intercepted enemy radio traffic throughout the day, mostly concerning how and when to attack our position. We also received reports that assets were observing groups of enemy moving down from as far as 15 km north of our location.

We remained in place, observing and continuing to improve the fighting positions as 1st Platoon conducted its mission. CPT Van Etten and his ANA counterparts attempted to conduct KLEs with elders in Dam Darya but had little success even starting a conversation with anyone.

At approximately 1600, the enemy attacked my platoon at Hill 1458. An extreme amount of effective small arms fire hit Wildcat Platoon from three sides, RPGs targeted the 60-mm mortar position, and we took serious casualties within the first moments of the firefight. We had to evacuate PFC Nathaniel Sharpe and SGT Beachnaw; SGT Beachnaw died after arriving at the CCP. We were in heavy contact until nightfall, at which time we were able to extract. Although the enemy hit our position heavily, we were able to ensure that 1st Platoon was able to conduct the decisive operation without interference.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Jamison Pereira, who served as the Scout Platoon Leader for the 2^d Battalion, 503^d Infantry (ABN). CPT Pereira's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: On 13 January 2010, CPT Pereira and his platoon were tasked with securing Hilltop 1458 to prevent the enemy from massing on the platoon conducting the decisive operation from the north. Although Hilltop 1458 was not as tall as the surrounding mountains and ridgelines, it provided excellent observation of enemy avenues of approach and allowed CPT Pereira's platoon to cover the decisive operation with their weapon systems. By applying the key conclusions of Step 2 of IPB, *Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations*, CPT Pereira identified the hilltop as the piece of terrain best suited to achieve his platoon's purpose.

According to FM 3-55, *Information Collection*, "knowledge is the precursor to effective action." Throughout Operation Blacksheep Sweep, CPT Pereira and his unit effectively synchronized and integrated assets in direct support of their operation. This use of information collection allowed the platoon to identify enemy combatants moving towards their position and provided the platoon with time to improve their defenses before the impending attack.

Shaping operations "create and preserve conditions for the success of decisive operations." Although CPT Pereira and his platoon paid a dear price when the enemy finally attacked, their initial application of IPB and

incorporation of information collection prevented the enemy from impairing their effectiveness and allowed CPT Pereira and his platoon to set the conditions for the platoon conducting the decisive operation to conduct its mission without interference.

CONCLUSION: As an enduring principle, Security is necessary in all military operations—from perimeter defense, to route clearance, to ensuring operations can move unimpeded to conduct the decisive operation. These vignettes illustrate that relentless training ensures security becomes second nature, no matter the situation.

CHAPTER 13

Counterinsurgency Operations

In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything. If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the population, you will win. If you are reacting to the enemy—even if you are killing or capturing him in large numbers—then he is controlling the environment and you will eventually lose. In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets you unexpectedly, and withdraws too fast for you to react. Do not be drawn into purely reactive operations: focus on the population, build your own solution, further your game plan, and fight the enemy only when he gets in the way. This gains and keeps the initiative.

— Kilcullen
28 Articles of
Company-level Counterinsurgency

INTRODUCTION: In the introduction of our COIN manual, FM 3-24.2, the writers tell us that to successfully overcome an insurgency, we must get in front of events. In our previous experiences—in Vietnam and elsewhere—we have become involved in the later stages of insurgency. “The Army has seen itself as defeating guerrilla forces—usually communist forces—rather than defeating an entire insurgency. It saw success as something it could achieve by using the force of arms directly against guerrilla forces.” Our hard-fought experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown us that it is necessary to combat the problem earlier and with much thought and analysis.

The 2-7 Marines deployed in January 2007 to the area immediately west of Fallujah, Iraq. The major population center in Fox Company’s AO was Saqlawiyah. Enemy sniper fire made dismounted patrols impractical at this time, and after losing a lance corporal to sniper fire, 2-7 Marines’ Commander decided to lock down the small city center. He then tasked 3^d Platoon, Fox Company, to establish a blocking position at a location known as Go Army Bridge. The Platoon Commander used his 2^d Squad to occupy an old British guard post that had been erected in the 1920’s. Reports of possible VBIED construction led him to attempt to better reinforce and protect this position.

I directed 2^d Squad to occupy positions slightly farther away from Go Army Bridge, on the north side of the duplex, after nightfall on 09 April 2007, while we waited for the old British fort to be reinforced. At sunset, prior to displacement of the Marines, a suicide driver drove a 500-lb truck-bomb into a 7-ton truck and injured five of the thirteen Marines in the position, including the squad leader.

I was in my room at FOB Riviera when the blast occurred, having just returned from making a daily inspection of my three squad-sized positions and getting ready to get some sleep before assuming the duties as Company Watch Officer. Even at a distance of several kilometers, the blast shook FOB Riviera and knocked sand from the walls. The first radio transmission was from LCpl Eric Lindeman, 2^d Squad's Radio Operator, who stated the squad had "sustained multiple casualties" and to "stand-by for further assessment." Maj G. Donald Hasseltine released the quick reaction force, and I hopped into one of the free seats in its convoy for the five-minute drive to Go Army Bridge.

After evacuating the casualties by helicopter from FOB Riviera, Maj Hasseltine came to my position and joined me on the rooftop to give me the necessary pep-talk. In 24 hours, one of my Marines was dead and five more were wounded. True to his style, Maj Hasseltine reassured me and the Marines that had we *not* been doing the right thing, the consequences would have been worse and that he had already requested additional engineer assets to further reinforce the position. The 2^d Squad remained at Go Army Bridge with a section from the mobile assault platoon as reinforcements.

Alert and on edge, 1st Squad remained at the downtown Iraqi Police (IP) station, 2^d Squad remained at Go Army Bridge, and 3^d Squad continued to rotate Marines to Checkpoint 286 every two to three days. At dusk on 19 April 2007, a complex attack struck Guard Post One at the IP station, which enabled a suicide bomber to drive a 1,000-lb truck-bomb into the city center and detonate at the far end of the IP station entry control point. The overpressure in the IP station caused us to evacuate four Marines for concussions. LCpl Wesley Frossard was manning Guard Post One, 25 meters from the explosion, and all six-inch by six-inch beams, at the four corners of his post, were shortened in height by about 18 inches, making it impossible to stand up in his former post. Additionally, pieces of the dump truck, ranging in size from baseball-sized to volleyball-sized chunks of

metal, were strewn about him. To everyone's amazement LCpl Frossard had no concussion, and his physical injuries were limited to some small scrapes.

By sunrise, 20 April 2007, a squad of Marine combat engineers had rebuilt Guard Post One, and Sgt Walker's Marines of 3^d Squad continued to stand guard on the rooftop of the IP station. Heavy equipment and generator lights were brought into the city center, and the clean-up operation continued around the clock as the city center was once again closed to traffic.

After the blast at the IP station, the battalion commander and sergeant major made another visit and pushed paint and reconstruction assets our way. There are differing opinions on the purpose of the paint and cleaning efforts directed by the battalion commander and sergeant major. I tend to view them favorably because they forced us to get the place looking clean and habitable after a massive attack, while also sending a message to the local Iraqis that an attack like that does not impact on us or our mission.

One day later, on the afternoon of 21 April 2012, while I was sitting in the IP station with Sgt Walker, an oversized dump truck drove underneath Checkpoint 286 and detonated with an estimated 2,000 lbs of explosives. Immediately, Sgt Walker and I believed everyone on Checkpoint 286 was dead. The company quick reaction force and all available cargo vehicles rushed to the site of the explosion, and all eight Marines were found alive but were urgent casualties. They were pulled from the rubble, triaged at FOB Riviera, and evacuated by helicopter to a trauma facility at an air base. During the evacuation, the recovery team came under precision-fire from the north side of MSR Mobile, and one Marine was shot through the thigh before the small-arms engagement ended.

Ironically, these three attacks had a positive effect on our relationship with the Iraqi civilians and resulted in their improved cooperation with our efforts. At the Go Army Bridge attack, Marines were credited with providing first aid to injured Iraqis before treating other Marines. At the IP station attack, we quickly cleared the city center and treated injured Iraqis. After the attack at CP 286, our company restocked the local medical clinics with supplies and evacuated injured Iraqis for treatment they could not receive in town. In his daily situation report from 25 April 2007, Maj Hasseltine wrote, "Local atmospherics are moving very pro-CF after the SVBIED attacks on the IP station and CP 286. Locals have

stated they have suffered and seen us suffer, and after the attacks have seen only the Marines and IPs trying to help Saqlawiyah.”

From the personal experience monograph written by Capt Douglas Ferreira, who commanded 3^d Platoon, Fox Company, 2-7 Marines. Capt Ferreira's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia

DISCUSSION: “In small wars caution must be exercised, and instead of striving to generate the maximum power with the forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population. Small wars involve a wide range of activities including diplomacy, contacts with the civil population, and warfare of the most difficult kind.” (*Small Wars Manual*, United States Marine Corps, 1940) In a counterinsurgency environment, one must never lose sight of the over arching need to transition to sustainable political solutions rather than achieve simple tactical gains. It is very easy to envision a scenario in which the Marines of 2-7 would isolate themselves from the population, identifying them as enemy supporters and refusing them medical care. This is all in line with the goals of an insurgent force: usurp the role of security forces and drive a wedge between them and the people. Generally, in a conflict, it is not a question of *if* something will go wrong, but mostly *when* and, most importantly, *how* will the team react to it.

Capt Ferreira's Marines' actions to help the injured Iraqi countered what the insurgent forces had intended, to drive a wedge between the Marines of 2-7 and the people they were tasked with securing. Ultimately, the actions of 2-7 Marines adversely affected a critical support zone for the enemy and set conditions to target insurgent forces without them receiving support from the population in the form of manpower and material.

On 12 July, 2009, 1st Battalion, 32^d Infantry, 10th Mountain, (TF Chosin) conducted an air assault into the village of Barge Matal in the summer of 2009. Alpha Company had seized Barge Matal but was fighting off insurgent counter attacks, and Afghan National Security Forces refused to hold the village unless an ISAF presence remained with them. TF Chosin remained in daily contact with enemy forces, with firefights often lasting between two to three hours, while, at the same time, searching for ways to hand over security to the local

Afghans. Maintaining daily combat operations in Barge Matal, while trying to secure other areas of the AO, was not sustainable.

During the rare lulls in fire, COL Mark O'Donnell, TF CDR, through *Shuras* with the village and provincial leaders, hammered out a solution that would allow the local populace, along with the ANSF, to retain control of Barge Matal; appease the skittish ANSF commanders; and allow TF Chosin to resume combat operations in our own AO in Kunar Province. The lynchpin to this solution would be to train what would later be called community-based security (CBS). There were no weapons to be had, no communication equipment, nor uniforms; there was no way to pay the force, and it was nearly impossible to resupply in an air-only AO. Finally, all training would have to take place on a two-way range inside a typical Afghan "fishbowl" (commanding high ground on all sides, with narrow exits to the north and south).

The CBS concept isn't new—it's been practiced in the Pashtun Belt (predominantly Pashtun areas in eastern Afghanistan) for centuries. Most Pashtun communities are situated in mountainous, remote areas and are governed by the local village and tribal elders. Hence, CBS forces, or *Arbakai*, as they're traditionally known in Afghanistan, are stood up by each individual hamlet and not by the central government. The first known centrally-sponsored *Arbakai* was stood up in Kunar Province by the provincial governor, Fazlullah. Traditional decentralized *Arbakai* and the government-sponsored organizations operate on the same basic precepts: they're charged with implementing the *Jirga's* (a decision-making body) decisions; maintaining law and order; and protecting the borders of the tribe or community. COL O'Donnell used the Anbar tribal engagement strategy model as a base system of precepts for Barge Matal CBS to provide a lasting solution to the security problem. Though many precedents exist for this type of strategy, it was really the only viable option that was available and was generated as a result of COL O'Donnell, CSM Jimmy Carabello, MAJ Scott Horrigan, CPT Charles Schaefer, and me simply sitting down in the courtyard of the girl's school in Barge Matal and discussing the matter.

CPT Schaefer and I formalized the training in a memorandum of instruction, accompanied by a sketch of the training sites and ranges, a resource list, and a rough timeline. COL O'Donnell and MAJ Horrigan reviewed and approved the document and called a *Shura* during which the local elders and ANSF commanders inducted the new volunteers into the

force and issued uniforms. After the induction ceremony, CPT Schaefer began training the CBS force, while I rotated back to FOB Joyce in Kunar Province to continue operations there.

CPT Schaefer, along with two squads of 4-4's MP platoon, led by SFC Graves, began with simple drill and ceremony training to instill discipline in the brand-new force. CPT Schaefer, with help from the local elders, helped choose platoon and squad leaders. The new recruits did not have issued weapons yet, but a few brought their own AKs to the induction. The next hurdle was to issue weapons and ammo to the force and establish a tracking system for personnel management, to include pay. Nuristan Provincial Reconstruction Team assisted us with payroll issues by handling all of the required paperwork to procure cash for payday.

After a short break, I rotated from FOB Joyce back to Barge Matal, and after a RIP with CPT Schaefer, picked up where he left off. I began by entering the individual recruits into the BATS/HIDE (biometrics system) and issuing ID cards to them. The CBS force then transitioned to flat range instruction, establishing the baseline for their AK-47 marksmanship. The first series of flat ranges went without incident and were uncomplicated by contact with AAF. As the CBS activity was becoming more apparent, though, AAF countered our training regimen by placing a sniper team on the high ground surrounding Barge Matal. Any movement through the village would draw contact from the AAF positions on the surrounding high ground, inevitably turning our training into a live-fire exercise and making it difficult to get a good grasp on the basics. Our solution was to do our crawl and walk phase, as well as any dry-fire training and instruction, in an alley and courtyard that was mostly covered and concealed from likely AAF positions. Transitioning from the basics to crew-served weapon operation and RPG ranges, the CBS force gained proficiency with more casualty-producing weapons but also drew more AAF fire. The AAF fighters were especially determined to prevent RPG training, engaging individual CBS members from over 800 meters before the CBS members even had a chance to move from their houses to the training site.

The CBS force was formed from men who had a vested interest in securing Barge Matal—they would be securing their own families. We couldn't blame the ANSF for not wanting to stick around Barge Matal; some of them hadn't been paid in over seven months, and they weren't local to the area, violating any Afghan's chain of allegiance—family, village, clan.

What we learned in Barge Matal was that a properly resourced and motivated *indigenous*, in the full sense of the word, force could provide security in its own village.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Serge Glushenko, who served as the Battle Captain, TF Chosin, for the Barge Matal TAC. CPT Glushenko's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: "Insurgents rely heavily on the support of local residents for their ability to endure and succeed. Local inhabitants provide food, shelter, volunteers, money, and intelligence without which the insurgents would be unable to carry out their operations." (*Manual 208, Iraqi Counterinsurgency Warfare.*) Insurgents cannot operate without the support from the local population. The community-based security; Village Stability Platforms; and, most recently, the District Stability Platforms have all worked hard to establish the local based security forces. As CPT Glushenko discussed, the Afghan tribal mindset is family, village, tribe; the majority of the ANSF are stationed away from their homes and, therefore, fall outside their direct tribal mindset. By having the local villagers establish their own security forces and training, equipping, and paying them, Coalition forces have been able to begin to separate the insurgents from their primary power base which is the population.

The locals will tolerate the insurgents targeting ANSF and Coalition forces but their homes home. The more that the insurgents attacked the CBS, the more the population turned against the insurgents. The focus came through Afghan Jirgas and had the support of the Afghan government in Kunar Province. This further promoted a stable and secure government working for the people of Kunar and isolated the insurgents even more. The goal in any COIN operation is to promote a stable and secure government so as to deny the enemy the powerbase that they need—the population.

In the spring of 2011, the 1st SBCT, 25th Infantry Division, deployed to RC-South. One platoon's COP was in a rural area with no major population centers and where basic essential services did not exist. The local villagers did not trust the government or security forces, and local leaders held more legitimacy than did official or political leaders. Taliban forces had complete freedom of maneuver.

Over the next two months, our platoon attempted to establish the Afghan National Security Forces and the local leadership of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in the areas that had been neglected by the previous unit. We attempted to promote programs, such as the reintegration of Taliban fighters and the establishment of Afghan Local Police (ALP). At this time, both programs were highly touted by CF leadership as a way to increase responsibility and accountability of government, military, and local leaders with the ultimate goal of transitioning complete control of districts to Afghan control. In the first two months, we conducted four Shuras attended by tribal, religious, government, ANSF, and coalition leadership, with varying levels of attendance and success.

The COP was attacked approximately four times in the first two months I was there; these attacks generally consisted of an initial volley of three to four indirect rounds, followed by engagement by automatic machine gun fire. The Soldiers of the platoon performed very well in these firefights, a testament to the platoon sergeant's strong leadership and his emphasis on training and physical fitness in the year leading up to the deployment. However, the recent destruction of two buildings on the COP by 82-mm recoilless rifle fire, in conjunction with HUMINT, suggested that a Chechen recoilless rifle expert had entered the area and was training local fighters in its employment.

Despite this setback, I was extremely optimistic about the fate of the district at this point, and it was undeniable that we were regaining ground and making progress in this hotly contested district. The biggest indicator of our progress was that we had won the favor of an elder who was arguably the most influential man in the district, despite the ineptitude of the local GIROA leadership. The district governor, really the only representation of the GIROA in the district, had alienated the populace by his incompetence and lack of education; a local land dispute that he perpetuated had also driven people to doubt his ability to look out for the well-being of the people of the district and had exposed his selfishness.

In late July, we held a Shura at the local district center to promote CF programs, namely the Taliban reintegration efforts. After a long debate among the leadership present in the room, the powerful elder, who in all but title controlled the district, endorsed the Taliban reintegration program, which I considered a major victory and a sign that things in the district were

going in the right direction. The district was generally split among three sub-tribes of the Pashtun tribe, and being the leading member from the most powerful subtribe, this elder was the most significant power broker in the room. The district governor understood this and generally acquiesced to what the elder said, as did the other personalities in the room. Within five days of this Shura, Taliban fighters engaged the COP sporadically for approximately twelve hours—the longest engagement of the deployment.

Shortly after this twelve-hour engagement, I was alerted to the fact that the influential elder, who had supported CF/ANSF/GIRoA reintegration efforts, had been kidnapped. Whether this was in response to the battle, the Shura, or was simply a Taliban objective, we will never know. Intelligence received indicated that the elder had been taken to the far northern reaches of the district and forced to stand a trial under Sharia law by the Taliban. The details were fairly disjointed and varied greatly according to source, but the general consensus was that the Taliban found the elder guilty of working with CF/ANSF (proven via mobile phone photos presumably from the Shura in which he had agreed to support the CF/ANSF/GIRoA reintegration effort). The elder was then purportedly beaten and told by the Taliban to cease and desist all contact with CF/ANSF/GIRoA upon pain of death. Rumors surrounded this event, ranging from the elder having gone voluntarily (and had possible familial connections to Taliban leaders in the area) to the Taliban kidnapping the elder's family and threatening him with their torture and death. The elder was eventually returned to his house after roughly a month of incarceration, and he did not attend another CF/ANSF/GIRoA Shura; this event was constantly referenced by tribal leaders and essentially destroyed all potential CF/ANSF/GIRoA initiatives.

The Taliban continued this intimidation technique by kidnapping the son of another CF/ANSF/GIRoA-friendly elder in the bazaar, as the elder allegedly provided the previous unit's platoon leader with intelligence regarding Taliban activities throughout the district. The details of this kidnapping were even less clear than the first, but most involved the son being beaten and held in the north until the elder agreed to cease supporting all CF/ANSF/GIRoA efforts. The news of these kidnappings spread rapidly throughout the populace, and the damage caused by this intimidation campaign was irrevocable, nullifying the concept that ANSF/GIRoA forces

could provide security for the people, even if they could defeat the Taliban in direct combat.

The most obvious effect of the intimidation tactic was a significant decrease in attendance of elders and tribal and religious leaders at CF/ANSF/GIRoA-led shuras beginning with the two elders directly affected by the kidnappings, which sparked conversation and ultimately fear throughout the population of the district and the loss of faith in the government's ability to provide security. There was never a day that these events were not mentioned during KLEs in the myriad villages of the valley, and it was quite obvious that the kidnappings had a devastating effect in the psyche of the people. Although the people would, most likely, rather be governed by the GIRoA than harassed and intimidated by a Taliban regime, they refused to work with ANSF/GIRoA to improve the security situation due to fear of reprisals.

With dwindling numbers attending Shuras and an overall feeling of discontent for the government, we attempted to regain the initiative by working more closely with the SOF element to the south in its efforts to promote the ALP program. This program placed locals in charge of their own security, in a similar structure to the Sons of Iraq or a neighborhood watch, and empowered elders in the village to provide a sense of safety for their community. We also increased patrols throughout the AO to increase security and the locals' perception of ANSF and to put the responsibility on ANSF leadership to do the majority of speaking to villagers during KLEs. Unfortunately, despite these efforts, fear had permeated the population.

An elder from near the SOF element's compound took up the mantle of most influential elder in the district, once again demonstrating that a non-GIRoA official received the loyalty of the people as opposed to the district governor. During all subsequent Shuras, this elder stated that he would refuse all CF/ANSF/GIRoA initiatives based on the current security situation and the kidnappings that had taken place. This sentiment was fully endorsed by all other elders present; CF leadership countered these arguments with promises of training, weapons, and radios in return for two to three able-bodied males per village to act as ALP members. What generally occurred from this point onward was a constant circular dispute with CF/ANSF/GIRoA arguing that, with the advent of the ALP, security would increase, and the elders stating that security would never be increased without help from outside the district as they would not commit men from

their villages. This completely negated the concept of local ALP and essentially consisted of the elders asking for additional security without putting anything at stake.

The last seven months of the deployment can be summarized as such: the refusal of elders to support ANSF/GIRoA/CF initiatives resulted in the transition of the district to complete Afghan control and the withdrawal of CF.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Charles Timm, who served as the platoon leader at this COP. CPT Timm's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: The FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, reminds us that United States involvement in counterinsurgency operations normally comes with insurgencies which are not going to be defeated quickly. Counterinsurgency operations inherently “demand considerable expenditures of time and resources” and the population “must have confidence in the staying power” of the government. During his deployment to RC-South, CPT Timm and his platoon faced the daunting task of legitimizing the government and security forces with the help of influential local leaders. Taliban forces continually undermined their efforts with acts of intimidation against the very leaders on whom CPT Timm and his platoon were relying.

Current counterinsurgency doctrine identifies two approaches to dealing with an insurgent force: direct and indirect. The direct approach is typically resource intensive and manifests itself in the shape-clear-hold-build-transition operational framework. It is important to note that the phases of the operation are not mutually exclusive; they represent a general progression of the operation. The indirect approach attempts to counter an insurgency through the use of “host-nation institutions or with groups in the society.” Over the course of their deployment, it seems that CPT Timm and his platoon were focused on the build and transition phases, attempting to connect inhabitants to the ANSF and the GIRoA. Unfortunately, conditions had not been properly set during the shape and clear phases.

According to current doctrine on the conduct of operations in an urban environment, one of the fundamentals of urban operations is “separate noncombatants from combatants.” (FM 3-06, *Urban Operations*) FM 3-24

expounds on that concept by stating that “identifying who is an insurgent and who is not, and then applying resources to separate insurgents from the population,” allows commanders to “focus their efforts on making the insurgency feel isolated.” Stabilizing the security situation and building confidence in the ANSF and the GIRoA were critical to isolating the insurgency from the population and were consequently the biggest challenges that CPT Timm and his platoon faced. Keeping in mind the phases of the direct approach to countering an insurgency are not mutually exclusive, CPT Timm and his platoon could have worked with their ANSF counterparts under the rule of law to identify the insurgents and separate them from the population. Unfortunately, as FM 3-24 recognizes, stabilizing the security situation “is an extremely difficult task that may take an extended period to complete.”

CONCLUSION: Our forces’ experience with counterinsurgencies makes it clear that intensive analysis of the area is necessary. Leaders must understand the elements that are driving stability and instability to develop successful strategies to return the area to peace and prosperity. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan make it clear that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to COIN.

CHAPTER 14

Inform and Influence Activities

“There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind.”

— Napoleon Bonaparte

INTRODUCTION: Historically, very senior staff officers were responsible for Inform and Influence Activities. With the formation of the BCTs, these capabilities were pushed to the brigade levels and, in some cases, below. This function can range from the very formal script that the battalion commander uses to address local nationals during weekly television programs, to printed fliers and billboards advertising tip-sharing websites, to the platoon leader who realizes he must get in front of an event by quickly seeking out the local district chief to provide facts concerning the event. Particularly in COIN operations, in which the decisive point is winning over the civilian population, this capability will be critical.

The 1-506th Infantry, TF Red Currahee, deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom VIII-IX. In March 2008, the 4th Platoon, D Company, was assigned to lead a patrol into the Jalrez Valley. The unit’s mission was to conduct a mounted reconnaissance into the valley to identify a good position for a platoon-sized combat outpost with a possible follow-on mission of meeting with the province’s governor.

The proposed COP site was co-located with a local Afghan National Police station (ANP) about 20 kilometers into the valley. This proposed location was ideal because it would allow us not only to achieve the primary task of conducting a screen, but also to build solid relationships with the local ANP and population. Following a KLE between my Battalion Commander, LTC Anthony DeMartino, and the ANP Chief of the District, LTC DeMartino and my company commander discussed the possibility of moving further into the valley to meet with the local governor. They agreed it was tactically sound to push on; the only asset we would lose was artillery indirect fire, which we would substitute with our organizational 60-mm mortars. We would be conducting a mounted patrol deep into the valley, further than any U.S. element had gone since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom.

My platoon was the lead U.S. element but was third in the order of movement; a French Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) with an Afghan Army unit would take the lead. Once the Afghans initiated movement, I knew we had a problem; they were moving at a snail's pace, making it very easy to accurately target our mounted patrol. I tried to contact the OMLT leader but could not because the French had activated their anti-IED system, blocking all communication to their radio. My element could not pass the Afghans because of the narrow road, so we had to continue at this slow pace.

One hour into the patrol, as we were nearing our objective, the convoy rounded a turn, and the enemy initiated their ambush from a compound on the north side of the road. The enemy destroyed the lead ANA truck with an RPG and then massed small arms fire from the compound and indirect fire from the ridgeline to the north. Immediately upon contact, the ANA soldiers dismounted and scattered, making it impossible for me to coordinate my platoon's fire. Furthermore, the destroyed Afghan truck blocked movement out of the kill zone. Once my commander moved to my position, he met with the OMLT leader to urge him to organize the Afghan soldiers and ordered me to take a dismounted patrol to the compound from where we were receiving fire.

Under heavy suppressive fire from the truck's gunners, I initiated bounding overwatch movement toward the compound. There were approximately five compounds between the enemy and us. One squad provided overwatch while another cleared a compound close to our objective. Before we could continue movement to our objective, however, the convoy came under attack from a third location. At this point, we developed a defensive plan in the compound we occupied as we could overwatch our target location from there.

The Joint Fire Controller, who was located with my Battalion Commander, began to integrate fixed-wing assets. He relentlessly suppressed the enemy and broke their will to continue the fight, but collateral damage was heavy. After my element reconsolidated with the mounted element and all of our friendly personnel were accounted for, we withdrew the force back to our FOB.

Later we received information from the ANP that the enemy was spreading lies about the events that happened that day. The enemy told residents that we came into the area to destroy homes, attack Afghan

citizens, and kill Muslims. We should have stayed longer and let the residents in the area know that we were attacked and were not the aggressor.

This battle changed our Task Force tactics for all engagements to follow. In the future, from the call of troops in contact, our battalion would stay on the objective overnight with the ANA or ANP, so the next morning they could tell local residents the truth about the events that happened the day before. We would have the ANA or ANP hand out humanitarian aid, hold a meeting with the elders of the village, and let the elders know that we were attacked. The ANA or ANP would also explain to the locals that the enemy that attacked us was the same enemy that was harassing and intimidating them and that the U.S. forces were sent here by the freely elected government of Afghanistan to help protect its citizens. We used the ANA or ANP to spread the word so the Afghan citizens would see an Afghan face solving and Afghan problem.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Earl Hilliard, who served as the Platoon Leader for 4th Platoon, D Company, 1-506th Infantry. CPT Hilliard's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: The contemporary Operating Environment often dictates that U.S. forces operate in and around the local populace. The perceptions and beliefs of the local populace can either greatly enhance or hinder the ability of U.S. forces to achieve their stated goals. Because of this, Inform and Influence Activities (IIA) must be integrated into all aspects of Unified Land Operations, to include offense, defense, and stability tasks. Successful IIA engagements can be hasty or deliberate or planned or spontaneous. CPT Hilliard's monograph illustrates an excellent example of an Infantry battalion integrating a deliberate IIA engagement plan into its Standard Operating Procedure for actions following contact with the enemy.

On 29 April 2007, a MiTT, along with a contingent of Afghan Border Police (ABP) and an ODA team, conducted a mission to secure the Maruf district center and clear the village of Baz Mohammad Kalay and its surrounding villages of Taliban personnel and equipment. The purpose of the operation was to disrupt Taliban supply lines and prevent the massing of combat power against coalition forces in Kandahar and Zabul Provinces.

En route to our objectives, we moved to a security position on the high ground for the morning and began to push east towards the valley in the afternoon so that we could use the cover of darkness as we entered the valley. We reached the western corridor of the valley around dusk, and immediately, one of the operators began to pick up radio transmissions from a Taliban commander that an American convoy was entering the valley. More alarming was an unidentified second transmission of an Afghan reporting on the size, strength, and location of our convoy as we moved east. We knew from a signal intercept that the source was either within or very close to our convoy.

Shortly after the radio traffic began, we conducted a security halt to send a small detachment of ABP forward to make contact with the enemy so that we could destroy the enemy with CAS or crew-served weapons. After the detachment moved out, a small, four-vehicle convoy approached our perimeter from the south. I moved to the edge of the hill overlooking the convoy and, through the interpreter, told the drivers that they should stay in place and not follow our convoy, or they would be shot.

A short time later, after the ABP element failed to make contact, we moved on toward the district center, and 30 minutes later, we were approached by the same convoy, and this time, the signal intercept team determined that the source who was reporting on our position was in the approaching vehicles. When the enemy convoy was in range of my truck, my team leader gave the order to disable the enemy trucks with small arms fire. Simultaneously, while believing the people in this convoy were guilty of reporting our positions to the Taliban, the fact that they had been previously warned not to approach our positions, and that it seemed that they were moving to attack our convoy, the ODA commander gave the order to destroy the enemy convoy over his team's radio net. I could not hear this transmission because I only had one radio in my truck, which was on my MiTT frequency, and in the heat of the moment, my team leader did not relay this message on the MiTT net.

In a matter of seconds, an ODA ground mobility vehicle roared up on my 3 o'clock flank and destroyed the convoy with .50 caliber and M240B machine gun fire. The .50 caliber rounds caught the vehicles on fire, and then, in the next second, a van within the convoy exploded in a gigantic mushroom cloud of bright magnesium-like sparkles, much like the flash explosives make when contacting metal. We determined this to be

improvised explosive material, and due to the secondary explosions coming from the enemy vehicle convoy, which, we believed, were also from military-grade explosives, the ODA commander decided to continue the mission and not conduct a thorough SSE.

The next day, we moved into the district center. There was no organized resistance, so we moved into a security position around the district center and began priorities of work. The following day, we learned that the Taliban had exploited the engagement with the convoy and reported to the citizens that we killed 14 old men and children. This hindered our operations because now the local populace was convinced that we were evil and that we would not help them. However, we were able to counter this initial report by involving the governor of Kandahar Province and sending ABP elements to conduct a thorough SSE of the engagement site. Upon their return, they reported that they found several AK-47 rifles and that all the casualties were military-aged males. Furthermore, approximately two days later, the ABP went throughout the villages to tell people what really happened during the engagement.

The U.S. forces countered the anti-American propaganda, as well, by conducting medical civic action program operations. Over the course of the next three days, we treated 400 Afghan men, women, and children, and collected the biometric data for all the military-aged males. This operation was a huge success in that the people were happy with our efforts. The people saw that we were here to help and not to kill innocent people.

From a personal experience monograph written by CPT Matthew McDonald, who deployed as a senior Infantry advisor on a MiTT. CPT McDonald's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: Threat forces, particularly non-state actors, operating in proximity to the population and drawing support from the population, will almost certainly attempt to manipulate the will of the population against U.S. forces. Often, an idea or message can prove more powerful than a weapon. CPT McDonald's monograph illustrates the enemy's use of IIA to exploit an engagement which he had clearly lost. It also illustrates the value of a deliberate IIA engagement plan, particularly one executed with host-nation forces in the lead.

In late May of 2009, an insurgent force of approximately 70 men attacked 3^d Platoon, C Company, 1-40 Cavalry, at Patrol Base Devoe in Paktia Province, Afghanistan. 1st Platoon, C Company, 1-40th CAV, serving as the QRF, conducted a counterattack on the withdrawing insurgent force and, together with 3^d Platoon, destroyed a significant number of the enemy with the assistance of attack aviation and fixed-wing assets.

While the recovery process was occurring, I took a team to conduct a BDA of the 500-lb JDAM impact site. The site was 700 horizontal meters from our position; however it was a difficult 1,000-foot climb to the impact spot on a high spur. The damage at the site was significant with considerable shrapnel 100 meters from the point of impact. There was a burnt AK 47 four meters up in a tree, a destroyed RPG launcher, and the remains of one combatant.

We completed SSE and collection of equipment and bodies, and by the time we returned from the patrol at approximately 0830L, we were dead tired. We had gone from an intense mission cycle, to a high stress QRF mission, to 100% security through the night, and finally to a tedious and somewhat disturbing exploitation. Despite this, there was still one critical task to conduct: we would move to the nearby village, Suri Kheyl to conduct a KLE with the village elders. The 1-40 CAV called it the sixty-minute inform and influence battle drill; it was also called consequence management. The concept was to discuss the truth of what occurred during a significant event to the local population very soon after the event had culminated. This built trust with the population and prevented the Taliban from negatively “spinning” an event and using it as propaganda.

The level of activity in Suri Kheyl was surprisingly normal. I located one of the village elders with whom I frequently interacted. I described to him in specific terms what occurred and explained why we engaged the enemy near their village. I illustrated the care we took to limit collateral damage. Then I explained in detail the plan for the enemy remains—namely that they would be turned over to the district government to receive a proper burial in accordance with Islamic tradition. The elder spoke words of gratitude for killing Taliban, but his demeanor was uneasy, and his face was very neutral. This was illustrative of the complicated relationship Suri Kheyl had with the Taliban. They certainly didn’t provide unequivocal support to the Taliban; rather, they were woven into a web of

tacit agreement and small compromises. These measures were a mode of survival—a result of being in an isolated valley far from government support. I was content that the village remained neutral throughout the fight and received my message well.

Following the Patrol Base Devoe counterattack and the ensuing KLEs, insurgent forces in C Troop's AO were unable or unwilling to mass combat power for a large scale attack. This action, in conjunction with other operations, had significantly attrited insurgent forces, limiting their manpower for large scale operations. Further, the enemy was psychologically deterred by our ability to decisively react to their large scale operations. Finally, I assessed that the insurgents lost significant popular support after the Patrol Base Devoe attack. The Suri Kheyl elders were aware of our effort to limit damage to their population and infrastructure. They also observed that the Afghan government's ability to protect them expanded, as ANA was highly integrated into our operation.

We also achieved a popular victory by allowing the District Sub Governor and the Afghan National Police to bury the deceased insurgents according to Islamic tradition. This further legitimized the Afghan government and showed that our forces were culturally sensitive.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Ryan Swisher, who served as the Platoon Leader of 1st Platoon, C Company, 1-40th CAV, of 4-25 ID. CPT Swisher's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: The ability to understand how and when to properly Inform and Influence is critical as we are often less focused on the destruction of an adversary and more focused on how to establish conditions of peace and stability. “Inform and Influence Activities (IIA) is the integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision making.” (ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*) Synchronizing and integrating the effects of Military Information Support Operations (MISO), Public Affairs (PA), Soldier/leader engagement (S/LE), and Combat Camera (COMCAM) are the fundamental building blocks on which IIA is built.

CPT Swisher and the leadership of 1-40 CAV understood the importance of personal interactions between United States military personnel and the local population, especially after a significant direct and indirect fire engagement with the Taliban in the vicinity of a village. CPT Swisher's consistent use of S/LE allowed him to identify a local leader, with whom he had previously interacted, and conduct a deliberate engagement to inform the leader of what had just occurred and influence him to support the Government of Afghanistan or at least not support the Taliban. CPT Swisher and his Soldiers were adaptive, culturally aware, and credible during their engagement with the local leader; "Soldiers' actions powerfully influence the credibility of IIA. Visible actions coordinated with carefully chosen, credible words influence audiences more than uncoordinated or contradictory actions and words. All audiences compare the friendly force's message with its actions." (FM 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities) Their actions during the fire fight with the Taliban, treatment of enemy combatants, and the ability to rapidly inform and influence local leaders had a positive synergistic effect that only a coordinated and integrated effort can achieve.

In January 2012, a Marine combined anti-armor team (CAAT), deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The team was task organized with eight MRAP vehicles and various small arms and anti-tank missiles.

Weapons Company was tasked with expanding, occupying, and stabilizing a new ten-km addition to the southern boundary of our AO. The only unit south of our AO boundary was a light armor reconnaissance (LAR) unit which was running screening and interdiction operations along the stretch of the Helmand River that turned west and flowed into Iran. The Taliban were using the unoccupied territory between our battalion and the LAR unit as a staging area for weapons and equipment that they were moving from Pakistan to local fighters as well as those in other parts of the country.

At midnight on the 4th of January, 2010, we conducted a 12-km dismounted infiltration into the river valley which was to be our new company AO. Under the cover of darkness, we established six vehicle check points (VCP) along key terrain to seize the AO. Both the local population and the Taliban element were completely caught off guard; the Taliban hid their weapons and retrograded, dressed as civilians, south and out of our

control without firing a single shot or initiating any IEDs. We proceeded to conduct four days of a systematic clearance of the local villages, which allowed us to capture several weapons caches, local thugs, and a few of the unarmed and command wire IEDs. All reports from the locals were that the Taliban element had complete control in the area but had retreated immediately upon our arrival. This Taliban force had been implementing a 2000 curfew of all locals which had greatly affected their ability to farm at night. When we allowed the farmers to move about freely at night, we instantly began a positive relationship with them.

On 12 January 2010, a squad was conducting a reconnaissance patrol of several NAI and also confirming a suspected motorcycle trail that bypassed one of our new VCPs. The squad was concluding an investigation of its first NAI when there was a nearby explosion. Immediately, it moved to investigate and found that a civilian vehicle had been destroyed by an IED along our most heavily traveled supply route. After a short time, the locals began to crowd around and identify the victims. Once they identified the vehicle as a taxi, family members identified remnants of the driver and his passengers as being a local farmer and his young daughter who were being given a ride to the market to buy supplies. The fact that the local nationals who gathered did not blame the squad and immediately began to grieve alerted me to the fact that they understood that the Taliban were guilty of this travesty. This was also evidence of the trust we had built with our neighbors.

Once the squad left the scene of the IED, I directed it to continue on with the patrol. As the squad reached its checkpoint, the squad leader reported a large gathering of military-aged males in the desert approximately one kilometer away. The squad took a long halt to observe the unusual activity and began to report that there were many vehicles gathering in the desert, and a crowd of unarmed males was forming on a road at the edge of the desert. I dispatched another squad from the closest checkpoint to over watch and report from an elevated position. I had a section of four MRAPs and approximately 20 Marines, from another platoon which had just arrived to bring supplies, set a blocking position along the primary route to our patrol base and provide a team to reinforce the squads reporting the suspicious activity.

My platoon sergeant took control of the CP and began sending reports to battalion HQ. We soon learned that the Taliban had recently

begun an IIA campaign that had caused riots throughout southern Helmand Province. Several nights before this incident, another Marine unit had conducted a night time raid in the battalion AO, and the Taliban immediately spread propaganda that the Marines had stabbed a Koran during their search of a local national's home. This rumor had spread fast, and what we were facing was a group of young men who had gathered at a market 15 km south of our position. This market was heavily influenced by Taliban fighters who had incited anger among the local Muslim males and encouraged them to move from the bazaar to the battalion HQ. However, when they saw our squad traveling on the edge of the desert, they thought they had found an easy target. The posturing of the four MRAPs and the second squad that had come to mutually support had halted their momentum temporarily.

I departed the CP at this point with a few Marines to get on scene and, upon our arrival, integrated my security detail among the squad that was in a defensive skirmishers trench. This lull was just what we needed, and we were able to move to nearby cover and array our forces into two mutually supporting positions that could bound forward and backward. There were a few noticeable ring leaders who were inciting the crowd, one of whom carried a loud speaker.

I walked out with a small security team and translator, and the man with the loud speaker met us with a small team of his own. I tried to have him sit and talk, but he was much too excited for that. He kept yelling that the crowd was going to kill all of the Marines and destroy our bases, and I told him that it would not be a wise move to make. After about 15 minutes, the conversation was going nowhere, and we each returned to our respective sides. At this point, we had a squad of Marines on line facing a quickly growing crowd of over 500 local nationals who were very animated and growing more hostile. Vehicles kept coming and going from the crowd, and the motorcycle traffic was very active and hard to track. We watched as small groups moved to some tree groves and tried to position on our flanks. By now, my platoon sergeant at the CP had received some air assets and was watching the crowd on the feed from a pair of A-10s. I noticed that when we repositioned our forces, the crowd gained energy, and I was reluctant to move because the only direction to go was away from the crowd and closer into a village.

At this point, the energy in the crowd began to boil over as the man with the loud speaker continued to incite violence, and three times, the crowd broke, and 10-15 young men charged our squad, throwing rocks and yelling. The first time, they came within 30 meters and turned around and ran back to the crowd. The second time (several minutes later), they came within striking distance, and several Marines and I stepped forward and pushed the first few back until the line broke again and returned to the crowd. The third time, I knew I had to stop the advance before they came within physical contact of my entire squad. I walked out ten paces while holding my sidearm in the face of the man charging me. The rocks were easy to dodge as the men were trying to throw while running, but I could tell he did not fear the sidearm, and it seemed he wanted me to shoot him. I knew that once one of them fell to a gunshot, the entire crowd would break and charge, so I holstered the pistol and hit him in the face instead. As he fell, the Marines in the squad fired several warning shots, but the squad leader and I quickly stopped them. The young Afghans were pulled away by fellow Afghans, and at this point, I knew I had to move or we would be fighting the whole crowd.

As the two squads bounded back to the position with the four MRAPs, the crowd became very excited again and broke into three groups. Two large groups moved out into the village to each of our flanks, and one group remained in front of us but advanced quickly to within 500 meters. We had not seen any weapons, but many men sat ready to move on motorcycles and dirt bikes. My platoon sergeant brought the A-10s down on two very low show of force maneuvers, and I had an M2 .50 cal fire four warning shots over the crowd to our direct front. When the crowd realized the firepower they were facing, they stalled, and I took this opportunity to walk out again with a security team and attempt to reason with the ring leaders.

I knew that, at some point, the men would tire out, as they were obviously not willing to die or else they would have all charged us by now. I began a very slow, long, and cordial conversation with their ring leader. Because the group was separated into three elements, the Taliban instigators were spread out and unable to keep the energy going in the group of men. I eventually conceded to allow a small group to pass through our lines and go to the river to wash and pray since prayer time was fast approaching. Once

these leaders left the group, the rest of the crowd dissipated, slowly piled back into their vehicles and drove south to regroup.

From the personal experience monograph written by Capt Samuel Moore, who served as the platoon commander of a combined anti-armor team (CAAT), Weapons Company. Capt Moore's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: “Adversaries and enemies have proven adept at using information to gain a marked advantage over U.S. Forces. Commanders may employ information-related capabilities to mitigate this advantage and gain the upper hand in the information environment.” (FM 3-13, *Inform and Influence Activities*) Capt Moore and his platoon, while conducting operations in Helmand province, found themselves in a situation where the Taliban's IIA potentially put his platoon and the mission at risk. Capt Moore may have been unable to stop the Taliban from spreading lies through their use of IIA, but he was absolutely capable of mitigating the affects. The IIA comes from words and actions and ranges from peaceful to violent; a direct fire engagement with the Taliban is a means of influence in the most extreme way. Capt Moore's rapid thinking, and his platoon's ability to conduct dynamic engagements that positively influenced the local population, allowed the tense stand-off with Taliban instigators to diffuse.

CONCLUSION: FM 3-13, *Inform and Influence Activities*, reminds us that lessons learned at the tactical and operational levels have forced us to push many of these responsibilities to the lowest levels. “All assets and capabilities at a commander's disposal have the potential to be used to inform and influence selected audiences to varying degrees.” Winning—particularly in a COIN environment—depends on IIA.

CHAPTER 15

Personnel Recovery

Let me not mourn for the men who have died fighting, but rather let me be glad that such heroes have lived. If it be my lot to die, let me do so with courage and honor in a manner which will bring the greatest harm to the enemy, and please, oh Lord, protect and guide those I shall leave behind.

— General George S. Patton

INTRODUCTION: The Warrior Ethos directs Soldiers to always place mission first, never accept defeat, never quit, and never leave a fallen comrade. The FM 3-50, *Army Personnel Recovery*, lays out the steps to ensure we never leave that fallen comrade. While we do everything within our power to ensure physical accountability of all of our personnel, in the dispersed manner in which our units operate, personnel recovery sometimes becomes necessary.

Between May 2006 and July 2007, more than a dozen American Soldiers died in and around Qarghuli Village, Iraq. The area had been a hot-spot for insurgents due to its location and the deeply entrenched Sunni loyalty there. For several years, the AQI leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who had direct ties to Osama bin Laden, lived and operated in the area around Qarghuli Village. The area became infamous with the rape and murder of a 14 year-old girl and the murder of her family by four drunken Soldiers from B Company, 1-502, in 2006. In retribution, three months later, local insurgents killed one Soldier and kidnapped and murdered two others. Their bodies were found two days later. In September 2006, Delta Company, 4-31 relieved B Company, 1-502, and for the next seven months was the target of relentless attacks, particularly along RTE Malibu.

My company, Bayonet Company, 2-69 Armor, arrived in Iraq in March 2007 and relieved Alpha Company, 2-5 Cavalry, which had been temporarily attached to 4-31 Infantry to assist in controlling RTE Malibu.

On 12 May, Soldiers from Delta Company, 4-31, sat in two adjacent HMMWVs over watching an IED crater on RTE Malibu. At 0444, insurgents dropped grenades into the turrets of the two vehicles. SPC Alex Jimenez, PFC Byron Fouty, and PFC Joe Anzak were dragged from the

scene and loaded into vehicles. SPC James Connell, PFC Dan Courneya, SGT Anthony Scoeber, and IA interpreter, Sabah Barak, never made it out of the vehicle. PFC Chris Murphy, already gravely wounded, attempted to flee but was gunned down after becoming entangled in concertina wire. Minutes later, the Delta Company Commander called for my QRF section to assist, and within minutes, we were out the gate. Carefully moving toward the burning vehicles, due to both the potential for IEDs and the round cooking off from the vehicles, we reached the area and began to uncover signs that some of the Soldiers may have been dragged away. There were bloody drag marks leading in two directions from the burning trucks, and there were clothing and equipment which appeared to have been shed as the Soldiers were being dragged.

The CO immediately ordered a hasty search of all homes in the vicinity of the site and the collection of all males older than small children. The Soldiers from Delta Company, 4-31, took this order to heart and began kicking down doors, yelling the names of their comrades. Meanwhile, following a blood trail about 200 meters from the site, my squad leader and I discovered one of the Soldiers entangled in concertina wire face down in an irrigation ditch along RTE Malibu. We identified him as PFC Murphy.

By now, the fires in the vehicles had begun to die down enough to approach them, and we were able to get a body count. With the discovery of Murphy and the burnt remains within the vehicle, we were able to determine that at least three Soldiers were missing. The radio chatter increased exponentially as word spread of the missing men and assets began pouring to the scene. The search continued full tilt for the weeks to come with thousands of troops flooding into the area; we called this the “Qarghuli Surge.”

The Qarghuli Surge marked the beginning to the end for AQI and other insurgent groups. By July 2007, the most powerful Sunni tribal leaders declared war on AQI, and a delicate partnership was forged between Coalition forces and the Sons of Iraq (SOI). In late July, the SOI and the IA took back Qarghuli after heavy fighting; for 48 hours, my platoon worked independently of my company, holding a bridge across which the IA and SOI were to bring their wounded. After the IA and SOI declared victory, the 4-4-6 IA came to relieve us.

I was uneasy about leaving Qarghuli when it was time to leave. More than two months had passed since the abduction of the Delta Company

Soldiers, and still no bodies had been found. The AQI had released a video stating the Soldiers had been killed and their bodies would never be returned.

On 11 October, the SOI led Soldiers from 2-14th IN, 10th Mountain, to a weapons cache in our new company battlespace. Buried in a spider hole, wrapped in plastic, were the weapons of the missing Delta Company Soldiers. The cache was behind the home of a known AQI member who had been absent from the area for months. By this time, the Soldiers had been missing for five months. We had probably patrolled past the spot where the weapons were found dozens of times, and without the help of the SOI and tribal leaders, they may never have been found. Search operations intensified for the next few days, but that was as close as our unit ever came to locating the missing Soldiers.

I was driving my truck down a country road in July 2008 when I heard the news bulletin on the radio that the remains of SPC Jimenez and PFC Fouty had been found. I pulled to a stop off the road and took a somber moment to pay my respects to a higher power for allowing those men to finally come home.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Tad Reed, who served as the Platoon Leader for Third Platoon, Bayonet Company, 2-69 Armor. CPT Reed's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: FM 3-50, *Army Personnel Recovery*, defines Army personnel recovery as “military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.” While Army training focuses largely on preventing personnel from becoming isolated, doctrine also recognizes that executing personnel recovery is a mission, throughout which the commander must use the operations process to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess.

Rapid assessment of the situation and quick action by the commander are often key to successful personnel recovery. Personnel recovery tasks include *report* (the isolating event), *locate* (find the isolated personnel), *support* (isolated personnel and their family throughout isolation), *recover* (extraction of isolated personnel), and *reintegrate*. In this vignette, the commander and Soldiers of Delta Company, 4-31 Infantry, appropriately and immediately responded to an incident by moving to the

site to establish accountability. Their subsequent and timely *reporting* of the isolating event initiated the personnel recovery process, focusing higher commands and adjacent forces on massing search efforts to locate the isolated personnel. Per FM 3-50, the locate task must be accomplished by “every appropriate means”; Delta Company’s use of physical clues, such as following drag marks, to build intelligence; integration of the Sons of Iraq in its search efforts; and immediate cordon and search operations are consistent with the execution tenets of personnel recovery.

Although this vignette concludes with the tragic loss of life, American forces remain committed to returning all Soldiers home with honor. Throughout personnel recovery, individuals involved must use doctrine, their own standard operating procedures, and all available assets while remaining grounded by the Soldier’s Creed: never accept defeat, never quit, and never leave a fallen comrade behind.

At approximately 0430 on 12 May 2007, a well-organized group of insurgents conducted an attack on a U.S. patrol that was securing a damaged road in a small rural village southeast of Baghdad. The insurgents killed five U.S. Soldiers and captured three U.S. Soldiers. The Soldiers were members of Delta Company, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment. The 2^d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment’s battlespace was directly north of this area.

My company, Alpha, 2-14, lived in a company-sized patrol base in the abandoned Yusifiyah Thermal Power Plant along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. Our area of operations consisted of three small villages surrounded by rural farmland and thick palm groves. We had been conducting counterinsurgency operations in the area since October 2006. We had created diverse intelligence networks in the village to the north, Abu Faris, and the village to the east, Mufarji, but had been unable to stimulate more than occasional low-level intelligence in the village to the south, Qarghuli. Violence had decreased against locals and U.S. forces had decreased over the past year, but we still faced a determined enemy.

At around 0440 on 12 May, a frantic Soldier woke me. I had only been asleep for an hour or so after monitoring the progress of 3^d Squad, 3^d Platoon, which was conducting operations in the palm groves south of our company patrol base. I hurried to the TOC where my Soldiers told me that there had been an insurgent attack along Route Malibu in Qarghuli Village. A patrol from Delta Company, 4-31 Infantry, had been attacked as it was

securing an IED crater that had yet to be repaired. The patrol could not be reached by radio, and Delta Company was sending an element to the site. Unmanned Aerial Surveillance (UAS) arrived at the site, and the video feed showed multiple burning vehicles. Our battalion TOC then informed us that there were as many as eight Soldiers missing.

The attack on the Delta Company patrol occurred on a narrow asphalt road that runs parallel to the Euphrates River. The road is elevated one to three meters above the farmland and houses on both sides and stretches six kilometers from the Yusifiyah Power Plant, at the northern end, to the Jurf al-Sakhar area, at the southern end. The houses in Qarghuli surround the road. My company areas of operations included about one and a half kilometers of the northern end of Qarghuli Village.

I immediately ordered SFC Terrell Blackman, the 3^d Platoon's Platoon Sergeant, to move his element east to a small bridge that was one of only three vehicular exits from Qarghuli. The bridge spanned a narrow but deep canal that ran along the east side of the village. I explained the situation to him and told him to occupy a large house that sat next to the bridge and block all traffic crossing the bridge. SFC Karl Henderson, 1st Platoon's Platoon Sergeant, was also in sector with four HMMWVs conducting route security on Mulla Fayad Highway, even further to the east. There were no roads capable of supporting HMMWVs that he could take to the bridge, but he could prevent any vehicles from leaving the farm land that spanned the east side of the canal. As I was passing instructions to him, he alerted me that one of his vehicles was in pursuit of a pick-up truck off of the main highway. He and his Soldiers intercepted the vehicle, and although there was no sign of the missing Soldiers, the hands of the two occupants of the truck tested positive for explosive residue. They were detained and turned over to B/4-31, the landowning unit.

As I was gathering the rest of my platoon leadership, I received word that Delta Company had been slowed in its movement to the attack site by an IED, but it eventually bypassed it and arrived at the scene. We were next alerted that five U.S. Soldiers and an Iraqi Soldier had died in the attack, and three U.S. Soldiers were missing. I gave 1LT Tony Sanabria, the 1st Platoon Leader, and 1LT Brian Grimsley, the 3^d Platoon Leader, warning orders to clear Qarghuli Village from the northern end to the company's southern boundary. Since 4-31 owned the majority of the village, I was confident it would clear the village from south to north. The follow-on

mission was to establish a temporary patrol base in a house on our southern boundary that could be used as a company headquarters and serve as our base of operation in the village.

My company began the clearance of Qarghuli Village at approximately 0600 on 12 May. My squads, augmented with Iraqi Army squads, cleared houses to gather as much information as we could from the villagers to ensure there were no armed insurgents in the area and that the missing Soldiers were not being held in the houses north of the attack site. While 2^d Squad cleared the palm groves and houses in northern Qarghuli, 1LT Sanabria and the remainder of 2^d Platoon cleared the farmland and Mufarji Village, on the east side of the canal. The morning was hot as we moved with our heavy gear, but every single one of us knew the names of the missing Soldiers, and we knew we had to find them soon.

Neither clearance yielded any significant intelligence although numerous men were brought in for questioning. After we established the company headquarters in a house along our southern boundary, I sent 1LT Grimsley and the Iraqi Army squads to conduct a more thorough exploitation of the area we had just cleared. I took a small element with me and went to meet with the local Imam. He knew of the events that occurred earlier in the morning and had been on the phone with friends throughout the area. The general consensus was that the Soldiers were taken across the river to the village of Owesat. Although nothing was certain at this point, I believed the Imam to be correct. There had been no persistent U.S. presence on the other side of the river, and I knew the insurgents in the area frequently crossed the river with weapons and local kidnap victims. There were stories of underground bunkers and elaborate holding cells at the edge of the desert built by foreign members of AQI. I immediately alerted battalion about this new information and was told to continue searching the area while beginning to plan for an air assault operation into Owesat as soon as I could refine intelligence.

After continuing our clearance operations for another 24 hours and gathering more information, we moved back to the power plant to begin preparing for the air assault. After reviewing the intelligence we had gathered and the detailed imagery from the UAS, I concluded there were two objectives in Owesat: one was a series of houses and buildings along the border where the farmland met the village and the other was in northern Owesat where canals and dirt berms would limit movement. Both areas had

been mentioned as locations where insurgents took local kidnap victims to be beaten or killed. The air assault began at 2300 on 13 May, and, although the unit pursued several men fleeing from the area and cleared both objectives, we returned to the power plant 24 hours later disappointed.

For the next 11 days we continued almost non-stop operations in Qarghuli, Owasat, and Murfarji. We conducted numerous air assault operations based on vague intelligence passed by a large pool of informants claiming to know the whereabouts of the missing Soldiers. As the days passed, the pool became smaller and smaller as we conducted mission after mission with no concrete results. We cleared every inch of our area of operations, on foot, with bomb dogs, search dogs, and cadaver dogs. We found old weapons caches, underground jail cells used for kidnap victims, and underground bunkers, but after the first three days, we found nothing we could use. A \$200,000 reward was offered for any information leading to the Soldiers, and 150,000 leaflets were dropped over the area asking for information and urging the locals to support the search effort. On May 23, 2007, the body of one missing Soldier, PFC Joseph Anzack, was found in the Euphrates River after a tip from a fisherman. We had all hoped he would be found, and no one wanted to admit the other Soldiers might be dead as well. We never quit searching for the other Soldiers, and three Soldiers from my company were killed in the last two weeks of May 2007, searching for their comrades. Sergeant Steven Packer was killed by a dismounted IED in the Qarghuli palm groves on May 17, 2007, and Staff Sergeant Joseph Weiglein and Sergeant Richard Valiant Correa were killed by an IED along a canal in Abu Faris on May 29, 2007.

On June 4, 2008, the Islamic State of Iraq declared that the remaining two Soldiers were dead. On July 1, 2008, U.S. Special Forces Soldiers detained an insurgent cell leader who, over the course of the next week, led them to a grave in Jurf al Sakharr. On July 8, 2008, the remains of Staff Sergeant Alex Jimenez and Specialist Byron Fouty were finally found.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Dan Hurd, who commanded Alpha Company, 2-14. CPT Hurd's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: On 12 May 2007, CPT Dan Hurd immediately started taking action when his sister battalion, 2-14 IN, reported that personnel in a

convoy were unaccounted for following an attack by insurgent forces. CPT Hurd immediately started deploying his available forces. According to FM 3-50.1, *Army Personnel Recovery*, immediate actions at the lowest level must be executed quickly; “[t]he objective of immediate recovery is to locate isolated persons, keep them under direct observation of friendly forces, and recover them before the enemy understands the situation.” CPT Hurd knew his company area of operations well. The IPB, particularly Step 2,—*Describe the Environmental Effects on Operations*—focuses on determining the friendly and enemy avenues that can be used. In doing this, CPT Hurd was able to place blocking positions along probable avenues of approach. This quick thinking led to the interception of two local nationals with traces of explosives on their hands.

CPT Hurd was also able to employ host-nation forces in his search for the missing Soldiers, allowing him to cover more area with fewer U.S. troops. The Iraqis he used in the clearing operations also prevented U.S. troops from having to clear entire towns in a forceful manner, which could have been counterproductive to gains made with the population. His relationships with the local population and his actions, which did not further alienate the population, caused intelligence about his area to be revealed. Even though the missing troops were not in his area, CPT Hurd used host-nation forces correctly and leveraged relationships with local leaders.

Although not used in the Army at this time, SOPs for personnel recovery could have greatly benefited in the search for the missing Soldiers. In FM 3-50.1, these SOPs are described: “With respect to personnel recovery, a standard operating procedure (SOP) provides instructions that cover those features of personnel recovery that lend themselves to a definite or consistent application, without loss of effectiveness.” If CPT Hurd’s battalion and brigade had personnel recovery procedures and SOPs in place, a faster cordon could have been established and could have possibly recovered the Soldiers. This event in 2007 is one of the tragic events that forced Personnel Recovery SOPs throughout our Army.

D Company, TF 1-121, deployed in May 2009 to Afghanistan and had been operating in Ghazni for four months. The 1st Platoon was divided into two teams prior to deploying; one, Embedded Training Team (ETT) 1, was stationed at Combat Outpost (COP) Bande Sardeh. The rest of 1st Platoon made up a Police Mentor Team (PMT) and was stationed at the D Company Headquarters, which was located

approximately 200 kilometers north. The ETT 1 had the duty of partnering with the 4th Kandak, 3^d Brigade, 203^d Corps, meaning that this small team of only sixteen Americans would coach, teach, and mentor an entire Afghan National Army (ANA) Kandak battalion.

Our COP was a small compound, no bigger than a football field, located inside of the 4th Kandak FOB. The D Company Commander, CPT William Broach, empowered me to decide how to best fulfill our mission as long as we remained within his guidance. I had the opportunity as a platoon leader to be responsible for an entire COP, team property book, patrolling schedule, and the mentorship of an entire ANA battalion.

After only a few weeks, we learned that the enemy was both present and aggressive in our AO. The enemy was composed primarily of Taliban fighters and relied heavily on the use of direct fire weapon systems and mortars. We encountered the enemy countless times throughout our first six months, often with Soldiers from the Polish Battle Group (PBG). The PBG, TF White Eagle, was the BSO and would approve, enable, and provide QRF to all of our patrols. The closest PBG element was an Infantry company that was located at Four Corners COP, which was approximately twelve kilometers northwest of our location at COP Bande Sardeh.

In early September 2009, I engaged the Polish company commander, CPT Schizik, about an operation I had planned and requested the priority of his QRF platoon for the mission on that day. I briefed the mission and OPORD to all members of the team, and we conducted mission rehearsals the day prior to executing. The planning was successful, and I believe that the mission was widely understood and we were well-prepared.

I conducted a link-up with the Kandak Commander, Kandak S-3 officer, and the Recon Company XO at approximately 0700 on September 10th, while my squad leaders, SGTs Grant Miller, Nicolas Ashley, and Matt Hodges, led pre-PCIs alongside the ANA. I confirmed the plan with the S-3 officer, since he would be the ground commander of 40 ANA soldiers, and we mounted our vehicles. We departed the COP at approximately 0730 and began movement towards our designated route.

As we approached the west end of Shah Towri, at around 0900, I had the vehicles halt, and I maneuvered on foot to the position of the lead truck. While the vehicles were adjusting security, the enemy initiated their ambush. Machine gun fire whipped and cracked over our heads, and I ran from my covered position into a ditch from where I could best direct fires.

Over the next three hours, we were supported by an Apache team and a French Mirage, the fire died down, and the Polish QRF arrived. Because the Apache pilots reported killing at least seven insurgents, I went to the radio, reported an updated SITREP to CPT Broach, and discussed my intention to maneuver north and conduct a BDA of the enemy that we destroyed. My intentions were to seize any enemy equipment and secure the local populace, hoping to locate the village elder and meet with him. CPT Broach approved of my plan and told me that he would be standing by with a QRF if needed. I then met face-to-face with the Polish platoon leader. Because the Polish QRF had approached our position from the southwest, its entire patrol was located on the southern side of the ditch, which was not passable by its vehicles. I requested he give me a squad of dismounts to aid in our BDA. The platoon leader and ten of his soldiers dismounted their vehicles and joined my dismounted element for the BDA. This enabled us to better mass combat power as we maneuvered north.

Once consolidated and reorganized, I ordered my gun trucks to initiate movement north across the open field in a wedge formation. The dismounted element followed approximately 100 meters behind the vehicles. As we moved into the village, we were forced to change movement formations to a column with dismounts leading because the village roads were very constricted. The dismounts could best pull security and direct the gun trucks from the front. SPC Corey Speck, CPL Matthew Eubank, and I were the three lead dismounts and were following a trail of blood through the village that wounded enemy fighters left as they fled.

As we approached a severely restricted northern road that went through the heart of the village, one of the Apache pilots reported that there was a tractor pulling a trailer with two males on it approximately one kilometer north of our location. The trailer was also filled with the bodies of several dead fighters and enemy weapons systems. The pilot reported that he had fired warning shots at the two men on the tractor, and they surrendered immediately by throwing their arms up in the air and remaining still in place.

While we were moving north through the tight maze of mud qalat walls to secure the two EPWs, the entire element had become spread out across over 500 meters of the village. Just as we had the tractor in sight, I sent the three MRAPs forward to the tractor to secure the EPWs and the weapons. Simultaneously, as the vehicles reached the tractor, I heard

gunfire and explosions from the south. I made the wrong assumption that, although the patrol had become spread out, all of my Soldiers had remained with the forward element. I immediately turned to my squad leaders and told them to give me accountability of all of our Soldiers. SGT Ashley reported that he did not know where Speck was. Speck had been maneuvering and clearing qalats with me, but when we pushed to the north end of the village, he was alerted by an ANA soldier to move back to a qalat toward the middle of the village. Speck later explained; "As I was walking, an ANA soldier fired a round in the air to get our attention and signaled for me to come back and help search another qalat that had blood stains on the door."

The pilot came back over the radio and told me he could see four soldiers breaking contact to the northeast of a nearby building. He stated that one of them was severely wounded, possibly KIA, and the other three were carrying him out. I knew that Speck had to be with them, and I prayed that he was not the casualty. Eubank and I both started screaming Speck's name, yelling for him to come to the sound of our voices. The pilot said we were no more than 100 meters apart, but we were separated by several qalat walls. The pilot helped me navigate through the maze of qalat walls to reach the location of the wounded. Finally, after maneuvering through several qalat houses and courtyards, we reached the four-man team that consisted of Speck and three Polish soldiers—one of whom was critically wounded. The casualty had been shot in the body armor enough times to completely destroy his chest plate. He had been shot in the shoulder, upper chest, and armpit. Furthermore, the Polish platoon leader was in the group and had been shot through his shin bone.

After moving the wounded man into a more secure courtyard, I deemed that location the new CCP and radioed for SSG Alden Williams to move to the new CCP. Still under enemy fire from the building, we were able to move all casualties to the new CCP which was far enough away for the Apaches to engage and destroy the building. I gathered accountability of my men, and because the ANA had all fled to the south, I attempted to ensure that the Polish platoon leader had accountability of his men. However, he was in so much pain from his gunshot wound he could not talk. Just before I cleared the pilots to engage the building, one of the other Polish soldiers, through broken English, explained that one of their men had been killed at the doorway, and his body was still inside the enemy-

controlled building. I told the pilot that we could not engage the building and that I was building my 9-line MEDEVAC report.

At this time, we had been in contact with the enemy for over five hours, and the MEDEVAC was en route. We were able to move all of the wounded, which totaled four Polish WIA, including the Polish platoon leader, and two ANA WIA to the HLZ approximately 200 meters from the CCP. The MEDEVAC landed, and we loaded all the casualties on to the choppers. After I helped load the Polish platoon leader onto one of the choppers, he grabbed my arm and, with tear-filled eyes, asked me to promise him that I would recover the body of his fallen soldier. I promised him that we would and prayed that I could deliver that promise.

Soon after the MEDEVAC was complete I learned that the PBG was sending a personnel recovery team to be air-inserted at our location with the sole mission of recovering the KIA in the building. We were able to maintain overwatch on the building but did not have the manpower to assault the building and recover the body. The air QRF landed at about 1600, and I briefed their leader on the terrain and the situation. SPC Speck aided in drawing a small terrain model in the sand to best display the location of the fallen and the layout of the building. We escorted the recovery element to the building and provided overwatch while it entered the building and recovered the body. The enemy had booby-trapped the fallen soldier and abandoned the building. The recovery team very cautiously disarmed the trap and recovered the fallen soldier back to the HLZ.

From the personnel experience monograph written by CPT Marcus Ruzek, the Platoon Leader for 1st Platoon, D Company, TF 1-121. CPT Ruzek's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: Combat is often chaotic, making accountability both a challenge and a necessity as individuals have the potential to become isolated as a result of friendly maneuver, enemy action, or environmental effects. Working with other countries' soldiers further complicates an already complex problem set. The FM 3-50.1, *Army Personnel Recovery*, recognizes the Army works with joint, other service, and government forces to ensure the successful recovery of its own Soldiers, other forces, DOD and other governmental workers, or designated individuals.

In this vignette, elements of Delta Company, TF 1-121 accomplished the personnel recovery tasks of *report*, *locate*, *support*, *recover*, and *reintegrate*, in concert with Polish forces, after accountability of a fallen, isolated Soldier was reported. Their timely *reporting* of the isolated Polish soldier's *location* ensured effective *support* and *recovery* by properly trained and equipped forces. Additionally, U.S. forces and their Polish allies used available means of intelligence and tools, such as maintaining overwatch of the building and constructing a terrain model, to quickly and effectively orient recovery forces to the isolated person's location.

Following an isolating event, personnel recovery is a deliberate effort by forces to safely return isolated personnel to friendly control. The importance of maintaining accountability throughout an operation assists commanders in immediately recognizing when an isolating event occurs, triggering and effectively initiating their personnel recovery response.

CONCLUSION: Throughout history many have asked why soldiers fight. We know why nations fight, but what compels a human being to take up arms against another. Should you ask an American Soldier, he would tell you that he fights for the Soldiers to the left and right of him. Intrinsic to this answer is the knowledge that his brothers would never leave him behind no matter what the situation. In these vignettes we see this truth. Recovery can entail locating and recovering personnel over time and space or can just simply be ensuring that we never leave behind wounded or killed brethren. Either way, the knowledge that we will never give up on him gives him the will to fight.

CHAPTER 16

Human Dimension

In War, the chief incalculable is the human will.

— B. H. Liddell Hart

INTRODUCTION: War is a human endeavor executed by humans who are imperfect. The human dimension encompasses the moral, physical, and cognitive components of Soldier, leader, and organizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ the Army to conduct unified land operations. The last 14 years have seen our Soldiers operate in an era of persistent conflict among people with diverse religious, ethnic, and social values. While our Soldiers have prevailed, we have come to appreciate that we must address the moral, physical, and cognitive development of the force (TRADOC PAM 525-3-7).

In December 2006, MiTT 4074 had been assigned to train a Pershmaga unit, made up of Kurdish soldiers, tasked to defend Kurdistan. In support of Operation Together Forward, popularly known as the Surge, the MiTT persuaded the unit to join the Iraqi Army, reflag as the 1/1/2 Iraqi Army, and deploy south to Baghdad.

Our MiTT was composed of 11 U.S. Soldiers. Each of the six commissioned officers belonged to a different basic branch and trained commanders and staff. The remaining five team members were the noncommissioned officers who came from different MOSs and trained the senior NCOs. Due to their senior ranks, the NCOs on our team were more accustomed to improving their military technical tasks than they were at honing their tactical tasks. For instance, our S-6 was performing high level networking tasks but needed to refresh his basic tasks like using the SINCGARS, the combat radio net. Our medical NCO spent his entire career as a hospital administrator which side-tracked his attention from maintaining his tactical medical skill proficiency. This forced us to borrow a specialist to assist in the immediate treatment of casualties. Additionally, our Transportation and Quartermaster Soldiers were reservists and had no combat logistics experience. Nonetheless, we were a strong team because the Soldiers were motivated, dedicated, and eager to learn their jobs.

Our MiTT, with 1/1/2 IA, was attached to 1-28 Infantry and given the mission of providing security and preventing sectarian violence in the

Baghdad Muhallah (neighborhood) of Hy Al-Amil. The Muhallah was a fiercely contested area, with elements of Jaysh AlMadhi (JAM) and Badr Corps attempting to seize this vital area from Sunni elements in control. The JAM is a Shia paramilitary organization whose main objective was to regain power from the Sunni in Iraq. This presented problems for Coalition forces in Hy Al-Amil because after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the JAM quickly seized control of the area and used sectarian violence to ethnically cleanse the Sunni from Hy Al-Amil. Therefore, the 1-28 Infantry and the 1/1/2 IA began establishing a series of company outposts to improve security and prevent sectarian violence.

By 13 March 2007, we had experienced about two weeks of relative calm; there was not so much as a single round fired in any of the areas in our control. Our battalion had regular positive meetings with local Shia leaders, and they had agreed to cease their violent activities. As a result, we discussed shifting our operations from combat missions to humanitarian missions and planned several missions to improve schools and ways of life for the locals. Those plans did not come to reality. At 1300, immediately following the call for prayer, four separate JAM elements attacked us. All of the COPs were enveloped and attacked simultaneously with RPGs and small arms fire. The strongpoint I occupied, COP Lion, was defended by 9 U.S. Soldiers and over 100 Iraqi soldiers. The JAM elements attacked with fixing fire designed to prevent us from counterattacking to relieve other strongpoints.

For the most part, everyone responded to the attack, but it was obvious we had not rehearsed what to do in the event of an attack. In particular, one advisor misplaced all of his gear and could not assist in the defense. We did not have a clear plan on where to go in the event of an attack, so the more aggressive Soldiers manned the defenses without communication devices or coordinating where they went.

When the attack started, I was in the BN HQ with my Team Leader and S-2 advisor. The Team Leader immediately ran to find the IA BN Commander, and I ran to get my gear from my living quarters. Two other U.S. advisors, the S-2 advisor and the S-6 advisor, and I climbed to the wall to assist the guard towers there. One IA soldier in a guard tower on the roof was shot in the arm by a JAM machine gunner on the street below. I occupied his position while the two U.S. advisors treated and then evacuated him to the aid station. I destroyed the JAM machine gun with

M203 fire and traversed onto the rest of the JAM insurgents who engaged us from the east. The S-2 advisor returned to assist me on the roof, but the S-6 advisor said there was no way he was getting back on the roof and remained in the BN HQ for the rest of the battle. My Team Leader talked with 1-28 elements and tried to arrange CCA support, but CCA was denied at the time due to weather.

After the initial attack, the JAM fire dwindled to sniper fire and sporadic AK bursts. I was able to look around and assess our defense and saw that, with the exception of my Team Leader, the S-1 and S-2 advisors, and me, the rest of the U.S. advisors had returned to their living quarters and were not emerging. The IA soldiers had hunkered down behind fortifications and were not returning fire. The S-2 advisor and I ran from IA position to IA position, trying to get them up and in a position to fight, but most remained hidden.

While I was trying to get the IA soldiers in the fight, we began taking heavy AK fire from the east of the compound. While I was directing fire onto the enemy, a JAM RPG gunner fired and struck a fighting position about one foot from an IA soldier. This explosion took off the IA soldier's head and splattered gore all around him. The natural reaction for everyone was to stop and stare at this horrible sight. The first words from my Team Leader's mouth to the IA BN commander were, "He's dead; worry about him later." The soldiers who heard this were shocked at how callous he sounded, and the S-1 advisor decided he could not be in the same area as the Team Leader and left the roof. The rest of us returned fire on the RPG gunner and destroyed him.

By day's end, when I was able to talk to the rest of the U.S. advisors, I found that they, along with the Iraqi leaders, wanted to return to FOB Liberty, the major U.S. compound in Baghdad. The medic stated he could not take any more mortar fire; other Soldiers stated that because they were not infantrymen, they could not be expected to do an infantryman's job. These were officers who, while professional at their jobs, were not used to the stress of combat. I never expected that I would have to convince U.S. forces to fight, and I spent so much time concerned with the enemy attack that I did not take the time to reassure our own forces.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Christian Carr, who served on Military Transition Team 4074. CPT Carr's monograph can

be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: On 13 March 2007, CPT Carr found himself in the very difficult situation of attempting to defeat a complex attack on his combat outpost as a member of a Military Transition Team (MiTT) advising a newly-formed Iraqi Army (IA) unit. Based on the narrative provided, it appears that CPT Carr's MiTT approached the mission, and this particular engagement, with the correct mindset. The FM 3-07.1, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces*, states that, "This mindset focuses on working by, with, and through foreign security forces to support the host nation's internal defense and development..." It seems clear to me that CPT Carr and his team leader not only participated in the defense of the IA outpost, fighting alongside their host-nation brethren, but also attempted to coach and inspire them, from the IA battalion commander down to the individual Soldier level.

However, this MiTT also experienced some difficulties of its own making. For starters, Chapter 7 (*The Advisor*) of FM 3-07.1, discusses the "Skills of the Advisor." Specifically, it states that, "Advisors should be selected based on subject matter expertise and not just rank." It would appear this principle was violated when selecting personnel for this team, as the author mentions a couple of examples of members of the team not being proficient in their basic Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) skills. Based on how the fight at COP Lion unfolded, it would appear that this issue had significant impacts on both the IA's and MiTT's performance during the fight and their subsequent low morale after the engagement ended. Also, Chapter 5 (*Unit Operations*) of FM 3-07.1 discusses pre-mission training, which basically reinforces the Principles of Unit Training found in ADRP 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*. Several of these principles, including *train as you will fight*, *train to develop adaptability*, and *understand the operational environment*. These principles seem to have been disregarded during this MiTT's pre-deployment training. Members of the team were either incapable (due to a significant lapse in PCCs) or unwilling to participate in the defense of their own outpost. Regardless of MOS or branch, local security and defense are tasks all organizations are responsible for, yet, the pre-deployment training and

preparation of the members of this team obviously did not prepare them physically, mentally, or professionally.

Finally, this team and its IA counterparts failed to apply the Characteristics of the Defense (as per ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*) or the principles of Engagement Area Development (as per FM 3-21.10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*). The result of these lapses in defensive planning and preparation was a demoralizing, albeit ultimately successful, execution of this defensive fight.

In conclusion, the experience of CPT Carr and his MiTT reflect many of the weaknesses inherent in the Military Transition Team construct. Building random, ad hoc groupings of Soldiers from different backgrounds and uncertain skill levels within their MOS is fraught with opportunities for uneven or poor results. The training and trust that must be formed between members of a team conducting such a demanding assignment requires extensive training, teamwork and rapport building, and familiarity with one another's strengths and weaknesses. The absence of these necessary building blocks to success was evident in this team, with serious repercussions to the success of the team and the mission of training their IA counterparts.

In October 2010, Apache Company, 2-4 Infantry, TF Warrior, deployed to the Wardak Province in Afghanistan. TF Warrior became the 4th Brigade's main effort in securing Highway 1 which linked Kabul to southern Afghanistan. Daily, the Taliban brought traffic to a stop with IED attacks, and criminal elements sold protection to many of the Afghan trucks who needed to traverse the highway.

Jaghathu District, located in the desert to the west of Highway 1, was the most remote area in the brigade Area of Operations. The people there made their income attacking U.S. forces in exchange for cash from the Taliban. They grew no crops and had no shops or markets. They did, however, have a series of bunkers, tunnels, trenches, and fortresses from which to ambush U.S. patrols. On the far eastern edge of the mountains lay Awatallah where, for years, the Taliban had stood in the open, in the middle of town, and rained 120-mm rockets onto the U.S. base in Jaghatu.

On 28 April 2011, my commander called me into his office and said, "Prevent the Taliban from firing missiles at the Jaghatu District Center." I asked, "Why today?" He stated that because it was the day the Afghans

threw out the Russians, and he expected the Taliban to celebrate the holiday by rocketing the District Center.

Every time a platoon had gone near Awatallah, the insurgent response had been fierce. To make matters worse, radio communications were almost impossible within the town. Tall mountains encircled three sides of the town, and units had to relay information and requests through units on the mountains or through aircraft if they were available. The Taliban used tunnels and prepared fighting positions to fire mortars and RPGs at any U.S. patrol that periodically ventured into town. The only road into town was seeded with IEDs.

I requested that the 60-mm mortar section be attached to my platoon, but the commander denied this although he did allow me to take the sniper team. I could not take my Platoon Sergeant, as he was the acting First Sergeant while the First Sergeant was away, and the commander had a mission for him, nor could I take my second most experienced NCO because he was involved in a commander's inquiry. I could not interest the ANP officers from our COP, since they refused to go into combat unless they had approval two levels up their command. I was able to convince the brand new Czech Republic training team and a platoon of Afghan soldiers the team was mentoring; however, none of the Czechs had been in combat before.

I went with what I had. My favorite squad leader, SGT Matthew Hermanson, would be there, and I was confident we would kill the Taliban and make it back to the COP again. I also decided to take PVT Anderson on this patrol. Although he was a trained Infantryman, he worked in the kitchen helping the cooks, and I wanted him to get some experience on patrol. I only had MATVs, each capable of holding three dismounts. In the first MATV, the dismounted element consisted of SGT Hermanson, SGT Timothy Gilboe, and PVT Anderson. I was in the second vehicle along with the JTAC, TSgt Andrew Corean, and the sniper team was split between vehicles. After I gave the mission briefing, my four MATVs, one Czech jeep, and one open backed truck of Afghans left for Awatallah, three kilometers away.

We took sporadic rifle fire from insurgents on motorcycles as we crossed the wadis between our base and Awatallah. Two kilometers out, sporadic fire ended and an incredible thunderstorm moved in; the radio crackled that, "air is black." There would be no MEDEVAC possible in this

weather. I decided to circle the trucks and wait out the storm. Once the storm ended and air support was again possible, we moved to a designated overwatch area north of Awatallah, but there was a problem: nobody could see historical rocket and missile launch sites. I relayed this to my commander who ordered us to dismount and move closer to the town. Keeping the vehicles on the high ground to the north, we dismounted and moved into a ridge to allow the dismounts and snipers to see the launch sites.

As soon as the dismounts were in place, we came under fire from the town below, so we quickly moved to protective outcroppings, returned fire, and called in Apaches. Despite the Apaches' presence, the Taliban mortar fire was coming closer and closer; we had identified a spotter in the town but were restricted by our ROE from engaging him. At this point, I went to where SGT Hermanson and SGT Gilboe were fighting and told them we needed a new plan. They agreed, and I told them the way I saw it, we had two options: use the Apaches to finish the fight or take the dismounts in and finish the fight. We decided the latter.

SGT Hermanson and his men, TSgt Corean, and I would be the lead element. We would sweep the small part of town where we had identified a cluster of enemy dead and wounded. The Afghan platoon and the Czech advisors would move behind the U.S. element. The snipers, both American and Afghan, would use the hill we were on to cover our movement, provide overwatch of the objective area, and seal off the town from reinforcements from the south. The Apaches would provide overwatch and continue to look for the mortar team. The trucks in the support by fire line would remain where they were, sealing off the northern side of town.

We moved down the hill and into the village. With the snipers at our backs, the Apaches overhead, and the support by fire line to our right, we felt invincible. I knelt in the last covered and concealed position, and I said, "If I go down, Hermanson, you're in charge. If you go down, Gilboe, you're in charge. Gilboe, if you go down, Corean, you take charge of what is left." With that, we moved up and cleared the first half of the objective area. Just as SGT Gilboe got within ten meters of the first Taliban casualty, I saw the man jump from the ground and begin to stagger away with rifle in hand. It was at that moment that I realized several of the wounded Taliban had been laying on the ground waiting for us: we had been lured into an ambush. My yelling was drowned out by the burst of AK fire that hit SGT Hermanson.

He was shot first. He had seen insurgents in a compound and turned to engage them. Using his own body to protect SGT Gilboe's back, he took bullets for his Soldiers. I ran from behind cover and tried to pull him out of the line of fire, when he shouted, "behind you!" I looked over my right shoulder but saw nothing, so I continued to pull him behind cover. I then looked over to my left and saw the insurgent raising his AK-47. He fired a burst which struck me in my left thigh, instantly shattering eight inches of my femur. I collapsed, and SGT Hermanson fell a few feet away. I saw two insurgents run from behind the man who shot me and head toward SGT Gilboe's location, firing the whole way. Meanwhile, the man who shot me continued to fire long bursts at me and SGT Hermanson; as I tried to crawl over to Hermanson to shield him, I kept telling him, "lay still, lay still, I'm coming over to you." When the insurgent stopped to reload, TSgt Corean stepped out from cover and shot him dead. Corean then threw a hand grenade into the compound, killing one of the insurgents who was running toward SGT Gilboe.

We could all hear SGT Gilboe and PVT Anderson screaming. PVT Anderson, who was serving as SGT Gilboe's ammunition bearer, was shot so many times in the back that his pack caught on fire. SGT Gilboe had expended his last rounds from his 240 machine gun and was desperately trying to put out the burning ammunition strapped to PVT Anderson. SGT Gilboe looked up and saw the last insurgent running toward him and PVT Anderson, so he stood up and rushed the insurgent bare-handed. When the insurgent raised his AK-47, SGT Gilboe reached out, grabbed the barrel, and held it to his own chest, taking three rounds point blank. The rounds shattered the plate carrier he was wearing, breaking his ribs, and bullet fragments tore through both of his thighs. SGT Gilboe forced the insurgent to the ground, mounted him, and began punching and pounding the insurgent's face. SGT Gilboe screamed for PVT Anderson to help him. PVT Anderson, who was still on fire, with ammunition exploding off of him, stood up and walked to him. SGT Gilboe was shouting, "Kill him, Andy; kill him Andy." A single shot from PVT Anderson, and suddenly there was silence.

SGT Hermanson died on the way to the support hospital. They did everything they could do to save him, but the trauma had been too great. He died protecting his men. He is a hero. SGT Gilboe was awarded a Silver Star for his actions. At his award ceremony, he said, "SGT Hermanson was

the real hero; he took bullets for his guys.” PVT Anderson was awarded the Army Commendation Medal with valor device for his actions that day. I spent seven months in Walter Reed recovering from gunshot wounds.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT James Dudley, who served as the Platoon Leader of 1st Platoon, Apache Company, 2-4 Infantry. CPT Dudley’s monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: CPT Dudley was placed in the difficult position of receiving adjusted indirect fire without the authorization to engage the enemy observer with the Apache aircraft that had responded to the contact. In the face of close range, accurate enemy fire, several of CPT Dudley’s men, specifically SGT Hermanson and SGT Gilboe, demonstrated impeccable personal courage. The ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile*, states, “Personal courage is not the absence of fear. It is the ability to put fear aside and do what is necessary”. In addition ADRP 6-22 establishes that, “Physical courage requires overcoming fears of bodily harm and doing one’s duty. It triggers bravery that allows a Soldier to take risks in combat in spite of the fear of wounds or even death.”

TRADOC Pam 525-3-7, *The U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept*, is the newly adopted strategy that the Army is using to train and prepare Soldiers for the rigors of war. It takes into account the cognitive, physical, and moral aspects of a person, and future training will be based on the findings. The near term, 2014-2020, focuses on leader development. The midterm, 2020-2030, focuses more on technology and giving leaner formations a greater capability. The long-term, 2030-2040, will allow for an increase in expeditionary maneuver by an operationally significant force.

Operation Wolf Tip, conducted in the Panjwai District by 1-25 Stryker, in September 2011, was a brigade-sized mission designed to secure Mushan and the rest of the Horn to the west. The main effort consisted of two Infantry companies air assaulting into and clearing the villages of Mushan, Kanozai, and Do’Ab. The decisive point of the operation was the construction of a COP in the village of Do’Ab. The COP was to be named COP Lion because it was the mascot for the Afghan National Army brigade with which 1-25 was partnered.

Mushan, Kanozai, and Do'Ab are the westernmost villages in the Horn; Bravo and Charlie companies of 1-5 IN would clear those villages by conducting the first phase of Operation Wolf Tip, an air assault into the area. Once Alpha Company, 1-5 IN, cleared Do'Ab, the company would build COP Lion and secure it with one platoon. The rest of the Alpha Company would operate out of COP Mushan, an established outpost located six kilometers to the east of COP Lion. My platoon was chosen to seize the location for COP Lion and defend the engineers who were constructing it.

For a grueling ten days, Bravo and Charlie Company, 1-5 IN, cleared their objectives amidst many small arms attacks and IED strikes. Once their clearing was completed, it was our turn to push out to the tip of the Horn and build COP Lion.

The engineer platoon tasked with constructing COP Lion was from the Michigan National Guard. In the first week the engineer platoon was with us, it cleared the land with bulldozers and began the erection of the perimeter wall. Every day, the engineer platoon arrived at COP Lion as the sun rose and would depart as the sun set, spending the nights at COP Mushan along with the remainder of my company. We formed a great working relationship with the engineers during that first week. We would help them with the construction of the perimeter walls, and they would surprise us each morning with cases of energy drinks or some steaks from the cook back at COP Mushan.

During the first week in the Horn, we established a vehicle patrol base in the middle of a field, and during the construction of the perimeter wall, we lived out of our Strykers. They were manned 24/7, and if Soldiers were not patrolling or helping the engineers, they were rotating shifts in the Strykers. My medic, PFC Kelton Thebeau, dug a trench and hung up ponchos for us to use as our bathroom. Although this was not the ideal condition, we were getting comfortable with our new home.

In addition to the COP Lion defense and working with engineers, I led frequent patrols with 12-15 soldiers around Kanozai and Do'Ab to reconnoiter the villages and collect biometrics of the local villagers. As a result of the resistance that our sister companies faced during the clearing portion of Operation Wolf Tip, we were methodical in our patrolling. We ensured our point man used the metal detector to clear the paths for the rest of the Soldiers. If there were to be any interactions or meetings with the

local Afghan people, my Soldiers established a security perimeter beforehand.

On 22 September 2011, I led a small dismounted reconnaissance patrol outside of COP Lion. As with my other reconnaissance patrols, I took 15 Soldiers, including my most experienced squad leader as the assistant patrol leader. My platoon sergeant remained back at COP Lion to maintain security while overseeing the engineers' construction of the third side of the perimeter wall. The purpose of our patrol was to get biometric data from the local Afghans and engage them about the ongoing construction of COP Lion.

We left our patrol base at around 0830, and the first hour of the patrol in Kanozai was quiet. We talked to a few locals and stopped at a few different compounds, but we found many of the locals in this new area were not cooperative. Before heading back to COP Lion, nearly two hours into our patrol, we conducted a KLE at a small local shop. Shop owners were usually knowledgeable with what went on in their village, and we were hoping to gain some intelligence about the village. As the assistant patrol leader, SGT Jesus Ochoa, emplaced security, I brought my RTO, PFC Kevin Brewington; Forward Observer, SGT Brock Webb; and my interpreter, Armani, into the shop to sit down with the handful of locals who loitered there. To demonstrate good faith and build rapport, we purchased a few drinks from the shop owner and had Armani introduce us. I then discussed the new combat outpost that we were constructing to the north. The locals were familiar with the location and repeated to Armani how happy they were that we were here. They mentioned that they had not seen Afghan or American Soldiers in this village for a long time. It did not take long for Armani, PFC Brewington, and SGT Webb to tell me they did not believe a word that the locals were saying, and I agreed with them.

After we logged the villagers' biometrics into the HIIDE system and discovered that none of them were in the system, I decided to continue the patrol. As soon as we left the shop and started on our patrol back to COP Lion, all of the men, besides the shop owner, started walking away in separate directions with a sense of urgency that seemed odd. After noticing the unusual departures, PFC Brewington and I exchanged an uncomfortable look.

We arrived at an intersection that we were required to cross to get back to our base, which was 350 meters north. Very methodically, and with

the metal detector leading the way, my first four Soldiers crossed the intersection without any incident. PFC Brewington and I followed next. We were traveling across the intersection when PFC Brewington stopped, noticing something down the road that was not there on our last patrol. I halted the section. The first four guys who had already crossed the intersection took up hasty security positions while the rear of the formation did the same. Brewington and I kneeled down and used our scopes to check the road, and there seemed to be some more debris across the road a hundred meters up the road. This was different debris from what we had seen earlier in the patrol, and we had not seen this debris when we patrolled this area a few days prior. Knowing that the insurgents usually placed IEDs somewhere in the vicinity of the debris, we took pictures of the location and radioed our grid coordinates to headquarters so that the area could be investigated on a future patrol. Just as I signaled my patrol to continue movement, everything went black.

My face felt like it was on fire, and everything was quiet. My immediate fear was that I was just shot in the face. I remember feeling embarrassed and angry. As I stumbled to the ground, I threw off my glasses and called for a medic. I could not open my eyes, and I felt extremely dazed. My medic, who was in the back of the formation, arrived in seconds. The first thing I asked him was if my face was still there. He assured me it was and started to squirt water on it. All of a sudden I heard the worst words that I have ever heard in my life, "Brewington is in the crater!"

I immediately forgot about the pain I was experiencing when I heard my squad leader yell those words. I pushed the medic away, instructing him to help Brewington. I later learned that PFC Brewington had stepped on a pressure plate IED. For the first time on our deployment, my platoon was in a serious situation, and I felt helpless. I could not stand, I could not see, I started trying to think of ways I could help, and then gunfire erupted; we were taking contact from the rear of our formation.

As I was trying to figure out this situation and regain control, SGT Webb came to where I was on the ground. I told him to use his radio and call in our grid coordinates. I tried to hand him the GPS I had attached on my plate carrier; however, unbeknownst to me, it had been smashed by the blast and was inoperable. Without hesitation, SGT Webb took out his GPS, radioed in our coordinates, and explained the situation. In between machine gun bursts, I could faintly hear the assistant patrol leader, the medic, and

another Soldier working on Brewington. I could also hear my weapons squad leader emplacing security. I kept asking SGT Webb what everyone was doing and what was going on. He told me calmly, “everyone is doing what they are trained to do in this situation.” For the first time since everything went black, I felt a sense of assurance. SGT Webb got on his radio and requested immediate air support. Since the insurgents usually withdrew when they heard the American attack helicopters in the air, SGT Webb’s radio call proved to be extremely beneficial.

Meanwhile, back at COP Lion, as soon as my Platoon Sergeant, SFC Abraham Bitolas, heard the explosion, he immediately assembled a squad. He knew that we were only a few hundred meters south of the COP, but he also knew the obstacles between him and us—Kanozai’s deep grape rows and tall walls—would make evacuating Brewington extremely difficult. With his assembled squad, SFC Bitolas grabbed the engineer operating the bulldozer and explained the situation. Immediately, the bulldozer operator agreed to plow a path from COP Lion towards the blast site. SFC Bitolas had the engineer bulldoze 300 meters through walls, compounds, and a grape field to get to us, with SFC Bitolas’ squad running behind the bulldozer as it plowed its way to us.

Upon their arrival, my patrol was able to put Brewington on a litter and hoist him onto the bulldozer. After Brewington was on the bulldozer, they lifted me onto it. Once I got into the bulldozer, it turned around and started back north. Just as the bulldozer arrived back at COP Lion, the medical evacuation helicopter was landing. I remember two of my squad leaders helping me off of the bulldozer and guiding me to the Blackhawk. As the helicopter took off, I could hear the flight medical crew working on Brewington. Lifting off from COP Lion, a Blackhawk usually will get to the Role 3 at Kandahar Airfield in 25-30 minutes. Role 3 is a large hospital that is capable of treating all combat-related trauma injuries. Brewington and I arrived at the Role 3 at Kandahar Airfield in 22 minutes, only 37 minutes after the blast.

Once at Role 3, PFC Brewington underwent several life-saving surgeries. He didn’t wake up until he arrived at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany two days later. As I lay in my bed at Role 3, I continued to request information on Brewington’s status. Due to the severity of my eye injury, the doctors scheduled my flight to Landstuhl for the next day.

From the personal experience monograph written by CPT Gerard Spinney, who led 1st Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment. CPT Spinney's monograph can be found in the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, Georgia.

DISCUSSION: War is inherently a human endeavor. CPT Spinney's story provides a small glimpse into the mortality Soldiers experience while operating in austere combat environments. It also demonstrates the unknown substance within the human spirit that drives Soldiers, seemingly ordinary men and women, to perform extraordinary actions in the face of extreme adversity.

CPT Spinney's platoon deployed to a hostile environment just south of the Arghandab River in Regional Command-South in Afghanistan. This area is home to a stubborn and determined enemy; Mullah Omar began the Taliban movement just north from where CPT Spinney's unit operated near the Arghandab River. This tough and determined enemy challenged American forces daily which emphasized the need for different branches within our military to interoperate effectively as a part of a larger team. CPT Spinney's Infantry platoon invested the time and effort early in the mission to assist the engineer unit in their efforts to build the COP. Their mission only required them to provide security. This simple act created a bond between the units that enabled their success in the face of the enemy.

When the enemy executed a complex ambush on 22 September 2011, the bond forged earlier in their mission propelled men from both units into action. Soldiers in the engineer unit saw Americans suffer casualties and unhesitatingly committed themselves into the fight to help fallen brothers-in-arms. They did not do it out of hatred towards the enemy or an intense desire to achieve their given task and purpose but, rather, out of a sense of camaraderie and loyalty to each other. The powerful combination of human emotions experienced in combat drove them to act selflessly for the benefit of two Soldiers who needed medical assistance. Throughout our nation's deployments, service men and women repeatedly acted selflessly and courageously for the Soldier, Sailor, Marine, and Airman at their sides simply out of the bonds and loyalties forged in the crucible of combat.

CONCLUSION: While we attempt to study and then define the human dimension, one thing becomes clear—many times it is the indefinable, unquantifiable qualities that impact on a Soldier's performance. Whether

they be loyalty, fear, commitment, or a sense of brotherhood, they are the aspects, the qualities, that make study of this area compelling.

CHAPTER 17

Conclusion

"On August 15, 2007, Hal Moore traveled to Colorado to meet recent veteran soldiers who have returned home alive, but without all their body parts. Many cannot walk. Many cannot hug. Many can hardly think of their futures. General Moore is going to honor and pray for those soldiers. They may not be his men, but they are men and women who paid a deep price to serve our nation. Regardless of his pain and recovery from [recent back] surgery, Hal Moore always is where he is needed the most. Moore reached down and visited with each soldier. With each, fresh tears could be seen. The words were soft, but the hugs were hard. Observation could not reveal who helped whom the most. Moore's last hours spent at [the ranch] were truly memorable, as a six o'clock sunrise greeted him [and a small group] on top of a small summit. The sunrise and the power of the moment took [their] breath away. The world stopped or so it seemed. The last to speak was General Moore.

'As I look upon these plains and mountains, the beautiful sunrise, I see yesterday. I see buffalo roaming the plains and the Indians in their teepees tucked away in the valley. I see an eagle or two flying the skies. I see life hundreds of years ago and now—they are gone, and we are here. They are dust, and soon shall we be dust. What I see here is the temporary nature of all life. All of life is so transitory...I will leave these mountains and this valley knowing that I will soon be with the buffalo and Indians of years past. So will you. Others will soon stand where we stand. May they know the nothingness of this world, the greatness of heaven, the shortness of time, and the length of eternity.'

Yes, the world had stopped."

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GLOSSARY

-A-

AAF	anti-Afghan forces
ABCT	Armored Brigade Combat Team
ABP	Afghan border police
ACP	assault command post
ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment
ADRP	Army doctrine reference publication
AIF	anti-Iraqi Forces
ALP	Afghan local police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Force
AO	area of operation
AOR	area of responsibility
APC	armored personnel carriers
AQI	al Qaeda in Iraq
AQIZ	Zarqawi's al Qaeda in Iraq
ASG	Afghan Security Group
ASR	alternate supply route
AT	antitank
AWT	air weapons team

-B-

BDA	battle damage assessment
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BDE	brigade
BFV	Bradley fighting vehicle
BMNT	begin morning nautical twilight
BN CDR	battalion commander
BN XO	battalion executive officer
BP	battle position
BSO	battlespace owner

-C-

CALFEX	combined arms live fire exercise
CAS	close air support
CASEVAC	casualty evacuation
CAV	Cavalry
CBS	community-based security
CCA	close combat attack
CCP	casualty collection point
CF	coalition force
CO	commanding officer
COIN	counterinsurgency
CoIST	company intelligence support team
COP	command outpost
CP	command post
CRFN	Camp Red Falcon North
CTCP	combat trains command post

-D-

D3A	decide, detect, deliver, and assess
DOD	Department of Defense

-E-

EFP	explosively formed projectile
EKIA	enemy killed in action
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
ETT	Embedded Training Team

-F-

F3EAD	find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate
FLIR	forward-looking infrared
FO	forward observer
FOB	forward operating base
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FS	fire support
FSNCO	fire support noncommissioned officer
FSO	fire support officer

-G-

GBU	guided bomb unit
GFC	ground force commander
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPS	Global Positioning System
GRF	global response force
GRG	grid reference guide

-H-

HA	humanitarian aid
HE	high explosive
HEAT	high-explosive anti-tank
HEDP	high-explosive dual-purpose
HHT	headquarters and headquarters troop
HLZ	helicopter landing zone
HMMWV	high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human intelligence
HVI	high-value individual

-I-

IA	Iraqi Army
ICOM	intercommunications
IDF	indirect fire
IED	improvised explosive device
IIA	inform and influence activities
IP	Iraqi police
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR	infrared
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Forces
ISI	Islamic State of Iraq
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ITAS	improved target acquisition sights

-J-

JAM	Jaysh al-Mahdi
JOC	joint operations center
JSS	joint security station
JTAC	joint terminal attack coordinator

-K-

KIA	killed in action
KLE	key leader engagement

-L-

LAW	light antitank weapon
LD	line of departure
LLVI	low-level voice intercept
LOC	line of communication
LNO	liaison officer
LZ	landing zone

-M-

MATV	mine-resistant, ambush-protected all-terrain vehicle
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
MiTT	military transition team
MOS	military occupational specialty
MPAT-OR	multi-purpose antitank reducing rounds

MRAP	mine resistant ambush protected
MRE	meal, ready to eat
MSR	main supply route
MTVR	medium tactical vehicle replacement

-N-

NAI	named area of interest
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NCOIC	noncommissioned officer in charge

-O-

OAKOC	observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment
ODA	operational detachment-Alpha
OE	operational environment
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OP	observation post
ORP	objective rally point
OPORD	operations order

-P-

PBG	Polish battle group
PCI	pre-combat inspection
PID	positively identify
PL	platoon leader
PSG	platoon sergeant
POO	points of origin

-Q-

QRF	quick reaction force
-----	----------------------

-R-

RC	regional command
RED	risk estimate distance
RIP	relief in place
ROD	remain-over-day
ROE	rules of engagement
RPG	rocket-propelled grenade
RTE	route
RTO	radio telephone operator

-S-

S-1	adjutant (U.S. Army). Battalion or brigade manpower and personnel staff officer (Marine Corps battalion or regiment)
S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-6	signal officer
SALT	situation, activity, location, time
SIGINT	signal intelligence
SINCGARS	Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SITREP	situation report
SOI	Sons of Iraq
SOP	standard operating procedure
SSE	sensitive site exploitation
STX	situational training exercise
SVBIED	suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

SWEAT-MSO sewer, water, electricity, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety and other considerations

SWT scout weapon team

-T-

TAC tactical air coordinator

TACSAT tactical satellite

TBI traumatic brain injury

TF task force

TL team leader

TLP troop-leading procedures

TOA transfer of authority

TOC tactical operations center

TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided

TRP target reference point

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

-U-

UAS unmanned aerial surveillance

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UBL utilization basic load

-V-

VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

-W-

WIA wounded in action

WP white phosphorous

-X-

XO executive officer

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